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A STUDY OF THE IDEOLOGY OF PALESTINIAN 
. ' ARAB NATIONALISM SINCE 19^8 . 
by 
JUDITH NOTTINGHAM 
THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M.A. 
,ABSTRACT 
I n the f i r s t h a l f of the nineteenth century, the predominant 
ideas i n P a l e s t i n e , as i n the r e s t of the Arab world, were of 
freedom from European r u l e . This was gradually achieved, at 
l e a s t formally,, and new ideas of pan-Arabism and u n i t y became 
ascendant. The o l d P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s d i s i n t e g r a t e d 
i n face of the ne^ r^ ideas and the loss of p a r t of Palestine to 
the Jews. 
With the expulsion of many Palestinians t o surrounding countries 
and the establishment of the s t a t e of I s r a e l , ideas of P a l e s t i n i a n 
l i b e r a t i o n developed based upon Thi r d World theories of people's 
war and i n some cases upon Marxism. 
At f i r s t the Arab establishment attempted t o c o n t r o l the new " 
P a l e s t i n i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n some cases a c t u a l l y set them up. 
However, they were eventually taken over by al-Fateh, the most 
powerful and successful of the new g u e r r i l l a groups. Al-Fateh's 
strength was based i n i t i a l l y upon i t s c a r e f u l assessment of the 
s i t u a t i o n - a n d i t s r e f u s a l t o become the creature of any p a r t i c u l a r 
Arab s t a t e . However, i t refused t o commit i t s e l f t o the formation 
of any d e f i n i t e form of P a l e s t i n i a n state i n the event of l i b e r a -
t i o n , and faced growing c r i t i c i s m from more r a d i c a l groups 
dedicated t o the establishment of a s o c i a l i s t Palestine. 
Because of i t s f a i l u r e t o b r i n g about u n i t y between the various 
groups and also because of i t s i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n c e s , al-Fateh 
missed i t s chance of seizing power i n Jordan i n 1969 and was 
h e a v i l y defeated the next year by King Husain's army. I t remains 
to be seen whether the Palestinians w i l l be able t o overcome t h e i r 
d i s u n i t y t o form a more v i a b l e resistance movement i n the f u t u r e . 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Our P a l e s t i n i a n brothers have l o s t almost everything, 
but i n the process they have discovered something 
precious, t h e i r s emi-obliterated P a l e s t i n i a n p e r s o n a l i t y , 
which.the I s r a e l i s and I m p e r i a l i s t s and reactionary 
Jordanian regime have t r i e d t o destroy and which t h e i r 
twenty-year status as displaced persons had threatened." 1 
Since the June War of 1 9 6 7 , i t has become generally recognised, 
even by I s r a e l , t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n resistance movement co n s t i t u t e s 
an important new element i n the Middle East. An I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y 
i n t e l l i g e n c e expert wrote: 
" . . . . a f t e r the downfall of the Arab armies 
the fedayeen a c t i o n gained renown f o r them i n the 
Arab countries and outside, and the Palestinians 
were transformed from an i n f e r i o r f a c t o r i n t o the 
standard-bearer of Arab nationalism and a source of 
p r i d e . " 2 
I t i s the purpose of t h i s t h e s i s t o trace the re-emergence.of 
the Palestinians,,as an organised e n t i t y w i t h a s p e c i f i c a l l y 
P a l e s t i n i a n - o r i e n t e d ideology, from the fragmentation which 
r e s u l t e d from the 1 9 l f 8 war. 
For the purpose of t h i s paper, ideology can be defined as a 
body of i n t e r - r e l a t e d ideas providing a coherent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n both the h i s t o r i c a l and . 
environmental context. Ideologies i n t h i s sense are us u a l l y 
formulated w i t h reference t o a s p e c i f i c group of i n d i v i d u a l s 
w i t h c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common, perhaps a cla s s , a 
r e l i g i o u s community or a n a t i o n . The Ideology explains the 
p o s i t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r group i n the order of things and 
provides them w i t h both long-term and immediate alms. 
1 o Carlos B e l l e , Address t o the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union of Students, 
meeting i n B e r l i n (GDR), March 2 0 t h - 2 6 t h I 9 6 8 . Belle was 
Angolan delegate. 
2 . Y, Harkabi, The P o s i t i o n of the Palestinians i n the I s r a e l i -
Arab C o n f l i c t and t h e i r National Covenant 1 9 6 8 (Translated 
from the Hebrew by J. Kraemer). 
0 
Nationalism may be defined as an ideology which gives a group 
an i d e n t i t y as a n a t i o n , the members of which have common 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and h i s t o r y . Once i d e n t i f i e d , the na t i o n i s 
provided w i t h c e r t a i n aims f o r which a l l members of the group 
must s t r i v e . The e f f o r t t o r e a l i s e t h e i r common destiny then 
f u r t h e r u n i t e s the members of the nat i o n i n t o a recognisable 
• e n t i t y . 
P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism o f f e r s the Palestinians an explanation 
of the s i t u a t i o n i n which they found themselves a f t e r the 19^8 
war. I t also gives them an end f o r which they can s t r i v e , the 
l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r country, and the means f o r achieving t h i s , 
armed s t r u g g l e . 
Since no ideology can e x i s t i n i s o l a t i o n from the m a t e r i a l world 
which i t . s e e k s t o e x p l a i n , i t i s necessary t o consider i n some 
d e t a i l , the context w i t h i n which P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism arose. 
Thus a large p a r t of the t h e s i s i s devoted to an h i s t o r i c a l account 
.of the Palestinians and the forms of organisation they adopted 
a f t e r 19^8 . 
At the same time, no ideology i s . t o t a l l y unaffected by the 
ideas which preceded i t or those which developed concurrently i n 
oth e r . p a r t s of the world, e s p e c i a l l y since the development of 
mass communication. I t i s ther e f o r e necessary to understand the 
ideas predominant i n the Arab world before ^^k8 and the circum-
stances which produced them. This i s the subject of the f i r s t 
chapter. 
During the 1 9 5 0 s , P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism as such was obscured 
by the r i s e of new forms of pan-Arab o r i e n t e d nationalism and 
t h i s period i s covered i n chapter two. Chapters three t o f i v e 
deal w i t h the re-emergence of P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism, the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s through which i t was expressed, and the d i f f e r e n t 
trends which developed w i t h i n i t . 
The s i x t h chapter i s a discussion of the i d e o l o g i c a l differences 
between these trends. I t attempts t o assess and compare the 
main r i v a l t h e o r i e s , f i r s t as coherent and i n t e r n a l l y consistent 
bodies of thought and second, w i t h respect t o t h e i r relevance 
to the s i t u a t i o n they attempt to' e x p l a i n . The guide to ac t i o n 
each provides i s judged according t o i t s success i n p r a c t i c e , 
u n t i l the crushing of the resistance i n September 1 9 7 0 . 
CHAPTER ONE: PALESTINE' BEFORE 1950 
Background 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, c e r t a i n sections 
of the Arab i n t e l l i g e n t s i a w i t h i n the Ottoman empire developed 
a desire f i r s t f o r Arab autonomy in s i d e the empire and l a t e r 
f o r complete Arab Independence. Palestine at t h i s time was a 
recognised geographical area w i t h i n the province of Syria. S t i l l 
under nominal Turkish r u l e , Syria suffered severely from the 
neglect and c o r r u p t i o n which characterised the f i n a l stages of 
Ottoman decline. Before the f i r s t World War the boundaries of 
the area known as Palestine included both present-day I s r a e l and 
Jordan. 
The Arabs recognised the existence of d i f f e r e n t regions w i t h i n 
t h e i r world but the I d e a l f o r which they strove was an 
undivided Arab e n t i t y . Neguib Azoury, a one-time a s s i s t a n t to 
the Ottoman•Governor of Jerusalem and an ardent Arab n a t i o n a l i s t 
d efined Palestine as 
". . . . divi d e d i n t o three d i f f e r e n t 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e spheres. A l l of the TransJordan 
area i s dependent on the Governor General of 
Damascus. The CisJordan area (north) . . . i s 
l i n k e d t o t h a t o f B e i r u t , the p a r t below t h i s 
depends on the Governorate of Jerusalem, which, 
because of the problem of sanctuaries. I s 
.' s i m i l a r t o a" Governorate General and corresponds 
d i r e c t l y w i t h Constantinople. The whole area 
between Beersheba and Mt. S i n a i and the Suez 
Canal has belonged to Egypt since the Treaty 
of London i n iS^fO." 1 
Azoury thus Included not only I s r a e l and Jordan to be i n the 
area c a l l e d Palestine but also the Sinai peninsula. 
The Middle East i n the nineteenth century saw a s i g n i f i c a n t 
change i n ideas beginning w i t h the desire to reform Islam and 
I t s i n s t i t u t i o n s by a r e t u r n t o the basic essentials of the 
Qur'an. 2 Other attempts were made to save the empire by 
moderate c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform and modernisation along European 
l i n e s . The f a i l u r e of these attempts l e d to the r i s e of the 
Young Ottoman movement, comprised of several c l a n d e s t i n e l y 
1.. Azoury, Le Reveil de l a Nation Arabe pp. ^ 2 - 3 . T r a n s l a t i o n 
by the author. 
2.. A l b e r t Houranl, Arabic Thought i n the L i b e r a l Age chapters 
1-9,, e s p e c i a l l y chapter 9 . 
organised groups seeking more r a d i c a l change. 1 The movement, 
which included both Arabs and Turks came t o power i n 1908 through 
a successful r e v o l u t i o n and f o r some time i t seemed the empire 
might regenerate i t s e l f from w i t h i n . This era was accompanied 
by the Arabs' desire f o r autonomy inside a reformed empire. 
A f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n the appearance o f a ra b i d form of 
Turkish n a t i o n a l i s m caused the new government t o undertake a 
p o l i c y of ' T u r k i f i c a t i o n ' , imposing Turkish as the o f f i c i a l 
language, even i n pure l y Arab areas. The naissant grievances 
of the Arabs were consequently transformed i n t o a str u g g l e f o r 
independence and e x i s t i n g theories of Arab nationalism were 
developed and extended i n defence of the Arab i d e n t i t y . 2 
An almost p a r a l l e l development, of which l i t t l e n o t i c e was 
taken at the time, was the growth of the Z i o n i s t movement i n 
Europe. I n . t h e l a t e nineteenth century the movement approached 
the Ottoman Sultan i n the hope of persuading him t o allow 
Jewish .immigration t o Palestine i n r e t u r n f o r the settlement 
of h i s f i n a n c i a l problems. Although o f f i c i a l l y refused per-
mission, several settlements of new Jewish immigrants were 
established i n Palestine before the t u r n of the century, 
b r i n g i n g the t o t a l Jewish community t o near l y 10 per cent of 
the population as a whole. 
. Arab n a t i o n a l i s m was e s s e n t i a l l y c u l t u r a l and l i n q u i s t i c 
i n character. I t took l i t t l e account of the r i s e of Zionism. 
I t s aims were vague and simple - independence, u n i t y and an 
op p o r t u n i t y f o r the Arab n a t i o n t o express i t s e l f . Only Azoury 
seemed t o r e a l i s e the p o t e n t i a l danger of the Z i o n i s t movement, 
and he had l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
as a whole. He,wrote i n 1905, 
"Two important phenomena of a s i m i l a r but 
opposite nature ... are manifesting them-
selves at t h i s time i n A s i a t i c Turkey. These 
are the r e b i r t h of the Arab n a t i o n and the 
l a t e n t e f f o r t , of the Jews t o r e b u i l d on a very 
large scale the ancient kingdom of I s r a e l . 
These two movements are destined to f i g h t each 
other c o n t i n u a l l y u n t i l one of them triumphs 
over the other." 3 
1 . Zeine N Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism chapters 1 - ^ . 
2. i b i d chapter ^, Eourani, o p _ c i t , pp. 26O-83. 
3o Azoury, OP c i t . p. V I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
By 1913 J the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s had formed a number of secret 
s o c i e t i e s t o forward t h e i r aims w i t h i n both the c i v i l and m i l i t a r y 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Ottoman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Student sympathisers 
abroad h e l d a congress i n Paris t h a t year i n support o f Arab 
independence from the Turks. 1 
Arab, nat i o n a l i s m was t h e r e f o r e the main p o l i t i c a l f o r c e 
a f f e c t i n g Palestine before the f i r s t World War. Although the 
Z i o n i s t movement had ambitions to e s t a b l i s h a state t h e r e , i t 
had hot become a t h r e a t t o the Inhabitants of the area. Both 
these movements had t o decide t h e i r a t t i t u d e s to the collapse 
of the Ottoman empire, and i n t h i s they were not alone. The 
European powers had long been tro u b l e d by the 'Eastern Question', 
t h a t i s t o say, how best to assure t h e i r continued in f l u e n c e 
i n ' t h e area. The f i r s t World War-was the arena i n which the 
d i v i s i o n of the s p o i l s was eventually decided. B r i t a i n , made 
use of every a v a i l a b l e means t o ensure possession of the 
spheres of Influence i t desired. I t simply promised a l l 
i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s what they most wanted i n r e t u r n f o r t h e i r 
support i n the war. The Arabs were promised Independence, 
the French Syria and Lebanon and the Z i o n i s t s Palestine. 
The agreement w i t h the French, undertaken s e c r e t l y i n 1916 , 
became known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 2 The promise to 
the Arabs, undertaken i n 1915 and 1916 , was contained i n a 
series of l e t t e r s between Sherlf Husain, the r u l e r of Hejaz, 
and S i r Henry MacMahon. 3 Another l e t t e r from Lord Balfour 
t o Lord Rothschild i n November 1917 contained the promise to 
the Z i o n i s t s . I t stated i n p a r t , 
"His Majesty's Government view w i t h favour 
the establishment i n Palestine of a n a t i o n a l 
. . home f o r the Jewish people ..." 5 
1. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, passim. Hassan Sa'ab 
The Arab F e d e r a l i s t s of the Ottoman Empire, passim. 
2 . Woodv/ard and B u t l e r (Eds), Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign 
P o l i c y 1919-19^9. 1 s t s e r i e s . Vol. 4, pp. 21+1-251. 
This was a t r i p a r t i t e agreement, the t h i r d p a r t y being 
Russia. Antonius, op c i t . Appendix B. pp. M-28-30. 
3 . G.B., Parliamentary Papers. Cmd 597^ . Antonius, op c i t . 
Appendix B. pp. M-1.^ -27. 
ko Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s . 
5 , The Times 19 th November .1917 . 
These promises, though perhaps c o n f l i c t i n g , e x h i b i t e d a 
c e r t a i n l o g i c a l consistency i n t h a t they were a l l designed 
t o promote B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . The promise t o the French was 
honoured i n the peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . The r e s u l t a n t system of 
• mandates, conferred by the newly-formed League of Nations, 
d i v i d e d Syria between the B r i t i s h and the French, the 
northern region (present-day Syria and Lebanon) going t o 
France and Palestine ( i n c l u d i n g present-day Jordan) going t o 
the B r i t i s h who also held the mandate f o r I r a q . 
The promises t o the. Z i o n i s t s were also honoured. The terms 
of the Balfour Declaration were incorporated i n t o the 
Palestine mandate and even b e f o r e . i t was l e g a l l y i n e f f e c t , 
the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Government permitted an increase i n 
Jewish immigration and the establishment of Jewish p o l i t i c a l 
and ec onomic i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The promises t o the Arabs were never honoured. Sherif Kusain 
persuaded the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s t o support h i s 1916 r e v o l t 
against the Turks because he believed the l e t t e r he had 
received from MacMahon had promised complete independence 
• f o r thfe whole Arab world i n c l u d i n g Syria. 1 However, the 
wording of the correspondence proved s u f f i c i e n t l y vague f o r 
wi d e l y d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to be placed upon i t . 2 
When h o s t i l i t i e s ended i n a B r i t i s h v i c t o r y , the Arab 
army, under Sh e r i f Husain's son, F a i s a l , established a 
p r o v i s i o n a l government i n Damascus u n t i l Syria could form a 
permanent Arab government on a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and l e g a l basis. 
F a i s a l administered Syria i n t h i s way f o r two years during 
the peace n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n s p i t e of the presence of the 
B r i t i s h and French armies on pa r t of the t e r r i t o r y . 
As the^peace n e g o t i a t i o n s drew to a close, i t became 
i n c r e a s i n g l y obvious t h a t the European powers had no 
i n t e n t i o n of al l o w i n g Syria t o achieve e i t h e r independence 
or u n i t y . I n an attempt t o f o r e s t a l l Syria's d i v i s i o n and 
su b j e c t i o n to Europe. An Arab n a t i o n a l i s t congress i n 1920 
declared F a i s a l k i n g . He re t a i n e d t h i s p o s i t i o n f o r only a 
1. Antonius. OP c i t . passim. 
2 . For the Arab case see W.F. Boustani, The Palestine Mandate, 
I n v a l i d and I m p r a c t i c a l , pp. 3 8 - ^ 7 . 
few months f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of the mandates. I n 
J u l y 1 9 2 0 , the French army marched i n t o Damascus and ejected 
F a i s a l ' s government, w e l l aware t h a t the B r i t i s h would do 
nothing t o stop them. The B r i t i s h were occupied w i t h 
c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n Palestine, which they 
l a t e r i n s i s t e d was excluded from the area promised indep-
endence by MacMahon. 1 , 
To compensate F a i s a l f o r h i s rough treatment at the 
hands of the French, the B r i t i s h made him head of s t a t e i n 
I r a q . The advance of Faisal's brother, 'abdallah, coming 
f r om the south w i t h an army t o defend Damascus, was also 
e f f e c t i v e l y stopped. The B r i t i s h o f f e r e d him the p o s i t i o n 
o f head o f s t a t e i n the area of Palestine east of the 
River Jordan, i f he stopped h i s march there. This region 
subsequently Became TransJordan, and was excluded from 
the area.included i n the Palestine Mandate which was 
destined t o become the n a t i o n a l home of the Jews. 
Arab P o l i t i c a l Organisation i n Palestine 
This vras the h i s t o r i c a l context w i t h i n which Arab 
p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n developed i n Palestine. I t was 
rooted i n the pre-war pan-Arab movement f o r independence 
and u n i t y , but soon adapted to the s p e c i f i c conditions 
p r e v a i l i n g i n Palestine I t s e l f . The pan-Arab trend con-
tinu e d i n P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c s and was eventually c r y s t a l l i s e d 
i n one of several p a r t i e s formed i n the 1 9 3 0 s , the I s t i g l a l 
(Independence) Party. 2 
1 . I b i d . 
2. The I s t i q l a l was r e a l l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n of one of the 
pre-war Arab secret s o c i e t i e s , . a l - H i z b al-'ahd (The 
Party of the Pact). I t took the name I s t i q l a l during 
the war. With the subsequent d i s i l l u s i o n caused by 
the i m p o s i t i o n o f the mandates, i t ceased t o operate 
i n an organised way u n t i l i t s regeneration i n the 
1 9 3 0 s . . 
This was a r e l a t i v e l y progressive f o r c e , representing the 
r i s i n g middle c l a s s , and e s s e n t i a l l y a n t i - B r i t i s h r a ther 
than a n t i - Z i o n i s t . I t s membership included many who had 
been members of Faisal's s h o r t - l i v e d Damascus government, 1 
and others prominent i n the economic l i f e of the country. 2 
The I s t i q l a l was very a c t i v e i n the Arab i n s u r r e c t i o n of 1936 
against the B r i t i s h . As. a r e s u l t , i t faced the death, e x i l e 
or imprisonment of most of i t s leaders and the disappearance 
of i t s more r a d i c a l elements, whether through t h e i r p h ysical 
or psychological d e s t r u c t i o n . Those who remained a l i v e were 
d i s p i r i t e d and the p a r t y never recovered. 3 The f i n a l blow 
came w i t h the establistiment of the Arab League i n 19^5* ^ 
For the f i r s t time, Arab u n i t y was given a formal and l e g a l 
mode of expression. Since many Arab states had, by t h i s time, 
a t t a i n e d independence from d i r e c t c o l o n i a l r u l e , the I s t i q l a l 
l o s t i t s r a i s o n d'etre. 
By the end of the 1920s a s p e c i f i c a l l y Palestine o r i e n t e d 
n a t i o n a l i s m had developed represented i n two r i v a l p a r t i e s , 
al-Hizb a l - ' a r a b i (The Arab Party) c o n t r o l l e d by the Eusseini 
f a m i l y , and Eizb ad-Difa' (The Defence P a r t y ) , c o n t r o l l e d 
by the Nashashibi f a m i l y . 5 Apart from family, r i v a l r y , the 
main d i f f e r e n c e between these two p a r t i e s l a y i n the methods 
they used t o achieve e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r o b j e c t i v e s , 
1. For example, the party's leader, Auni 'abd-al-fladi, was 
Fai s a l ' s secretary. Further examples can be found i n 
"Arabs' Wiio's Who," Co l o n i a l O f f i c e Papers. CO / 7 3 3 / 2 W 
176935'Shaikh Kamal Kassab: 'One of the e a r l i e s t members 
of the pan-Arab movement - was president of the National 
Defence Committee i n Damascus under F a i s a l and was a 
prominent leader i n the movement against the French." 
2 . For example: Rashid H a j j Ibrahim: "Member of the I s t i q l a l 
p a r t y . He i s manager of the Arab Bank i n Haifa ... president 
of the Arab Chamber of Commerce i n Haifa." I b i d . (Arabs' 
Who's Who was compiled f o r the i n t e r n a l use of the 
5'" C o l o n i a l O f f i c e ) . 
3 . J. Hurewitz, The Struggle f o r Palestine^ p.82. 
k. The League was established w i t h B r i t i s h approval. C e c i l 
Hourani, "The Arab League i n Perspective", MEJ Vol. 1 
No. 2 , p. 129 . 
5 . D e t a i l s of these two p a r t i e s can be found i n Kurewitz, 
op c i t , passim, and M.E.T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman, 
passim. 
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independence from B r i t i s h r u l e , an end to Jewish Immigration, 
an end of the sale of land t o the Jews and rep u d i a t i o n of the 
Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n . While the 'extremist' Husseinis refused 
to co-operate w i t h the B r i t i s h i n any way, the 'moderate' 
Nashashlbis attempted t o achieve t h e i r ends by compromise 
and argument w i t h the a u t h o r i t i e s . 
The Husseinis were by f a r the most popular, l a r g e l y because 
of t h e i r c o n t r o l over the r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s of Islam 
which gave them immense psychological and f i n a n c i a l advantages. 
The most prominent p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e during the mandate was 
H a j j Amln al-PIusseini ,il:', president of the Supreme Muslim 
Council 2 and M u f t i 3 of Jerusalem. He became undisputed 
Arab leader i n every period of c r i s i s . 
I n s p i t e of considerable popular support, which could be 
r a l l i e d whenever necessary, both the Arab and Defence p a r t i e s 
f a i l e d t o organise or educate t h e i r supporters. They repre-
sented the t r a d i t i o n a l semi-feudal and middle class i n t e r e s t s . 
The idea of delegating any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e i r f o l l o w e r s 
was u t t e r l y f o r e i g n t o them. 
1. H a j j Amln was born i n the l890s,. the son of Tahir a l -
Husseini, M u f t i of Jerusalem. He was educated i n 
Tur k i s h schools and at al-Azhar i n Cairo. During the 
f i r s t World War he was an o f f i c e r i n the Turkish army 
u n t i l 1917 when he went t o Jerusalem t o r e c r u i t volunteers 
f o r F aisal's Arab army. By 1919j r e a l i s a t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s 
r e a l i n t e n t i o n s f o r Palestine reached the Arabs by v/ay 
of the Peace Conference and from being very p r o - B r i t i s h , 
H a j j Amin became an important n a t i o n a l i s t f i g u r e , help-
i n g t o organise the f i r s t Arab Congress. During the , 
disturbances of 1920, when F a i s a l was declared King of 
S y r i a , H a j j Amin's inflammatory speeches against the 
B r i t i s h made i t necessary for.him t o f l e e to Damascus 
and then TransJordan. He was amnestied by the B r i t i s h 
a f t e r a short time, but h i s name remained on t h e i r p o l i c e 
f i l e s . C o l o n i a l O f f i c e Papers, op c i t . E l i e Kedourie, 
" S i r Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine," 
MES V0I5. pp. 50-69. 
2 . The Council was set up by the B r i t i s h f o r the admini-
s t r a t i o n of the Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d i n g Muslim 
c h a r i t i e s , p r o p e r t i e s and t r u s t s . I t also appointed 
judges ( q a d i s ) . 
3. Religious leader. 
I n a d d i t i o n t o these various n a t i o n a l i s t forces, there was 
a small communist p a r t y and labour movement, both of which 
reached the height' of t h e i r p o p u l a r i t y during the second 
World War, when the Communists enjoyed a b r i e f period of 
l e g a l i t y . 1 The p a r t y had both Arab and Jewish members and 
consequently at every p o i n t of c r i s i s s p l i t along communal 
l i n e s . 2 I t o f f i c i a l l y supported the a n t i - B r i t i s h i n s u r r e c t i o n 
i n 1936, although most of the Jewish members s p l i t away or 
l e f t as a r e s u l t . 3 During t h i s period i t had q u i t e strong 
l i n k s w i t h the . I s t i q l a l p a r t y , k 
Arab P o l i t i c a l A c t i v i t y i n Palestine 
The-1936 i n s u r r e c t i o n was the high point of Arab p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y i n P a l e s t i n e , but i n s o f a r as i t was organised at a l l , 
i t owed very l i t t l e t o H a j j Amin or any other recognised 
p o l i t i c a l leader. I t sprang from.a peasant movement l e d by 
a l i t t l e - k n o w n r e l i g i o u s preacher. Shaikh 'az ad-Din al-Qassam. 5 
1 o Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism i n the Middle 
East, p. 109. 
2 . i b i d , pp. 77=110. M a r t i n Ebon, "Communist Tactics i n 
P a l e s t i n e " MEJ Vol 2 No 3 passim. Yehoshua Porath, 
"Revolution and Terror i n the PCP 1929=39" New East 
Vol 18 Nos "^-k, passim. 
3. Laqueur op. c i t , p. 110. 
^. * This was l o g i c a l since, i n semi-feudal s o c i e t i e s , nev; 
middle class p a r t i e s are progressive f o r c e s , and as such 
the Communists are u s u a l l y prepared t o enter a l l i a n c e s 
w i t h them. 
5. Al-Qassam s t a r t e d preparing f o r armed struggle i n 1928, 
i n the b e l i e f t h a t any r e v o l u t i o n should depend upon the 
organised peasants and workers and t h a t popular f e e l i n g 
was not enough t o l i b e r a t e a country. He thought the 
e x i s t i n g leaders incapable of the task, and thus began 
organising a clandestine, p r i n c i p l e d , r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
movement based e s s e n t i a l l y on Islamic b e l i e f s . I n 1928 
he asked H a j j Amin t o appoint him as a t r a v e l l i n g preacher 
so t h a t he could move about the country t o gather 
f o l l o w e r s . H a j j Amin refused and al-Qassam continued 
on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e . By 1935 h i s group numbered 200, 
mainly peasants.and workers from the slums of Haifa. He 
launched h i s armed struggle i n November of t h a t year. 
N a j i ' a l l u s h , al-Maqawamah al°'arabiyyah f i F a l a s t i n 
1917-19^8 DP. 101-^. 
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Once the i n s u r r e c t i o n was underway, the p o l i t i c a l leaders had no 
a l t e r n a t i v e but t o assume c o n t r o l of i t and accept i t as t h e i r 
own. 1 Al-Qassam was k i l l e d very soon a f t e r he began operations 
i n November 1935, and h i s death was mourned throughout the 
country. 2 His f o l l o w e r s continued t h e i r a c t i v i t y , p r e c i p i t a t -
i n g a.general s t r i k e i n A p r i l 1936 which was country-wide and 
threatened t o take the i n i t i a t i v e from, the p o l i t i c a l leaders. 
A l l p a r t i e s t h e r e f o r e q u i c k l y endorsed the s t r i k e and a few 
days l a t e r u n i t e d t o form a ten-man Executive, al-Hayah a l -
'arablyyah a l - ' u l l a h (The Higher Arab Committee) which, then 
took c o n t r o l of the subsequent i n s u r r e c t i o n . 3 A f t e r s i x 
months the Higher Committee c a l l e d o f f the s t r i k e i n face of 
a plea from several Arab Heads of State assuring the 
Pal e s t i n i a n s of B r i t a i n ' s "good i n t e n t i o n s " , h 
Armed str u g g l e broke out again i n 1937 a f t e r a Royal Com-
mission of Enquiry chaired by Lord Peel, recommended the 
p a r t i t i o n of Palestine i n t o Jewish and Arab areas, as the 
best s o l u t i o n . 5 The i n s u r r e c t i o n l a s t e d three<;=years i n a l l , 
d uring which time a l l Arab p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were 
declared i l l e g a l and most of the leaders imprisoned or de-
ported. Only the Nashashibls co-operated w i t h the B r i t i s h 
and consequently l o s t v i r t u a l l y a l l the support they had. 
The Plusselnis and those I s t i q l a l leaders who escaped deport-
a t i o n , f l e d t o the surrounding countries and set up bases 
from which they t r i e d t o continue t o d i r e c t the i n s u r r e c t i o n . 
1. John Marlowe, Rebellion i n Palestine^ p. 152. 
2. C o l o n i a l O f f i c e Papers. " P o l i t i c a l Events i n 1935 and 
1936 down t o Outbreak of Disorders", memo by the Govern-
ment of Palestine t o the Permanent Mandates Commission 
1936, CO/733/287/75031/2 p. 3 para. 19. 
3. This u n i f i c a t i o n was e f f e c t e d on the i n i t i a t i v e of 
Rashid H a j j Ibrahim, a member of the I s t i q l a l (see 
p.8 fn . 2 ). The Higher Committed f o r most of i t s 
existence was under the c o n t r o l of the Husseinis. 
*f. Notes were sent t o the Higher Committee by Emir 'abdallah 
of TransJordan, King Ghazi of I r a q and Abd al-Aziz of 
Saudi Arabia, asking t h a t the s t r i k e be ended. 
5. .G.B., Parliamentary Papers. CM 5*+79. 
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For a time, i n 1938, the B r i t i s h appeared t o have l o s t a l l 
a u t h o r i t y over the country 1 but they u l t i m a t e l y reasserted 
c o n t r o l , p a r t l y by f o r c e , and p a r t l y by making p o l i t i c a l con-
cessions. 2 I n a d d i t i o n , the Husseini-Nashashibi r i v a l r y 
began t o degenerate i n t o a c i v i l war, which s e r i o u s l y under-
mined Arab morale. 3 
By the second World War, the P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs were i n a 
very weak p o s i t i o n , t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s smashed, 
t h e i r leaders i n e x i l e , t h e i r arms supplies exhausted. I n 
a d d i t i o n , Jewish immigration had brought the Jewish population 
t o 30% of the t o t a l . When war a c t u a l l y broke out many of 
the e x i l e d Arab leaders worked i n Germany i n a n t i - B r i t i s h 
propaganda, k H a j j Amin played a prominent r o l e i n t h i s . 5 
When the War ended the B r i t i s h began t o consider withdrawing 
from P a l e s t i n e . This e n t a i l e d reaching some kind of com-
promise formula w i t h both Arab and Jewish communities and 
consequently many deported leaders were allowed t o r e t u r n . 
H a j j Amin, who had been in t e r n e d i n France, mysteriously 
escaped t o Cairo a t the end of 19^6, and though s t i l l banned 
from P a l e s t i n e , began to reorganise h i s supporters from 
Egypt. 
1. G.B., The P o l i t i c a l H i s t o r y of Palestine under the 
B r i t i s h A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , memo to UNSCOP. Ju l y 19^7. 
pp. 20-21. 
2. I n May 1939? the B r i t i s h Government issued a White 
Paper which acceded t o many of the Arabs' demands. I t 
promised independence a f t e r ten years and an end t o 
Jewish immigration, except w i t h Arab consent, a f t e r 
f i v e . Cmd 6019. 
3. ' a l l u s h , op c i t , pp. 126-33« 
This was l o g i c a l under the circumstances since most of 
them had spent three years a c t i v e l y f i g h t i n g the B r i t i s h 
i n the 1930s. On the other hand, i t should be noted 
t h a t the communists had also fought i n the 1936 
. i n s u r r e c t i o n but during the second V/orld War. devoted 
much energy to a n t i - f a s c i s t propaganda, e s p e c i a l l y 
a f t e r Germany invaded the US£R. 
5o Maurice Pearlman, The M u f t i of Jerusalem, passim. 
•Joseph B. Schechtman, The M u f t i and the Feuhrer, passim. 
Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Th i r d Reich and the Arab East, 
pp. 312-3. H a j j Amin himself says t h a t he collaborated 
w i t h Germany as a st a t e though he di d not support 
Nazism as a do c t r i n e . Jacques Derogy and Edouard Saab, 
Les Deux Exodes, pp. l83-lf. 
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The s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e d from t h a t of the 1930s i n many ways, 
not l e a s t of which was the emergence of the newly independent 
Arab states and the Arab League. The League'supported fiajj 
Amin, not only because he was the l o g i c a l choice as a f i g u r e -
head f o r P a l e s t i n e , but also because of the r i v a l r y between 
Egypt, supported.by the other s t a t e s , and the Hashemites of 
TransJordan. The League feared Emir 'abdallah's ambitions 
f o r leadership of a 'Greater Syria*. Thus, as 'abdallah was 
supporting the ^moderates' i n Palestine, 1 the League 
n a t u r a l l y backed H a j j Amin. 
The a l l i a n c e was mutually necessary, since. H a j j Amin had 
l o s t the Supreme Muslim Council 2 as a source of f i n a n c i a l 
and psychological power and was obliged t o t r u s t i n appeals 
to n a t i o n a l sentiment f o r popular support, and the Arab 
League f o r m a t e r i a l support. 
I n the course of 19^7 i t became i n c r e a s i n g l y clear t h a t 
P alestine would be p a r t i t i o n e d . B r i t a i n submitted the 
question t o the United Nations, leaving the Arab case t o 
. be defended by the new Arab s t a t e s , inexperienced i n i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l diplomacy. They l o s t from the beginning, when the 
UN, c o n t r a r y t o t h e i r wishes, i n s i s t e d on sending a Com-
mission of Enquiry t o Palestine. 3 I n November 19^-7 the 
UN f o r m a l l y adopted a r e s o l u t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n w i t h economic 
union of Arab Palestine t o TransJordan. k 
1. The remnants of the Nashashibi Defence Party, and 
another small, p a r t y which took the same l i n e , the 
Reform Party of Dr. K h a l i d i . 
2 . See above p. 9 f n . 2 . 
3 . The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine 
.: (UNSCOP) was the l a s t i n a long l i n e of commissions 
of enquiry sent t o Palestine t o i n v e s t i g a t e the 
various 'disturbances' which occured during the man-
date. The Arabs were t o t a l l y d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h 
such commissions and wanted the question of indepen-
dence f o r Palestine judged on i t s m e r i t s . 
UN,, GA OR F i r s t Special Session Vol I . pp. 122-77. 
k. TransJordan was not a member of the UN a t t h i s time, 
which saved 'abdallah the embarrassment of v o t i n g . 
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Even before November, the Palestinians had begun to pre-
pare f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n t o prevent the implementation of 
p a r t i t i o n . The Higher Committee h a s t i l y organised a m i l i t a r y 
f o r c e from wherever possible 1 and by the end of 19^7 had 
.formed a s o r t of army, Al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (The Holy War). 
This army began operations i n November" and by March 19^8 
the P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs had c o n t r o l of much of the country. 
The f o l l o w i n g month, however, as the B r i t i s h completed t h e i r 
w ithdrawal, they began t o lose ground t o the Jewish forces. 
The P a l e s t i n i a n s ' most important m i l i t a r y leader, 'abd-al-
Oadir al-Husseinl 2 was k i l l e d i n m i d - A p r i l 3 and from t h a t 
time the. s i t u a t i o n d e t e r i o r a t e d r a p i d l y f o r the Arabs'. 
Many f l e d the country t o the safety of neighbouring s t a t e s . 
The defeat of the Palestinians had many causes. Their 
o r g a n i s a t i o n had. never f u l l y recovered, m a t e r i a l l y or 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , from the 193^ i n s u r r e c t i o n . Moreover, 
they had become dependent on the Arab League f o r arms and 
ammunition, k and t h i s material' support was withdrawn a t a 
c r i t i c a l moment. 5 As i n the 1930s, t h e i r ranks were 
weakened by i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n and lack of c e n t r a l c o n t r o l . 6 
1. There was already i n existence the m i l i t a r y arm of the 
Arab Party, al-Futuwwah (The Youth) l e d by Kamal Arakat. 
• This had been set up i n 1935 t u t was disbanded a f t e r the 
i n s u r r e c t i o n . Another group, an°Na.iaddah (the Scouts) 
based i n J a f f a and l e d by a Muslim lawyer, Muhammad 
Nimr. al-Hawari, was set up i n 19'+5} consciously modelled 
on the Jewish Kaganah. • 
2 . 'abd al-Qadir had been a c t i v e i n the 1936 i n s u r r e c t i o n 
. as leader of the Jerusalem area. He was the son of 
• Musa Kazem al-Husseini, a prominent n a t i o n a l i s t f i g u r e 
i n the 1920s. Although 'abd al-Qadir was a member of 
the Husseini f a m i l y , he was not involved i n the i n t e r -
,Arab f a c t i o n f i g h t s ' i n Palestine. 
3 . He was k i l l e d defending the town of al-Qastel. I t was 
• a s t r a t e g i c a l l y important town, yet the Arab League had 
refused t o send arms and- ammunition f o r i t s defence. 
Al-Fateh^ "Abdel Qadir a l - I i u s s e i n i ; A Symbol of 
Resistance 19^8". Fateh Vol 1 No. 7. (January 1s t 1970) p.6. 
ko The League had decided t o back the Palestinians v/itn arms 
and volunteers a t the end of 19^7« Muhammad Darwaza, 
Al-Qadiah al°Falastlniyyah f i M u khtalif Marahilha Vol 1. 
pp.. 97 -101 . 
5. See above f n . 3« 
6 . Volunteers from the Arab states were under one Fauzi a l -
K a u q j i , v a r i o u s l y described as 'soldier of f o r t u n e ' and 
'charlatan'. Pie r e l i n q u i s h e d a post i n the I r a q i army to 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the' 1.936 i n s u r r e c t i o n and had worked f o r 
several d i f f e r e n t Arab governments i n h i s chequered career. 
Hurewitz, op c i t p. 69; S i r A..S. K i r k b r i d g e , A Crackle of 
1^ . 
Thorns, pp. 15^-7. 
Kauqji d i s l i k e d 'abd al-Qadir and refused t o co-operate w i t h 
him i n 19^7. I t i s widely believed t h a t he collaborated v/ith 
the Haganah i n order to hasten 'abd al-Qadir's defeat. 
Rony E. Gabbay, A P o l i t i c a l Study of the Arab-Jev/ish C o n f l i c t , 
p. 8 1 . 
On May l ^ f t h 19^+8, one day before the l a s t of the B r i t i s h 
withdrew, the Jews declared an independent state of I s r a e l i n 
the areas of Palestine under t h e i r c o n t r o l . The Arab states 
who, a few weeks e a r l i e r , had refused the Palestinians v i t a l 
arras, now sent i n t h e i r regular armies. I n i t i a l successes 
s h o r t - l i v e d and a f t e r the f i r s t truce i n June 19^8 they l o s t 
ground t o the Z i o n i s t s . Only 'abdallah's Arab Legion held i t s 
p o s i t i o n . 1 
By the beginning of 19^9 most of Palestine was occupied 
e i t h e r by the Z i o n i s t s or 'abdallah's forces. The Egyptian 
army r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l only over the Gaza S t r i p . This d i s -
t r i b u t i o n of forces was the basis f o r the Armistice Agree-
ments. 
The P a l e s t i n i a n s were i n complete d i s a r r a y . Most of them 
had f l e d , c r e a t i n g an enormous refugee problem f o r the surround-
in g s t a t e s . The population remaining i n areas under Z i o n i s t 
c o n t r o l was only 10?? Arab. The only p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n 
l e f t t o the P a l e s t i n i a n s was the Higher Committee, which had 
attempted t o d i r e c t operations from outside the country 
throughout the war. What remained of al-Jihad al-Mugaddas 
continued t o put up some resistance i n the Jerusalem area 
both t o the Z i o n i s t s and to 'abdallah's forces. 2 A l l the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s could do i n the circumstances was to t r y t o save 
the West Bank from annexation by 'abdallah. 
This may have been the r e s u l t of superior m i l i t a r y t r a i n -
ing or some pre-arrangement w i t h the Z i o n i s t s , 'abdallah 
had conducted secret n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Z i o n i s t s since 
19^7 t o t r y t o ensure some personal advantage from 
p a r t i t i o n . Marie S y r k i n , V/ay of Valour, pp. 213-9; 
Benjamin Shwadran, Jordan a State of T e n s i o n p . 2M-9; 
'abdallah a t - t a l , Karithah F a l a s t i n ^ pp. 3*+^, ^38-65, 
529-36; James KacDonald, Kv Mission i n I s r a e l 19^-8°51. 
pp. 12M-, 193-^ . One of the main reasons f o r the Arab 
armies' f a i l u r e was t h e i r d i s u n i t y and lack of co-
o r d i n a t i o n , mainly due t o 'abdallah-Lgypt r i v a l r y . 
2 . A1°Jihad represented the so c a l l e d 'extremists' l i n k e d 
to the Higher Conmittee. I t sought above a l l an i n -
dependent Palestine and was thus as much a t h r e a t f o r 
'abdallah as the Z i o n i s t s were. 
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'abdallah had made no e f f o r t t o conceal h i s ambitions to 
annex p a r t of Palestine and as h i s Arab Legion advanced, loc a l ' 
i n h a b i t a n t s were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y disarmed. 1 M i l i t a r y governors 
were appointed t o the major towns. 2 I n a d d i t i o n , the union 
w i t h TransJordan of those parts of Palestine assigned t o the 
Arabs i n the p a r t i t i o n r e s o l u t i o n , was under consideration by 
the UN. The UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, had 
suggested as a basis f o r peace t a l k s : 
"... t h a t ... Palestine ... i n c l u d i n g Trans-
Jordan, might form a union comprising two 
members, one Arab and one Jewish." 3 
The Arab League was thus obliged to take some decisive 
a c t i o n t o p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and prevent 'abdallah 
from achieving h i s ambitions. Their f i r s t step was the 
establishment of a p r o v i s i o n a l P a l e s t i n i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
This a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , though purely nominal w i t h no r e a l 
power, k included several members of the Higher Committee. 
H a j j Amin himself was not given a place on t h i s body, which 
was intended more as a psychological weapon than an a c t i v e 
i n s t i t u t i o n , 5 since the League feared he would take the 
i n i t i a t i v e away from them. 
1. ' a l l u s h , Al-Masirah i l a F a l a s t i n . p. 187. 
2 . John Baghot Glubb, A Soldier w i t h the Arabs, p. 82 . 
3 . L e t t e r from Bernadotte t o I s r a e l and the Arab states 
June 27th 19^8. Count Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem, 
p. 129. 
k. The League s t i p u l a t e d ' i t s h a l l not have competance 
at present over higher p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . ' Muhammad 
K h a l i l . The Arab States and the Arab League.Vol. 2 , 
ppb 56D -8 . 
5. One of i t s f i r s t actions was to disband the Communists 
and a r r e s t them, ostensibly, f o r t h e i r acceptance of the 
P a r t i t i o n r e s o l u t i o n . Cahiers Vol. 1^-15. p. 1^1. 
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H a j j Amin had no i n t e n t i o n of being excluded from 
P a l e s t i n i a n a f f a i r s however and i n September 19^8, on the 
eve of United Nations discussions of the Bernadotte Plan 1 
he began pressing f o r the establishment of a r e a l P a l e s t i n i a n 
government based upon an elected General Assembly. 2 Under 
the circumstances the League had t o do more or less as Hajj 
Amin wished and announced the establishment .of a Government 
of A l l Palestine 3 w i t h Ahmed H i l m i 'abd al-Baqi k as Prime 
M i n i s t e r . The League s t i l l managed t o exclude Ha j j Amin 
from any p o s i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and had come to agree-
ment w i t h the Higher Committee on t h i s p o i n t . 5 However, 
when he returned t o Gaza several days l a t e r , entering 
Palestine f o r the f i r s t time since h i s e x i l e i n 1937, 6 
the Higher Committee c a l l e d a P a l e s t i n i a n Congress 7 which 
unanimously elected him i t s president. The Congress 
accepted the Government of A l l Palestine set up by the 
League, 8 proclaimed Palestine independent 9 and voted a 
p r o v i s i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n to be v a l i d u n t i l general e l e c t i o n s 
could be held. 
1. This was e s s e n t i a l l y p a r t i t i o n and economic union of 
Ara.b Palestine w i t h TransJordan. 
2 . Cahiers Vol. 1^-15. pp. 1^1-2. 
3 . MEJ V o l . 3 No. 1, p. 77 . 
ho H i l m i was a prominent member of the I s t i q l a l and president 
of the Arab N a t i o n a l Bank. He had also been appointed 
m i l i t a r y Governor of Jerusalem by 'abdallah. Vftien he 
accepted the p o s i t i o n of Prime M i n i s t e r , 'abdallah d i s -
missed him. i b i d , p. 75 . 
5 . ' a r i f a l - ' a r i f , An-Nakhbah Vol. 3 , p. 703. 
6 . MEJ Volo ^ No. 1. p. 77. 
7o I t was c o n s t i t u t e d as f o l l o w s : 8 from the Higher Com-
mi t t e e ; 10 l o c a l mayors; 1^ presidents of l o c a l coun-
c i l s ; 21 from the n a t i o n a l committees; 12 delegates 
from those defending the Arab case i n Europe during 
the mandate; 6 t r i b a l c h i e f s ; and k- from the unions 
of engineers, lawyers and pharmicists. ' a r i f , op c i t 
p. 703 . The Assembly was e s s e n t i a l l y representative 
of the feudal and middle classes. Even the unions 
represented'were p r o f e s s i o n a l unions. 
8 . Cahiers Vol. 16 . p. 236. 
9 . That i s , Palestine excluding TransJordan. 
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This c o n s t i t u t i o n , which transformed the Congress i n t o a 
s o r t of parliament, brought H a j j Amin back i n t o the p o s i t i o n 
o f o f f i c i a l P a l e s t i n i a n leader as a r e s u l t of h i s being 
president of the Congress, and he was empowered to appoint 
the government i n any time of c r i s i s . 1 
The re-emergence of E a j j Amin provoked an immediate 
response from 'abdallah 2 who c a l l e d h i s own P a l e s t i n i a n 
Congress i n 'amman, formed mainly from the t r a d i t i o n a l 
opponents of the Husseinis. 3 This 'amman Congress passed 
r e s o l u t i o n s condemning the Gaza government, re-opening' 
f a c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s which had remained i n abeyance f o r 
over a year. The Gaza government, which was very d e f i n i t e l y 
a c o a l i t i o n began t o show signs of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , h Most 
important, however, the 'amman Congress provided some s o r t 
of l e g i t i m a t e basis f o r 'abdallah's subsequent persecution 
of Husseini supporters i n the West Bank. The day a f t e r the 
Congress the Arab Legion s t a r t e d t o round up the remnants of 
al - J i h a d al-Mugaddas s t i l l a c t i v e i n the Jerusalem area 5 
1. Cahiers Vol. l 6 , p. 236. 
Marcel Colombe, "Le Probleme de I ' E n t i t e Palestinienne 
dans les Relations Interarabes," Orient No. 29. p. 60 . 
2 . He considered s e t t i n g up h i s own P a l e s t i n i a n Government 
but r e j e c t e d the idea. Esmond Wright "Abdallah's Jordan," 
MEJ V o l . 5 No. p. h66, 
3 . The president was Sheikh T a j i a l - F a r u q i , an o l d opponent 
of H a j j Amin. 
h. Two of i t s members attended the 'amman Congress. Wright 
OP c i t p. ^66. 
5 . . Glubb, OP c i t , p. 192. 
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and at the same time the TransJordan M i n i s t r y of Defence 
demanded t h a t a l l Palestinians surrender t h e i r arms or j o i n 
the Arab Legion. The. l a s t stronghold of a l - J i h a d f e l l soon 
afterwards. 1 
For a w h i l e the p o s i t i o n appeared t o be one of stalemate,, 
w i t h the Arab League morally supporting the Gaza Government 
and 'abdallah remaining de f a c t o r u l e r of the West Bank. 
Then on 1s t December ^^k8 'abdallah c a l l e d another P a l e s t i n -
i a n Congress, t h i s time i n Jericho 2 which proclaimed him 
'King of a l l Palestine' and recommend the e l e c t i o n of 
P a l e s t i n i a n representatives f o r 'consultation on the matter 
of P a l e s t i n e ' . 3 
I n s p i t e of indignant p r o t e s t s from a l l over the Arab 
world k 'abdallah continued w i t h h i s plans and the Jericho 
r e s o l u t i o n s were r a t i f i e d by the TransJordanian parliament. 5 
His main concern was t h a t annexation, when i t f i n a l l y . 
happened, should appear ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' and i t was therefore, 
necessary t o wait u n t i l an e l e c t i o n could be held which would 
b r i n g West Bank representatives i n t o the parliament. A year 
elapsed before a l l the necessary amendments could be made to 
TransJordanian law. 6 I n the meantime de f a c t o r u l e was con-
1. i b i d . 
2 . There were many delegates (estimates range from 500-2000)• 
i n c l u d i n g mayors, t r i b a l c h i e f s , mukhtars, m i l i t a r y 
governors and representatives from refugee camps not 
under TransJordanian r u l e . Delegates v;ere transported 
t o the Congress by the Arab Legion. The President of 
the Congress was Sheikh Muhammad ' a l i a l - J a ' b a r i , mayor 
of Hebron, nominated by the TransJordan Government, 
' a r i f , OP c i t V o l . k. p. 877; a t - T a l l , op c i t . pp. 375=6; 
Wright, op c i t , p. tfb6s Ann Dearden, Jordan p. 77 . 
3 . ' a r i f , OP c i t Vol. p. 877. 
h. There were also a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t the Congress had been 
conducted i n ah atmosphere of "repression and t h r e a t s " . 
Journal d'Egypte 12th December 19M-8. 
5. Benjamin Shwadran "Jordan Annexes Arab Palestine" MEA 
Vol. 1 No. k pp. 102-lf. 
6 . I n December 19^9 a l l Palestinians were granted Trans- . 
Jordanian n a t i o n a l i t y i f they wished i t . The post of 
Governor General f o r Palestine was allov/ed to lapse and 
a l l areas were administered d i r e c t l y from 'amman. 
Jordanian Government, Al-Jaridah ar°Rasmiyyah, 17th 
December 19^9, p. ^ 5 . 
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s o l i d a t e d . 1 When the e l e c t i o n s were f i n a l l y held i n A p r i l 
1950 2 the new parliament 3 f o r m a l l y proclaimed the union of 
the two banks of the Jordan i n the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, h 
Thus Palestine disappeared from the map to be replaced by 
I s r a e l and Jordan. Throughout the annexation 'abdallah had 
been helped by the support he received from the West, and 
i n p a r t i c u l a r B r i t a i n . Immediately a f t e r the 1950 e l e c t i o n s 
the status quo, t h a t i s , the existence of I s r a e l and Jordan, 
was o f f i c i a l l y guaranteed i n a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n by B r i t a i n , 
America and France. 5 
Both the Gaza Government and the Arab League had proved 
t o t a l l y incapable of holding t h e i r ground i n the face of 
the i n t e r e s t s ranged against them. From the time of the 
Jeri c h o Congress H a j j Amin and h i s government had been faced 
w i t h both i n t e r n a l dissent and a growing i n d i f f e r e n c e on the 
p a r t of the Arab s t a t e s . By February 19^ +9 the Government 
had l e f t Gaza f o r "a modest v i l l a i n a Cairo suburb" where 
i t survived "only as a focus f o r a n t i - ' a b d a l l a h propaganda 
and conspiracies. 6 
The League i t s e l f had threatened to expel TransJordan i f 
'abdallah continued n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h I s r a e l on the one hand 7 
and h i s p o l i c y of annexation on the other. When i t came t o 
1. I n March 19^9 m i l i t a r y r u l e was replaced by c i v i l i a n . 
A q i l Hyder A b i d i , Jordan - A P o l i t i c a l Study 19^8-57. p. 68 . 
P a l e s t i n i a n s were given responsible p o s i t i o n s i n the 
TransJordan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , u s u a l l y the opponents of H a j j 
Amin, l i k e Ragheb Nashashibi who was appointed M i n i s t e r 
f o r Refugees i n August 19^9. Shwadran op c i t (MEA). p. 105. 
I n November 19^9 the l a s t economic b a r r i e r s between the 
East and West Banks were cut. Cahiers Vol. 20 , p. 2^+3. 
2 . These, l i k e the Jericho Congress vrere held i n an atmos-
phere of repression, 'abdallah had been sys t e m a t i c a l l y 
and imprisoning both supporters of Hajj Amin, and members 
of the Communist Party. He also disbanded the Palestine 
• Arab Workers Society, the l a r g e s t Arab trade union i n 
Palest i n e . Cahiers V o l . l8°19. pp. 151-2 . Laqueur op c i t ^ 
p. 127. 
3 . The new parliament was 50^ P a l e s t i n i a n , t h a t i s t o say 
20 of the ^0 members were from the West Bank. 
k. King 'abdallah, at-Takmilah, p. 17. 
5. Text i n J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy i n the Near and Middle 
East V o l . I I . pp. 308 -9 . 
6 . Dearden, op c i t , p. 76. 
7 . See above p. 15 f n . 1. 
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the p o i n t a compromise was reached whereby 'abdallah dropped 
h i s contacts w i t h I s r a e l ( a t l e a s t f o r a while) and was 
allowed t o annex Palestine as t r u s t e e u n t i l such time as the 
country could be t o t a l l y l i b e r a t e d . 1 
Palestine a f t e r Annexation 
From the e a r l y 1950s Palestine not only ceased t o e x i s t 
p h y s i c a l l y but also as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y . The m a j o r i t y of 
the P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs were dispersed throughout the Arab 
wor l d , most of them i n refugee camps h a s t i l y set up by the 
United Nations. 2 Many of them were s t i l l t e c h n i c a l l y on 
P a l e s t i n i a n s o i l , t h a t i s to say oh the West Bank of Jordan, 
i n Gaza or i n s i d e I s r a e l . Although t h e i r conditions v a r i e d 
from country t o country they were a l l t o some extent deprived 
of t h e i r c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l freedom. 3 
Their remaining p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s found i t increas-
i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o operate i n any e f f e c t i v e way. H a j j Amin 
and the Higher Committee were based i n Cairo but t h e i r 
a c t i v i t y consisted l a r g e l y of i s s u i n g protests and manifestos 
on every possible occasion, k Popular support f o r t h i s body 
gradually-diminished. Hilmi's Government of A l l Palestine 
continued i n existence but d i d nothing on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e . 
I t became merely a rubber stamp f o r Arab League p o l i c y . I n 
1952 the Government's f u n c t i o n s were assumed by a Palestine 
D i r e c t o r a t e , a department of the Arab League 5 and i n 195^ 
even t h i s ceased t o f u n c t i o n . 6 
1. Text i n K h a l i l op c i t V o l . I I , p. 166. 
2 . See Table I . 
3 . Gabbay op c i t , pp. 206-16; Sabr'i J i r y i s , The Arabs i n 
I s r a e l , passim. 
Even so H a j j Amin's supporters continued to be persecuted 
i n Jordan along w i t h the Communists. The persecution i n -
creased a f t e r 'abdallah's assassination i n J u l y 1951 
a l l e g e d l y by H a j j Amin's f o l l o w e r s . SGT, "Abdallah's 
Assassins" World Today Vol. 9 No. 10, pp. »f11-lf9; A b i d i 
op c i t , pp." 85=1Oo; Jean Pierre Alex, "En Jordan!e 
L'Agonie d'un Royaume" Orient No. 2 , pp. 103-7. 
5. Text,of Arab League Resolution i n K h a l i l op c i t V o l . 2 , 
p. 171. 
6. MEJ V o l . 8 No. 2y p. 188. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE LOSS OF THE PALESTINIAN 
IDENTITY 1950 - 1961 
With the collapse of o l d P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
p o l i t i c a l - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the Palestinians as a separate group 
ceased along w i t h any ideas of P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism which 
migh^t have otherwise developed. New forces appeared i n the 
Arab world i n the form of a regenerated Arab nationalism. 
Any p o s s i b i l i t y of form.ing a separate P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c a l 
e n t i t y was l o s t f o r some 10 years.. 
The loss of Palestine shook the Arab world and although 
the old-^guard leadership t r i e d t o a t t r i b u t e the defeat to 
Arab m a t e r i a l backwardness, many of the new generation f e l t 
t h a t the f a i l u r e was p r i m a r i l y due t o the-pro-West o r i e n t a t i o n 
o f the t r a d i t i o n a l leadership, i t s r e a c t i o n a r y nature and i t s 
d i s u n i t y . 
There was a profound discontent i n the Arab world and as a 
r e s u l t many governments f e l l . The new regimes which replaced 
them1 were pledged not t o repeat the mistakes of t h e i r pre-
decessors. 
I n 1952 a coup i n Egypt ev e n t u a l l y brought Nasir t o power, 
whose n a t i o n a l i s t a t t i t u d e and actions provoked the t r i -
p a r t i t e . inva s i o n of Suez i n 1956. Peter Mansfield, Nasser, 
passim; Anthony N u t t i n g , No End of a Lesson, passim. I n 
Syria i n 195^ the f a l l of Sh i s h a k l i brought back p a r l i a -
mentary government to the country which provided a channel, 
through which the new progressive elements could gain 
power. The coup which deposed S h i s h a k l i was the f o u r t h 
since 19^8. T h e _ f i r s t two were i n 19^9 b r i n g i n g t o power 
f i r s t Colonel Husni az-Za'im ( n o n - p o l i t i c a l ) and then 
Colonel Hinnawi who was a conservative and sympathiser of 
Hizb ash-Sha'b (People's P a r t y ) . S h i s h a k l i came t o power 
i n 19^9 by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l methods but subsequently assigned 
complete c o n t r o l through a coup i n 1951. He was a member, 
of Hizb al-Qawmi as-Suri (see page 2k f n , 1 ) . 
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Thus i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y they tended to be n e u t r a l i s t , 
i n domestic p o l i c y , s o c i a l i s t , and on the Arab l e v e l , 
dedicated t o u n i t y . These developments can best be under-
stood by a look at the new forces which came i n t o t h e i r 
own a f t e r the Palestine war, i n the form of new mass p a r t i e s 
w i t h r e l a t i v e l y w e l l defined ideologies. An examination of 
these p a r t i e s also explains the f a i l u r e of any new 
. P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i s a t i o n t o develop i n the 1950s. 
The P a r t i e s 
Before 19^8 there had been several p a r t i e s t h a t could be 
described as mass p a r t i e s and a few t h a t had quite sophisticated 
i d e o l o g i e s . With the exception of the Communist p a r t i e s 
these were based e i t h e r upon Islamic p r i n c i p l e s , l i k e Jama'iyyah 
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood) 1 or had 
l i m i t e d r e g i o n a l aims l i k e Hizb al-Wafd (Delegation Party) 2 
1. The Brotherhood was founded i n Egypt i n 1922 by Sheikh 
Hassan al-Banna. I t believed t h a t only a r e t u r n t o Islamic 
p r i n c i p l e s .could regenerate Egypt. I t became i n c r e a s i n g l y 
• p o l i t i c a l i n character and established branches throughout 
. the Arab world. By 1 9 ^ i t had a t e r r o r i s t v/ing. I t s 
branch i n Palestine was set up i n 19^5 by ' a l l a l - J a b i r i . 
(Pi?ogres Egyptien, 10th November 19^5) . By 19^-7 t h i s 
branch claimed 100,000 members (Al-Ahram, 30th January 
• 1 9 W . 
2 . The Wafd began in. Egypt i n 1919 a f t e r a demand by the 
Egyptian n a t i o n a l i s t s t h a t they should be allowed t o send 
a delegation t o the,Paris P^ace Conference which was then 
discussing the f a t e of Egypt. I t v/as e s s e n t i a l l y a party 
seeking n a t i o n a l independence. I t s leader was Sa'ad 
Zaghlul'. J.M. Ahmed The I n t e l l e c t u a l Origins of Egyptian 
Nationalism, passim. 
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i n Egypt or Al-Hizb al-Qawmi as-Suri (Syrian National P a r t y ) . 
Arab.nationalism remained l i t t l e more than a vague sentiment, 
or at best was. c r y s t a l l i s e d i n t o r e l a t i v e l y small e l i t i s t 
p a r t i e s l i k e a l - I s t i q l a l i n Palestine. Arab nationalism 
faded w i t h the f i r s t generation of leaders, most of whom 
had e i t h e r died, r e t i r e d from a c t i v e p o l i t i c s or become 
p a r t of the establishment by 19^8. 
A f t e r the Palestine war two new p a r t i e s emerged as v i t a l 
popular forces i n the Arab wo r l d , based on the b e l i e f t h a t 
more than anything else the Arabs needed freedom from f o r e i g n 
domination and u n i t y . The two'parties d i f f e r e d fundamentally 
over some p o i n t s but i n general they both expressed the 
pervading d i s i l l u s i o n w i t h the o l d corrupted leadership. 
They had a massive f o l l o w i n g even i n countries l i k e Jordan, 
where they were i l l e g a l . The popular desire f o r u n i t y swept 
a l l before i t . For more than a decade the problem of l i b e r a t -
i n g Palestine was shelved u n t i l Arab u n i t y could be achieved. 
There was no place f o r any k i n d of regionalism, t h a t i s t o 
say, there was no place f o r P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism. A 
d e t a i l e d look at the new two Arab n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s and 
t h e i r ideologies w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the dominant ideas of the 
1950s and show why the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine ceased t o be 
a p r i o r i t y . 
The SNP was established i n 1932 i n Lebanon by Antun 
Sa'adah. Although i t was a clandestine p a r t y i t soon 
established branches i n Syria and Palestine. I t v/as 
based.on the b e l i e f t h a t there was a separate Syrian 
n a t i o n u n r e l a t e d t o the Arabs. I t was therefore very 
h o s t i l e t o Arab nationalism. I t attempted a coup i n 
Lebanon i n 19^9 and i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Syria were 
good a t t h i s time. Later i t was banned from Syria 
w i t h the r i s e of Arab nationalism there and became 
semi-iegal i n Lebanon supporting the conservative 
f o r c e s there. Labib Zuwiyya Lamak, The Syria S o c i a l 
N a t i o n a l i s t Party, passim. 
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1) Hizb al-Ba'th a l - ' a r a b i a l - I s h t r a k i (The Arab S o c i a l i s t 
Resurrection P a r t y ) . 
The Ba'th p a r t y was founded i n 19*+0 i n Damascus by Michel 
A f l a q . 1 I t began working openly i n 19I+3 a f t e r Syria became 
independent. I t went from s t r e n g t h to strength u n t i l i t gained 
power i n Syria i n 1958. Though the p a r t y was s t i l l small i t 
a c t i v e l y helped the P a l e s t i n i a n s i n 19^8, pledging i t s members 
i n the surrounding countries t o do a l l they could f o r the war 
e f f o r t and sending one b a t t a l i o n t o the f r o n t to f i g h t . 2 I t 
also t r i e d t o put pressure on the Arab states t o honour t h e i r 
o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h respect to Palestine while at the same time i t 
pointed t o the weakness and d i s u n i t y of these governments, and 
c a l l e d on the Arab' people t o take a c t i o n themselves. 3 An 
a r t i c l e w r i t t e n on January 12th by Salah ad-Din B i t a r , one of 
t h e i r leaders, o u t l i n e s t h i s p o s i t i o n : 
"The war places a heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the 
Arab governments and people, and imposes grave 
s a c r i f i c e s . 
"The duties of the people, i n short, are t o 
prepare f o r war - a v i c t o r i o u s war. They must 
put an end t o the i n a c t i v i t y and promises of 
peace, which have l e d them to t h i s n a t i o n a l 
d i s a s t e r . They must make a new pact which w i l l 
i n v o l v e every Arab man and woman i n the war 
e f f o r t and which a l l Arab countries must 
j o i n . 
"As to the governments, they must extend con-
si d e r a b l y both t h e i r a c t i v i t y and t h e i r 
i n f l u e n c e , 
1 ,• They should r e a l i s e t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i c y they have pursued u n t i l now w i t h 
respect t o Palestine i s an u t t e r f a i l u r e . 
They must th e r e f o r e change t h i s p o l i c y 
fundamentally. 
1. Kemal Karpat, P o l i t i c a l and So c i a l Thought i n the 
Contemporary Middle East^ p. 1o5^ 
2 . ' a l l u s h , op c i t (Masirah)^ p. 100. 
3 . Anon ( c o l l e c t i v e ) , N i d a l al-Ba'th Pt. 1. (Dar a t - T a l i ' a h ) , 
p. 222. 
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2 . They should r e a l i s e t h a t p o l i t i c a l success 
i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena depends upon 
i n t e r n a l s t r e n g t h . 
3 . They should take steps against those states 
which support p a r t i t i o n ... i n c l u d i n g c u t t i n g 
d i p l o m a t i c , economic and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . 
"The e f f o r t t o u n i f y and Arabise Palestine 
should be made not only t o f u l f i l l Arab 
h i s t o r y ... but also to prevent a l l the 
Arab n a t i o n f a l l i n g prey t o t h i s new 
Imperialism - i n t e r n a t i o n a l Zionism." 1 
The p a r t y d i d not l i m i t t h e i r c r i t i c i s m t o the Arab 
governments. I t also c r i t i c i s e d the P a l e s t i n i a n leaders f o r 
la c k o f p o s i t i v e a c t i o n . 2 A f t e r the war the party worked 
t o r e v e a l the l i n k between the defeat of the Arabs and the 
c o r r u p t i o n of t h e i r governments. I t demanded fr e e and honest 
e l e c t i o n s throughout the Arab world. 3 
However, i n s p i t e of i t s genuine concern over Palestine 
i n 1 9 ^ - 8 the party's r e a l aim was Arab u n i t y and progress. 
I t s c o n s t i t u t i o n , published i n 1 9 ^ 8 , defined the Arab n a t i o n 
i n c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c terms, k s t r e s s i n g the harmony 
between personal freedom on the one hand and the n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t oh the other. 5 The Arab nation's u n i v e r s a l mission 
was t o renew human values and a i d progress. 6 The Party was 
not t o l i m i t i t s e l f t o any one Arab country. I t described 
i t s e l f as, f i r s t , " s o c i a l i s t " : 
"... socialism c o n s t i t u t e s the i d e a l s o c i a l 
order which w i l l allow the Arab people t o 
r e a l i s e i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ..." 
second, "popular": 
• "... sovereignty i s the property of the 
people alone, which i s the source of a l l 
power ...". 
and t h i r d , " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " : 
" s o c i a l i s m cannot be achieved except by 
r e v o l u t i o n and struggle ..." 7 
1 . i b i d , pp. 2 2 9 - 3 3 . 
2 . I n February 1 9 ^ - 8 the p a r t y pointed out t h a t the actions 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s had undertaken up t o t h a t time were so 
few t h a t they only served t o show t h a t the Arabs v/ere 
incapable of r e a l l y decisive a c t i o n , i b i d , p. 2 2 2 . 
3 . ' a l l u s h OP c i t (Masirah), p. 1 0 ^ . 
ko The C o n s t i t u t i o n was f i r s t published i n English i n MEJ 
Vo l . 1 . 3 Noo 2 , pp. 1 9 5 - 2 0 0 . Translated by Leonard Binder. 
F i r s t p r i n c i p l e . 
5 o i b i d , second p r i n c i p l e . 
6 . i b i d , t h i r d p r i n c i p l e . 
7. i b i d , a r t i c l e s k-6c 
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The two main slogans of the pa r t y were Wahdah, Hurriyah 
I s h t i r a k i y y a h (Unity, Freedom^ Socialism) and Ummatun 'arabiyyatun 
wahidah, t h a t u r i s a l a t i n khalidah (one Arab n a t i o n , possessor 
of an immortal mission). The party's membership was r e s t r i c t e d 
mainly t o the i n t e l l e c t u a l s although i t had qu i t e a wide 
f o l l o w i n g . 
I n s p i t e of i t s ideology of r e v o l u t i o n , i t r e l i e d upon 
e l e c t i o n s and coups t o gain power. Occasionally i t would 
s t r i k e up an a l l i a n c e w i t h the Communists, but i n general i t 
c r i t i c i s e d them f o r t h e i r materialism and dependence upon 
the USSR..1 The p a r t y had a high regard f o r the legacy of 
Islam, though i t was i n no way a r e l i g i o u s organisation. 2 
From 19^9-5^ the pa r t y based i t s e l f upon four main p r i n -
c i p l e s . The f i r s t of these held t h a t popular, u n i t e d Arab 
struggle was the only way t o l i b e r a t e Palestine i n p a r t i c u l a r 
and the Arabs i n general. To achieve l i b e r a t i o n i t was 
necessary f i r s t t o put an end t o the d i s u n i t y which had 
caused the loss of Palestine. Imperialism and Zionism were 
viewed as e s s e n t i a l l y the same phenomenon. The party raised 
two slogans i n connection w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e , namely t h a t 
the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine was l i n k e d to u n i t y , and t h a t 
the Arab League should be replaced by a genuinely popular 
Arab f e d e r a t i o n . 
The second p r i n c i p l e held t h a t there could be no l i b e r a t i o n 
of Palestine without complete l i b e r a t i o n from Imperialism. 
The t h i r d ..considered t h a t the establisliment of a s o c i a l i s t 
system f o r the achievement of s o c i a l j u s t i c e , was a n a t i o n a l 
duty. Moreover, t h i s should be f a c i l i t a t e d by p u t t i n g an 
end to f o r e i g n trade. 
The f i n a l p r i n c i p l e held t h a t there should be a f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y and t h a t a l l f o r e i g n troops should be 
expelled from Arab s o i l . There should be no defence pacts, ' 
and no r e l i a n c e on f o r d gn a i d . 3 
1. Karpat, OP c i t , pp. I 8 9 - 9 7 . 
2 . Michel A f l a q , "The C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Arab Socialism", 
Arab Socialism. Sami Hanna and George Gardner (eds), 
pp. 297-303. 
3 . • ' a l l u s h , OP c i t (Masirah). p. 103. 
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The Ba'th t h e r e f o r e d i d not see the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine 
as an immediate aim, nor d i d i t contemplate the establishment 
of any. P a l e s t i n i a n - o r g a n i s a t i o n separate from i t s p o l i t i c a l 
organisations i n the d i f f e r e n t Arab states. P a l e s t i n i a n 
members of the p a r t y were members i n the country of t h e i r 
residence, dedicated above a l l t o the achievement of Arab 
u n i t y and socialism. 
When the party began t o achieve some measure of power a f t e r 
the f a l l of S h i s h a k l i , P a l e s t i n e , as a separate issue sank 
even f u r t h e r i n t o o b s c u r i t y . The focus of i n t e r e s t s h i f t e d 
t o organising o p p o s i t i o n t o the Baghdad Pact, and b r i n g i n g 
about the Syrian-Egyptian Union. 1 I n February I966 a 
f u r t h e r coup took place i n Syria which u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t e d 
i n the d i s c r e d i t i n g of A f l a q and the r a p i d movement of the 
p a r t y t o the l e f t . 
2 ) Harakat al-Qawiniyyin al-'arab (The Arab N a t i o n a l i s t Movement) 
• This o r g a n i s a t i o n , although by no means as large as the 
Ba'thj was i n some respects more important. I t r e f l e c t e d the 
extent t o which the problem of Palestine came to be viewed 
only w i t h i n an Arab context, and of less immediate importance 
than u n i t y . Unlike the Ba'th, the ANM was formed as a d i r e c t 
r e s u l t of . the 1 9 ^ - 8 defeat. _ 
The movement was i n i t i a t e d by some students at the American 
U n i v e r s i t y of B e i r u t b e t w e e n - 1 9 ^ 9 and 1 9 5 2 w i t h the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of a Committee f o r Resisting Peace w i t h I s r a e l . This 
Committee took the name al-'urwah al-Wuthqah (The f i r m t i e ) , 
and published a weekly magazine. 2 I t s members were from 
1 . . i b i d , pp. 1 0 ^ - 5 . 
2 o L e i l a S.Kadi, Basic Documents of the Armed P a l e s t i n i a n 
Resistance Movement^ p. 1 ^ . 
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many d i f f e r e n t Arab countries i n c l u d i n g Palestine, 1 but they 
agreed .in the course of discussion: 
"... t h a t Arab nationalism i s a f a c t and we 
are one people ..." 2 
From 19^9-51 the organisation was not a party i n the 
proper sense: 
"We are s t i l l undergoing the emotional r e -
actions of students. Our c u l t u r a l discussions 
l e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l matters .... We discussed 
the problem of how t o r e t u r n t o Palestine .... 
By 1951-2 our group was ready to graduate and 
r e t u r n t o our homelands. We asked ourselves: 
were we r e a l l y sincere or were we only salon 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s ? I f we were sincere then we 
must f i g h t and not keep s i l e n t . We agreed 
. t o consider forming a p a r t y . " 3 
Even so, at t h a t time: 
"... we lacked a f u l l ideology. I t stopped 
short at c e r t a i n p o i n t s . Instead, we had a 
c o l l e c t i o n of some p o l i t i c a l and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
ideas and t o p i c s . " M-
With respect t o P a l e s t i n e , the organisation considered t h a t 
l i b e r a t i o n was: 
"... something not to be i s o l a t e d from events 
i n the r e s t of the Arab world as a whole. We 
saw the need f o r s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l 
renaissance .... The main reason f o r our 
defeat had been the s c i e n t i f i c society of 
. . I s r a e l as against our own backwardness ..." 5 
P a l e s t i n i a n members included George Habbash, a medical 
student from Lydda; Wadi Haddad, Alimed a l - K h a t i b , and 
Ahmed Ghurshi, a l l medical students. I n a d d i t i o n there 
was Hani a l - H i n d i from Syria and Hamad a l Farhan, an 
economics student from Jordan. They were a l l influenced 
by a professor of p o l i t i c s . a t the u n i v e r s i t y , Constantin 
Zurayk, ( I n t e r v i e w by author w i t h Abu Fadl, al-Fateh, 
summer 1969 'amman).. 
George Habbash, unpublished i n t e r v i e w given t o John 
Cooley ( C h r i s t i a n Science M o n i t o r ) , March 23rd I 9 6 9 , 'amman. 
3 . i b i d , 
i b i d . 
5. i b i d . 
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The ANM t h e r e f o r e accepted the old-guard argument t h a t the 
defeat was i n . l a r g e measure due to m a t e r i a l backwardness. At 
the same time, l i k e the Ba'th they stressed the need f o r u n i t y . 
I n the f i r s t . d a y s of t h e i r existence as a p a r t y the slogan they 
adopted was: Wahdah, Hurriyah. Thar. Dumm. Hadid. Nar (U n i t y , 
Freedom^Revenge, Blood, Steely F i r e ) . By U n i t y , the ANM meant 
a p o l i t i c a l u n i t y achieved through popular s t r u g g l e , coup, 
conspiracy or any other method. There was no clear d e f i n i t i o n 
of the type of. u n i t y t o be sought. They even supported 
B r i t i s h i n s p i r e d moves to u n i t e the Hashemite regimes of 
I r a q and Jprdan i n the e a r l y 1950s. They were severely 
c r i t i c i s e d by the Ea'th f o r lack of p o l i t i c a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
i n supporting such a re a c t i o n a r y a l l i a n c e . 
By Freedom, the ANM simply meant an end to Imperialism 
and the Revenge they sought was to be through a quick, 
decisive and v i o l e n t b a t t l e between the u n i f i e d Arab states 
and I s r a e l . No s p e c i a l r o l e was assigned t o the Palestinians 
as such. Moreover, the ANM d i d not d i s t i n g u i s h between r i c h , 
poor, bourgeoisie or peasant; They d i f f e r e n t i a t e d only 
between a l l y and opponent. 1 
The p a r t y began i t s organised a c t i v i t y i n Jordan i n 1953 
where i t founded a magazine c a l l e d Ar-Rai (Opinion) - "We 
sold a l l the copies we could p u b l i s h ..." 2 I t clashed w i t h 
the Ba'th from the beginning f o r two main reasons. F i r s t , 
the Ba'th could not understand the need f o r another p a r t y w i t h 
aims s i m i l a r t o i t s own. Second, the Ba'th f e l t t h a t the 
ANM slogan of "Revenge" instead of i t s own slogan of 
. "Socialism" served only t o d i v e r t the people from t h e i r 
r e a l s o c i a l problems. 3 On the other hand, the ANM r e j e c t e d 
the Ba'th. because: 
"we saw t h a t i t s p a r t y organisation d i d not 
t o t a l l y m o b i l i s e the people f o r i t s cause ..." k 
1. ' a l l u s h , OP c i t (Masirah). p. 
2 . . Cooley i n t e r v i e w , op c i t . 
3 . ' a l l u s h , OP c i t (Masirah). p. ^ kk. 
ho Cooley i n t e r v i e w , op c i t . 
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However, i t would appear t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s were much more 
deep-seated, being based mostly on the question of s o c i a l 
change., The .AKM's a t t i t u d e to the Communist p a r t i e s , f o r 
instance, was one of complete antagonism, u n l i k e the Ba'th 
which d i d contemplate a l l i a n c e s w i t h the Communists. 
A f t e r 1956 and the invasion of Suez, s o c i a l and economic 
change i n Egypt became one of Nasir's p r i o r i t i e s . This put 
the ANM i n an awkward p o s i t i o n because by t h i s time support 
f o r Nasir was one of t h e i r main concerns: 
"... we saw the path t o the. l i b e r a t i o n of 
Palestine as co-operation w i t h the UAR" 1 
The movement th e r e f o r e had t o r e - t h i n k i t s a t t i t u d e . I t solved 
the problem by t h e o r e t i c a l l y d i v i d i n g the b a t t l e of l i b e r a t i o n 
i n t o two stages, the p o l i t i c a l and the s o c i a l . I n May 1957 
a book was published w i t h the t i t l e Ma' al-Qawmiyyah a l -
'arablyyah (With Arab Nationalism). This was the f i r s t 
p u b l i c a t i o n which could be looked upon as a c o n s t i t u t i o n 
or programme f o r the ANM. I t l i s t e d both immediate and 
f u t u r e aims. The immediate aims were: 
"An end t o the h a t e f u l d i v i s i o n of the 
Arab land and complete :^rab u n i t y . An 
end t o Imperialism i n a l l i t s forms by 
complete l i b e r a t i o n . An end to I s r a e l 
by revenge ..." 2 
The f u t u r e aims were: 
"A n a t i o n a l Arab so c i e t y t o r e a l i s e s o c i a l 
j u s t i c e i n a l l i t s forms, to r e a l i s e the 
humanity of the Arab i n d i v i d u a l , and t o 
make possible the Arab mission on a 
p r a c t i c a l and e f f e c t i v e l e v e l . " 3 
The two stages of the struggle were described as: 
" F i r s t , the stage of p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e , 
aimed at f r e e i n g the Arabs and e s t a b l i s h i n g 
• a sound e x t e r n a l framework f o r the united 
Arab soc i e t y . Second, b u i l d i n g Arab 
society w i t h a social-democratic content 
so t h a t t h i s u n i t e d Arab society might 
r e a l i s e s o c i a l j u s t i c e . 
" I t i s c l e a r t h a t we cannot end one 
stage except a f t e r f r e e i n g ourselves 
from d i v i s i o n . Imperialism, I s r a e l and 
the corrupt o f f i c i a l s who c l i n g t o the 
status quo and prevent change." k 
1. i b i d . 
2 . ' a l l u s h , op c i t (Masirah), p. 1^6. 
3 . i b i d , pp. 1^6-7. 
^. i b i d , p. I i f7 . 
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Although t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d a considerable departure from 
o r i g i n a l ANM ideas which discounted s o c i a l change a l t o g e t h e r , 
i t s t i l l d i d not conform t o the Ba'th l i n e which saw u n i t y as 
impossible without socialism. The change i n ANM t h i n k i n g 
r e f l e c t e d more than anything e l s e , the changes w i t h i n Egypt, 
and showed a bankruptcy of o r i g i n a l thought w i t h i n the move-
ment at t h i s stage. 
With the formation of the UAR i n 1958, the ANM drew much 
closer t o the Ba'th. V/adi Haddad, one of the ANM leaders was 
noted f o r a saying during t h i s period t h a t "the Ba'th i s the 
brains of Arab nationalism and we are the muscles". However, 
when the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between Nasir and the Syrian Ba'th 
caused the rupture o f the UAR the ANM once more became a r i v a l , 
Although, as time went on, the ANM entered i n t o occasional 
a l l i a n c e s w i t h both the Ba'th and the CP i t s h o s t i l i t y towards 
them did not lessen e s p e c i a l l y i t s hatred of the Communists. 
However, the ANM d i d express a genuine popular f e e l i n g w i t h i n 
t h e Arab n a t i o n i n i t s desire f o r u n i t y . I t had considerable 
success because of the s i m p l i c i t y of i t s slogans compared to 
the r e l a t i v e l y complex ideologies of the Ba'th and the CP, 
both o f which r e l i e d h e a v i l y on i n t e l l e c t u a l s f o r support 
and membership. 
This b r i e f look a t the new Arab n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s shows 
why there was no attempt t o b u i l d new P a l e s t i n i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s 
a f t e r 19^+8. The emphasis was upon u n i t y and i t was through 
u n i t y t h a t the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine would u l t i m a t e l y be 
achieved. There was an overwhelming popular support f o r 
these ideas, and the Palestinians themselves joined the new 
p a r t i e s i n great numbers. 
Palestine and the Arab states 
The Arab states and leaders were qu i t e prepared t o accept 
the new Arab n a t i o n a l i s t l i n e on Palestine since i t released 
them from any immediate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r undertaking a war 
of l i b e r a t i o n . On the other hand they could not abandon 
Palestine completely since i t provided them a l l at times of 
i n t e r n a l t r o u b l e w i t h something e x t e r n a l upon which they 
could focus a t t e n t i o n . I t provided them w i t h the e t e r n a l 
excuse f o r f a i l u r e s of domestic p o l i c y . 
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I n the e a r l y f i f t i e s the main concern of the Arab states 
was t o r e l i e v e themselves of as much r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Palestine 
as they could without appearing t o be t r a i t o r s . During the 
Armistice n e g o t i a t i o n s i n 19^9 1 the Arab states i n s i s t e d on 
• r e p a t r i a t i o n and compensation of the refugees as a pre-
. r e q u i s i t e t o any peace settlement. 2 This could be i n t e r -
preted as re c o g n i t i o n . o f p a r t i t i o n , although no Arab s t a t e 
dared t o recognise the Z i o n i s t e n t i t y o f f i c i a l l y or sign a 
peace t r e a t y . 3 
While the Arabs accepted the short term r e l i e f o f UNRV/A k 
they at f i r s t r e j e c t e d any idea put forward by the UN f o r 
permanent resettlement of the refugees. I n s i s t i n g on repat-
r i a t i o n as the only s o l u t i o n . However, i n 1950 the UN set up 
a r e i n t e g r a t i o n fund to finance large economic development 
p r o j e c t s i n the Arab countries which would enable them t o 
absorb the refugees i n t o t h e i r economies. The lar g e s t scheme 
based on t h i s idea was the plan t o e x p l o i t the Jordan waters 
• f o r the b e n e f i t of both the Arab states and I s r a e l . 5 Although 
such a scheme was e n t i r e l y against the Arabs' p r i n c i p l e s , v i r t u a l 
agreement had been reached by August 1955? the obvious economic 
advantages- of the scheme having overcome any scruples about 
res e t t l e m e n t . 6 
1, These were conducted i n d i r e c t l y through the United Nations. 
2 , U.N., "Ad Hoc Committee 5^th Meeting", General Assembly 
O f f i c i a l Records ^ t h Year. This includes t e x t s of 
speeches by the Arab representatives. 
3 , I s r a e l i n s i s t e d , on the contrary t h a t r e p a t r i a t i o n 
could only be discussed a f t e r a peace settlement was 
agreed and the t a l k s were deadlocked. I s r a e l refused 
to implement a UN r e s o l u t i o n which demanded t h a t the 
refugees be allowed to r e t u r n . UN Resolution No. 19^ 
( I I I ) , 11th December 19^8, UI^ Doc. A /810, GA OR 3rd Year, 
pp. 2 1 - 5 . 
k. The United Nations R e l i e f and V/orks Agency was set up 
i n 19^9 by UN Resolution No. 302 ( I V ) , 8th December 19^+9, 
UN Doc". A/1251 J GA OR hth Year, pp. 23 -5 . See also 
Don Peretz, "The Arab Refugee Dilemma", Foreign A f f a i r s 
• V o l . V3 No. 1. pp. 13'+-^8. Alimed H l l m l i n h i s capacity 
as. Prime I'linister of the A l l Palestine Government accepted 
UNRWA on the c o n d i t i o n i t d i d not prejudice eventual 
r e p a t r i a t i o n . Text I n K h a l i l , op c i t Vol. 2 . pp. 167-8. 
5 . This scheme was commissioned by UNRWA i n 1952 from the 
Tennessee V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y , w i t h the f i n a n c i a l backing 
of the. USA. E a r l Berger, The Covenant and the Sv/ord, p. 135* 
6 . Talks l a s t e d f o r some two years and many counter-schemes 
were proposed. I b i d , pp. 137-M-I; Peretz, op c i t . pp. 398-^12. 
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The scheme only f a i l e d to be put i n t o operation because the 
Americans t r i e d t o make i t p a r t . o f an o v e r a l l peace plan. 1 
A f t e r t h i s , I s r a e l continued w i t h her own plans f o r d i v e r s i o n 
of the Jordan waters to the Negev. 2 
I f t h i s , gradual b a c k s l i d i n g on p r i n c i p l e by the Arab states 
characterised the e a r l y f i f t i e s , the l a t e f i f t i e s saw a qual-
i t i t a t i v e change i n a t t i t u d e . Instead of simply r e l i n q u i s h i n g 
t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r P a l e s t i n e , the Arab leaders began t o 
encourage the P a l e s t i n i a n s to accept t h i s " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " f o r 
themselves. There were three f a c t o r s which favoured t h i s 
development, f i r s t , the need t o f i n d some a l t e r n a t i v e to f u l l -
scale war w i t h I s r a e l , second, the re-emergence of H a j j Amin 
t o p o l i t i c a l l i f e and t h i r d , the use of Palestine as a weapon 
i n the i n t e r - A r a b s t r u g g l e f o r leadership of the Arab world. 
Underlying a l l . these f a c t o r s was the r i s e of power of Nasir 
i n Egypt, and h i s desire t o be both powerful and popular. I t 
was e s s e n t i a l l y Nasir's need t o preserve h i s popular image 
which gave these three f a c t o r s t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e . We w i l l 
. take them .in t u r n . 
1, The Alter'native t o W^ar w i t h I s r a e l 
As' soon as the Palestine war of 19^8-9 had f i n i s h e d many . 
P a l e s t i n i a n refugees i n the West Bank and Gaza began t o 
" i n f i l t r a t e " back across the a r m i s t i c e l i n e s on r a i d i n g ex-
p e d i t i o n s . Usually the i n f i l t r a t o r s were " r a i d i n g " t h e i r 
own farms which they could see from the border, since the 
a r m i s t i c e l i n e s cut many v i l l a g e s i n h a l f or separated them 
from t h e i r farmlands. 3 Later, however, these excursions 
began t o develop i n t o organised and p o l i t i c a l l y motivated 
undertakings, e s p e c i a l l y i n Jordan, where the ANM became 
inv o l v e d , h At t h i s stage the r a i d s became an embarrassment 
both to King Hussein i n Jordan and President Nasir i n Egypt 
1. Berger, OP c i t p, lM-2. 
2 . I t was the completion of t h i s scheme i n 196^ v/hich 
f i n a l l y detonated the P a l e s t i n i a n armed struggle. 
3. Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, p. 56. 
k. Cooley i n t e r v i e w , op c i t . 
3^ 
by b r i n g i n g d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y heavy I s r a e l i r e t a l i a t i o n on 
the border v i l l a g e s of both countries.1 Public opinion i n 
the Arab world began to demand some decisive a c t i o n as a 
r e p r i s a l f o r - t h e I s r a e l i a t t a c ks. ' 
King Hussein t a c k l e d the problem by imprisoning any i n f i l -
t r a t o r s t h a t were caught and i n s t i t u t i n g border p a t r o l s . 
President Nasir who wished to preserve h i s p o p u l a r i t y , could 
not solve the problem i n t h i s way. Thus, i n order t o prevent 
demands f o r an a l l - o u t war which he knew the Arabs could not 
win, he organised and t r a i n e d commando groups from among 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s i n Gaza. These groups then entered I s r a e l 
and undertook sabotage operations. Although these operations 
were only of l i m i t e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s , and brought even heavier 
I s r a e l i r e t a l i a t i o n , both on Gaza and the V/est Bank, they 
succeeded i n lessening the pressure f o r f u l l - s c a l e war. 2 
Plowever, war was not avoided i n the end f o r these operations 
together w i t h Nasir's gradual s l i d e towards the Communist 
bloc i n Foreign A f f a i r s r e s u l t e d i n the t r i - p a r t i t e invasion 
of Suez i n 1956. 
•The g u e r i l l a r a i d s ceased a f t e r t h i s , but they had achieved 
several t h i n g s . They had given the Palestinians i n Gaza a 
t a s t e of s p e c i f i c a l l y P a l e s t i n i a n m i l i t a r y organisation and 
had provided them w i t h some l i m i t e d experience i n g u e r i l l a 
a c t i v i t y . Moreover, Nasir had shown t h a t f o r him the 
P a l e s t i n e issue was one which could not be ignored. On the 
one hand i t could be u s e f u l t o him p o l i t i c a l l y and on the 
other as a popular leader he could not a f f o r d to neglect 
the i n t e r e s t s of the Palestinians e n t i r e l y . From the 
beginning h i s regime extended a c e r t a i n degree of formal 
r e c o g n i t i o n t o a d i s t i n c t and separate P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y . 
For example, new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l laws i n Gaza 3 gave the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s a greater measure of self-government w i t h i n 
the context of Egyptian m i l i t a r y r u l e , k 
1. Mansfield, OP c i t (Egypt). p. 56. The l a r g e s t I s r a e l i 
• r e t a l i a t i o n r a i d was on the West Bank v i l l a g e s of 
Nahhalin causing 9 deaths. Berger, op c i t . p. 101; 
OP c i t . p. 1 l 8 . 
2. Mansfield, OP c i t (Egypt). p. 56. 
3. January 195^« 
^. MEJ V o l . 8. p. 200. 
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2. The Re-emergence of Ha.1.1 Amin 
The occasion H a j j Amln chose t o begin serious p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y again was the apparent f u l f i l l m e n t of Arab n a t i o n a l i s t 
hopes, the formation of the United Arab Republic i n 1958. 
I n November 1957 w i t h the union only a few months away, 
H a j j Amin demanded t h a t Palestine become "an inseparable part 
o f S y r i a " and be included " w i t h i n i t s n a t u r a l f r o n t i e r s " 
as p a r t of the UAR. 1 
When the union a c t u a l l y took place h i s demands were r e -
newed " i n the name of the P a l e s t i n i a n people". 2 This was 
fol l o w e d by a massive propaganda campaign by the Higher 
Committee. 3 When'Nasir v i s i t e d Damascus i n March 1958 he 
was met by a P a l e s t i n i a n delegation which handed him a 
p e t i t i o n containing the same demands signed by over 5jOOO 
people, k 
The Higher Committee used the argument t h a t Palestine was 
"the only bridge l i n k i n g Egypt and Syria and u n i t i n g them". 
Thus, i n c l u s i o n of Palestine w i t h i n the UAR would r e a l i s e 
"the a s p i r a t i o n s of the Arab n a t i o n . " I t was i n a d d i t i o n 
"an e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r f o r the .defeat of colonialism and 
Zionism." 5 K a j j Amin's propaganda campaign was given 
added f o r c e by the r e v i v a l of the National Congress i n Gaza 
which had i n 19^8 r a t i f i e d the A l l Palestine Government. 6 
The Congress was c a l l e d together on the grounds t h a t i t was: 
" i n the a c t u a l circumstances . . . worthy 
t o be recognised as the best representative 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n Arab people." 
I t immediately proclaimed the union of Palestine to the UAR. 7 
1. Colombe, op c i t ^ p. 6 l . 
2. i b i d . 
3. See above, p. I f . 
> o Al-Ahram. 10th March 1958, 
5. Colpmbe, o p _ c i t , p. 62. 
6. See above, p. f y j ; 
7. Colombe, op c i t , p. 62. 
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Nasir was put i n a very d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . Union of Palestine 
t o the UAR was out of the question. "Palestine" included the 
West Bank of Jordan as w e l l as I s r a e l and therefore any move 
towards annexation would bri n g the UAR i n t o c o n f l i c t not only 
w i t h I s r a e l but also Jordan. At the same time, Nasir could 
not Ignore the wishes of the P a l e s t i n i a n s . He had to f i n d a 
compromise. He refused t o br i n g Palestine i n t o the UAR on 
the grounds t h a t he d i d not wish t o behave l i k e 'abdallah had 
. done p r e v i o u s l y i n annexing the West Bank. Moreover he 
refused t o allow t h a t the r e c o n s t i t u t e d N a t i o n a l Congress i n 
Gaza was any more representative of P a l e s t i n i a n wishes than 
'abdallah's Jericho Congress 1 had been. 2 New P a l e s t i n i a n 
i n s t i t u t i o n s would have t o be set up through which the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s could r e a l l y express t h e i r wishes. 
Thus 'in February 1958 Gaza was given a s p e c i a l charter 
which provided f o r an Executive Committee and a L e g i s l a t i v e 
Council t o be elected mainly from the refugees. 3 Two months 
l a t e r at i t s f i r s t meeting the new Executive Committee 
passed a unanimous r e s o l u t i o n recommending: 
" t o the r e l e v a n t a u t h o r i t i e s , the r e a l i s a t i o n 
of the annexation of Palestine t o the UAR 
at an opportune time and i n a way judged t o 
be convenient." k 
I n t h i s way Nasir d i d not have t o r e j e c t the union of 
Palestine t o the UAR out of hand. But he was given the power 
t o decide when and how i t should take place. However, the 
Palestine issue was not permitted to sink i n t o o b s c u r i t y 
again. . H a j j Amin continued t o a g i t a t e and Nasir himself 
had come t o r e a l i s e what a u s e f u l t o o l Palestine and the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s might be f o r him provided he could keep the 
s i t u a t i o n under c o n t r o l . 
1. See above, p. j^9V 
2. Colombe, op c i t . p. 63. 
3. The Executive Committee numbered 10, the L e g i s l a t i v e 
Council +^0 - 30 from the refugees, 5 of whom were t o 
represent the doctors, lawyers, teachers, merchants and 
farmers. The other 10 were t o be Egyptians. 
Colombe, op c i t . p, 63. 
^-o i b i d . 
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I n March 1959 he submitted a proposal t o the Arab League: 
"... t o organise the P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y 
and permit the P a l e s t i n i a n people to make 
t h e i r voices heard through elected repre-
sentatives on both the n a t i o n a l and 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . " 1 
N a t u r a l l y Nasir t r i e d t o ensure t h a t h i s i n i t i a t i v e s on Palestine 
d i d not undermine Arab Nationalism. A charter, which was p u b l i c l y 
read by the Mayor i n Gaza i n March 1959 shows how P a l e s t i n i a n 
developments were being f i r m l y placed w i t h i n the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t 
context: 
"We the sons of Palestine proclaim t h i s 
Charter t o which we pledge our allegiance: 
F i r s t : Palestine i s an inseparable part 
of the Arab land and i t s l i b e r a t i o n the 
sacred duty of a l l Arabs. I t s union w i t h 
the UAR i s n a t u r a l and indispensable to 
u n i t y . 
Second: I s r a e l i s an aggressive s t a t e , 
i l l e g a l l y established by Imperialism 
on the r u i n s of Arab Palestine and i t i s 
our duty t o crush a l l such I m p e r i a l i s t 
. bases. 
T h i r d : Arab nat i o n a l i s m and the t o t a l 
u n i t y of a l l Arabs i s the i n s p i r a t i o n 
and aim of our b a t t l e . 
Fourth: I t i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h a 
s o c i a l i s t , democratic and j u s t society 
i n which freedom and the r i g h t s of man 
are respected. 
F i f t h : Peace and p r o s p e r i t y must r u l e 
i n the Arab land. 
S i x t h : The establishment of the n a t i o n a l 
imlon 2 i s a p o s i t i v e measure necessary 
t o prevent dissension." 3 
This Charter f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t s the Arab N a t i o n a l i s t sentiment 
o f the time. More than anything else i t i s an a f f i r m a t i o n of 
f a i t h i n Nasir and h i s p o l i c i e s . 
1. Colombe, op c i t ^ p. 63. 
2. Nasir set up the N a t i o n a l Union as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 
3. Colombe, op c i t . p. 6^ -, f n . 3. 
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H a j j Amin had begun by t r y i n g t o use Nasir but Nasir had 
taken h i s place as champion of the P a l e s t i n i a n cause e s p e c i a l l y 
i n the minds of the new generation. I n May 1959 Nasir 
announced h i s i n t e n t i o n t o c a l l a.general Congress f o r 
P a l e s t i n i a n s and set up a commission to make the necessary 
preparations. Hajj Arain protested t h a t the Higher Committee 
was the only body which could genuinely represent the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s and "revive' the Palestine cause". 1 His pro-
t e s t went v i r t u a l l y unheard and overwhelming popular support 
went t o Nasir.. By August the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the two 
men had reached c r i s i s p o i n t and H a j j Amln was o f f i c i a l l y 
asked to leave Cairo. 2 
3, Palestine between the Arab states 
Nasir's p o p u l a r i t y throughout the Arab world was so great 
by t h i s , time t h a t i t was becoming an embarrassment to the 
other governments. His concern w i t h the Palestine issue 
obliged these other governments t o show t h a t they were also 
concerned w i t h the subject. When Nasir dismissed H a j j Amin 
from Cairo he gave the other Arab regimes the o p p o r t u n i t y 
they had been w a i t i n g f o r , and Palestine was brought i n t o 
the arena of inter-Arab r i v a l r i e s . I n t e r e s t i n the Palestine 
question was given an a d d i t i o n a l impetus at t h i s time by the 
imminent discussion at the UN of a new plan t o r e i n t e g r a t e 
the refugees i n the host c o u n t r i e s . 3 The implementation 
of such a plan was obviously not i n the i n t e r e s t s of 
Lebanon w i t h i t s d e l i c a t e Muslim-Christian balance t o 
maintain. Thus Lebanon was the f i r s t t o take advantage of 
H a j j Amin's dismissal and allowed him tp e s t a b l i s h h i s new 
Headquarters i n B e i r u t . On August 22nd 1959 Pierre Jemayal, 
M i n i s t e r of Public Works and leader of Hizb al-Kata'ib 
1. i b i d , pp. 6^-5. 
2. Schechtman, OE_cit, p. 26^+. 
3. This plan was sponsored by the Secretary General of 
UN, Dag Hammarskjeold, a f t e r he had v i s i t e d the area 
e a r l i e r i n the year. 
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(Phalangist party) 1 proposed t h a t a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e be 
created i n the parts of Palestine s t i l l i n Arab hands. 2 
This, i n t u r n provoked an immediate r e a c t i o n from the 
Jordanian government which had no i n t e n t i o n of r e l i n q u i s h i n g 
i t s hold, on the West Bank. On 28th August Hazza' a l - M a j a l i , 
the Prime M i n i s t e r 3 stated: 
"Jordan c a t e g o r i c a l l y refuses the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of a Palestine Government .... We would 
consider any c a l l f o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 
(such) a government an attack on our con-
s t i t u t i o n and sovereignty .... We would not, 
however, oppose a regrouping of P a l e s t i n i a n 
refugees.on our t e r r i t o r y . " h 
This controversy between Jordan and Lebanon continued t o 
develop and throughout H a j j Amin backed Jemayal. Then i n 
November 1959 the dispute was widened when the Higher Com-
mit t e e sent a long memorandum to a l l the Arab Heads of State 
and t o the Arab League. I t said e s s e n t i a l l y : 
"... the Arabs of Palestine request the Arab 
states t o handle the Palestine question w i t h 
a view t o r e a l i s i n g one a s p i r a t i o n . . . - t o 
stamp out Jewish aggression against Palestine 
.and purge i t of Zionism and Imperialism ... 
" I n view of the great part the Palestinians 
could play i n regaining t h e i r homeland we 
appeal t o the Arab states t o take the 
I n i t i a t i v e and b r i n g Palestine back i n t o 
existence i n a manner desired by the 
P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs, whether by p l e b i s c i t e 
or f r e e popular e l e c t i o n . 
"Such a move must be backed by t r a i n i n g , 
arms and money etc. A l l Palestinians from 
18-50 must be brought under compulsory 
m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and a Palestine army 
must be created, t r a i n e d and armed to be 
the vanguard of the Arab force which w i l l 
march t o regain Palestine." 5 
1o C h r i s t i a n Conservative. 
2. L'Orient. 23rd August 1959-
3. M a j a l i f i r s t became Prime M i n i s t e r at the end of 1955 
when Jordan was considering entry i n t o the Baghdad Pact. 
He l a s t e d only one week i n the face of h o s t i l e a n t i -
Fact demonstrations . He assumed power again i n 1959 
as the t h i r d Prime M i n i s t e r since the 1957 coup which 
had deprived Jordan of i t s f i r s t glimmer.of p o l i t i c a l 
democracy. He was assassinated one year l a t e r . From 
the s t a r t he was s t r o n g l y pro-Kashemite. 
h. L'Orient. 29th August 1959-
5. F u l l Text i n Jewish Observer and Middle East Review. 
January l 5 t h 196O. 
This could have remained j u s t one of the many memoranda 
and manifestos Issued by the Higher Committee had i t not been 
f o r the support accorded to i t by General 'abd al-Karim Qasim, 
the new r e v o l u t i o n a r y leader of I r a q . Qasim had overthrown 
the I r a q i monarchy the previous year through an army coup. 
Instead of taking I r a q i n t o the UAR as had a t f i r s t been 
expected, Qasim g r a d u a l l y became Nasir's main r i v a l f o r 
leadership of the Arab world. The f i n a l break i n r e l a t i o n s 
between Qasim and Naslr came i n March 1959 a f t e r a pro-UAR 
r e v o l t had been crushed i n the Mosul d i s t r i c t of I r a q . 1 
By championing the P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e , Qasim could 
embarrass both Naslr w i t h h i s moderate approach and King 
Hussein w i t h h i s o u t r i g h t r e j e c t i o n of the idea. He r i s k e d 
nothing by t h i s a t t i t u d e since he had n e i t h e r borders w i t h 
I s r a e l nor a large refugee problem.to contend w i t h . Thus on 
1 5th December 1959 before the I r a q i Medical Congress, Qasim 
declared: 
"The P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs cannot continue to l i v e 
under f o r e i g n t u t e l a g e . They are ready now 
f o r t h e i r own s t a t e and government .... Three 
gangsters have committed aggression against 
P a l e s t i n e , I s r a e l ... Jordan, and Egypt -
under Farouk .... These annexations no longer 
have any j u s t i f i c a t i o n and the Arabs of 
Palestine can assume a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e i r 
own a f f a i r s . The I r a q i Government w i l l 
support w i t h a l l i t s means the new Govern-
ment of Palestine ..." 2 
The r e a c t i o n s of Jordan and Egypt t o t h i s suggestion were 
quick, p r e d i c t a b l e and h o s t i l e , 3 but Qasim could not be 
d e f l e c t e d from h i s path by c r i t i c i s m . He continued to pro-
mote h i s idea of a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and elaborated i t . 
1 . U r i e l Dann, I r a q Under_Qas_sem, pp. 16^-77. 
2. L'Orient, l 6 t h Decem.ber 1959. 
3. See L'Orient^ 2 ^ t h December f o r M a j a i l ' s r e a c t i o n , 
and also Qasim's. 
^1 
He published the f u l l t e x t of H a j j Amln's long memorandum 
accusing the other governments of supressing i t , 1 I n t h i s 
. way he. o b l i g e d the other states t o take some sort of a c t i o n 
on Palestine simply to prevent him from having the sole 
' i n i t i a t i v e i n t h i s f i e l d . 
Thus on January ^ t h 196O Nasir announced the establishment 
o f a s p e c i f i c a l l y P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l Union i n the northern 
province of the UAR. ( t h a t i s , Syria) l i k e the one already 
established i n Gaza. 2 The Union i n Gaza had not been con-
sidered P a l e s t i n i a n as such apart from the f a c t that a l l the 
i n h a b i t a n t s of Gaza were P a l e s t i n i a n s . The establishment 
of a P a l e s t i n i a n as d i s t i n c t from. Syrian Union i n the 
n o r t h e r n UAR was a r e a l advance i n r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s as a separate e n t i t y . 3 
Jordan's response t o Qasim was less p o s i t i v e . On 19th 
January M a j a i l ^ i n a speech t o the parliament o u t l i n e d h i s 
plan, f o r solving the Palestine problem. He said the 
Palestine issue should not be used as a weapon of p o l i t i c a l 
bargaining and t h a t Arab co-operation i n the widest sense 
was needed. However, the most s i g n i f i c a n t points he made 
were the f o l l o w i n g : 
f i r s t : Any attempts t o t r a n s f e r the Palestine problem from 
the i n t e r - A r a b l e v e l t o one of narrow regionalism would be 
considered as a p l o t against Palestine and a f l i g h t from 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
second: The Jordanian e n t i t y must be recognised on both 
banks.of the r i v e r . 
• t h i r d : The s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of Jordan should be recognised 
i n t h a t the m a j o r i t y of P a l e s t i n i a n s now had Jordanian 
n a t i o n a l i t y . 
1. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review^ 15th January 196O. 
2. See above, p. :3B_JfnV.2. 
• 3 . MEJ V o l . I t f . p. 19«+, 
h. See above, p. l+O'nVJj". 
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By t h i s time the dispute had reached such a p i t c h t h a t the 
Arab League c a l l e d a Foreign M i n i s t e r s Conference i n Cairo. ' 1 
I r a q refused to a t t e n d , conducting a c o n t i n u a l propaganda war 
from Baghdad f o r the du r a t i o n of discussions, 2 Egypt accused 
I r a q of betraying Arabism and making common cause w i t h Zionism. 
Jordan repeatedly threatened to walk out unless discussions 
on the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y ceased. 3 The discussions ended on 
29th February 196O and the f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n was agreed 
upon: 
"The Council of the League of States has 
studied the problem of re-organising the 
Arab Pa l e s t i n i a n s and evaluating t h e i r 
p e r s o n a l i t y as a u n i f i e d people or simply 
as refugees. A l l the world should hear the 
voices of the Pa l e s t i n i a n s on the n a t i o n a l 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l through the medium, 
of t h e i r elected r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The 
Council noted the points of view expressed 
and decided to study the question when 
next i t meets." h 
The Council met again i n August, and although I r a q par-
t i c i p a t e d the r e s u l t s were equally negative. 5 A f t e r t h i s 
the League gave up any serious attempt to bring about agree-
ment and relegated the Palestine issue to sub-committees of 
"experts". A l l the recommendations of these sub-committees 
foundered on the rocks of Jordan's h o s t i l i t y towards any 
form, of P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y . 6 
I n the meantime, the various Arab regim.es continued w i t h 
t h e i r own p o l i c i e s . Both I r a q and Egypt began t o e s t a b l i s h 
P a l e s t i n i a n armies, each t r y i n g to appear as the one t r u e 
champion of the P a l e s t i n i a n cause. 7 At a passing out parade 
i n August 1960 Qasim addressed h i s P a l e s t i n i a n troops w i t h 
the assurance: 
1. I t opened on February 8 th 196O. 
2 . Colombe, OP c i t . p. 78 . 
3 . i b i d . 
ko i b i d pp, 78 -8 , f n , l^f, 
5. MEJ V o l . I t f , p. kk8, 
6. Meetings were held i n May and June 196I and recommended 
the c r e a t i o n of a P a l e s t i n i a n Government. But the r e -
commendations remained on paper only. 
7. The Egyptian t r a i n e d troops made t h e i r f i r s t appearance 
i n Gaza on 23rd J u l y 196O. MEJ Vol. 1 -^. p. Mf8; The 
I r a q i troops held a passing out parade on 11th August. 
Colombe, op c i t . p. 70. 
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"You w i l l very soon see w i t h your own eyes, 
the Holy V/ar which' w i l l s t a r t .... I con-
g r a t u l a t e you on the b i r t h of the e t e r n a l 
P a l e s t i n i a n Republic." 1 
Jordan's response was to i n t e n s i f y e f f o r t s to Jordanise her 
P a l e s t i n i a n s . New procedures were adopted to enable 
P a l e s t i n i a n s t o o b t a i n Jordanian n a t i o n a l i t y w i t h much less 
f o r m a l i t y than before, 2 
Up to t h i s p o i n t , H a j j Amin had been c a r e f u l not t o favour 
any one side i n the dispute, and c o n t i n u a l l y pressed f o r 
u n i f i e d Arab a c t i o n on P a l e s t i n e , By the middle of I 9 6 I he 
r e a l i s e d t h a t t h i s p o l i c y could not succeed and he decided 
t o throv/ i n h i s l o t w i t h Qasim. I n J u l y he went to Baghdad 
t o inspect the P a l e s t i n i a n troops there. 3 I t was an un-
f o r t u n a t e choice, f o r the death of Qasim i n February 1 9 6 3 
was also the p o l i t i c a l death of H a j j Amin. He was reduced 
once more to simply i s s u i n g declarations and p r o t e s t s . 
Before 1 9 6 2 t h i s wrangling over Palestine d i d not s i g n i f y 
any r e a l r e v i v a l o f popular P a l e s t i n i a n f e e l i n g , although, 
as a by-product, i t r e s u l t e d i n the establishment of new 
" P a l e s t i n i a n " i n s t i t u t i o n s , h Popular f e e l i n g remained w i t h 
Arab n a t i o n a l i s m and u n i t y , Palestinians continued working 
1 . Colombe, op c i t . p. 7 0 . 
2 . i b i d , p. 7 ^ . 
3 . i b i d , p. 7 5 . 
k. I n a d d i t i o n t o the armies, the p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n 
Gaza and the N a t i o n a l Unions i n both parts of the UAR, the 
P a l e s t i n i a n students i n both I r a q and the UAR v/ere unionised. 
Moreover i n March 1 9 6 2 Gaza was given a new C o n s t i t u t i o n 
which nominally gave the Palestinians more independence 
there w i t h i n the context s t i l l of Egyptian m i l i t a r y r u l e . 
I t must be r e a l i s e d however, t h a t i n the case of a l l these 
i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e i r establishment had been s o l e l y t o act as 
instruments f o r the regime which i n i t i a t e d them. They were 
not i n i t i a t e d by the Palestinians themselves. 
f o r Arab u n i t y through the n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s i n each separate 
country. Nasir's p o p u l a r i t y was a major f a c t o r i n t h i s 
e s p e c i a l l y f o r the! d u r a t i o n of the UAR experiment. The 
Palestine issue influenced Arab nationalism only i n s o f a r as 
i t reinforced, the anti-Western element and became an obstacle 
i n the path of any permanent rapprochement w i t h the West. 
• I n summary, we can say t h a t throughout the 1950s Arab 
n a t i o n a l i s m prevented the development of any s p e c i f i c a l l y 
P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s or the organisation of 
the Palestinians-as a separate e n t i t y . . Only the use of 
Palestine as a pol i t i c a l . w e a p o n by the d i f f e r e n t Arab 
regimes saved i t from complete o b s c u r i t y during these years. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY 
1961-196^ 
Having seen how Arab nationalism obscured the growth of 
any s p e c i f i c a l l y P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism i n the 1950s, we w i l l 
now examine i t s r e b i r t h i n the e a r l y 196OS. This period was 
d i f f i c u l t f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n s since Arab nationalism was not 
by any means dead and the new P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism had to 
st r u g g l e against i t s w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d ideology and i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
At f i r s t the Arab leaders t r i e d t o ignore and crush the new 
-feature i n Middle East p o l i t i c s . -Later, however, they t r i e d 
t o adopt i t as t h e i r own by modifying t h e i r ideology and 
al l o w i n g the establishment of new Pa l e s t i n i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Thus i n the e a r l y 1960s, P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s t f e e l i n g 
re-emerged and was expressed i n the formation of small groups 
dedicated to armed s t r u g g l e . A c e r t a i n l e v e l of i d e o l o g i c a l 
awareness also developed, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h al-Fateh's b e l i e f 
i n P a l e s t i n i a n independence of a c t i o n . 
The p r e v i o u s l y strong Arab nati o n a l i s m , which had i n 
some states become p a r t of the r u l i n g establishment, was 
forced t o accept the s e t t i n g up of new P a l e s t i n i a n i n s t i t u -
t i o n s . However, i t managed t o curb t h e i r power by placing 
them i n the hands o f what was l e f t of the old-guard 
P a l e s t i n i a n leadership rather than allowing them to f a l l 
i n t o the hands of the more r a d i c a l elements. 
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The Decline of Arab Nationalism 
The f i r s t r e a l blow t o Arab nationalism was the secession of 
Syria from the UAR at the end of I 9 6 I . 1 The f a i l u r e of t h i s 
f i r s t experiment i n u n i t y caused a l l the n a t i o n a l i s t leaders 
and p a r t i e s considerable loss of face. Moreover i t established 
the Syrian Ba'th as yet another r i v a l f o r the popular leader-
ship of the Arab world. 
The second blow came i n 1963» I n February of t h a t year 
Qasim was k i l l e d as the r e s u l t of a B a ' t h i s t coup. I r a q , 
S y r ia and Egypt thus a l l had leaders dedicated t o Arab 
n a t i o n a l i s m and the achievement of u n i t y . Talks began almost 
immediately i n the hope t h a t some form" of p o l i t i c a l union 
could be agreed upon. Formal agreement was reached i n A p r i l 
but i t was never put i n t o practice, and by the end o f the year 
the Arab world was more di v i d e d than ever. 2 
Thus by I963 the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s , whether Ba'thists or 
N a s i r i s t s (ANM) had revealed t h a t they were incapable of 
p u t t i n g t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s i n t o p r a c t i c e . The s p l i t between 
the Ba'th and the ANM was wider than before. The two 
B a ' t h i s t regimes i n I r a q and Syria were i n keen competition 
w i t h each other. The ANM had s p l i t a f t e r the f a i l u r e of the 
UAR, one wing remaining as a close adherent of Nasir's p o l i c y 
and the other wing moving to the l e f t . 3 A l l the n a t i o n a l i s t s , 
whatever t h e i r p a r t y , were h o s t i l e t o the Communist p a r t i e s . 
1, Unless otherwise s t a t e d , general h i s t o r i c a l background 
f o r t h i s chapter was drawn from Keesings Contemporary 
Archives; Cahiers de L ' I n s t i t u t de L'Orient Contemporain; 
the newspapers c i t e d i n the b i b l i o g r a p h y ; IPS, Kitab 
as-Sanawi. 196^. 
2, Later i n 1963 Nasir published the t e x t of these negotia-
t i o n s , r e v e a l i n g the Ba'th i n a r e l a t i v e l y unfavourable 
l i g h t . Nasir's p a r t i n these n e g o t i a t i o n s and h i s sub-
sequent behaviour seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t he was never 
r e a l l y i n favour of these new t a l k s . F u l l t e x t of the 
various discussions, both b i l a t e r a l and t r i l a t e r a l , i n 
American U n i v e r s i t y of B e i r u t , Arab Documents 196^.. 
pp. 75 -213. -
3 , The l e f t wing included the P a l e s t i n i a n branch l e d by 
George Habbash. This was i t s e l f d i v i d e d between r i g h t 
and l e f t , the l e f t centred on Naif Hawatmeh and the 
newspaper a l - H u r r i v a h published i n B e i r u t . Authors 
i n t e r v i e w s . B e i r u t , summer 1969o 
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Consequently, there appeared a general d i s i l l u s i o n w i t h a l l 
the e x i s t i n g Arab p o l i t i c a l organisations. 
. I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the main source of the party 
d i f f e r e n c e s was Palestine. Both the Ba'th and the ANM r e j e c t e d 
the Communists because they had accepted p a r t i t i o n and recog-
nised I s r a e l , while the Ba'th and the ANM continued to argue 
over the p r i o r i t y of "socialism" or "revenge". 1 
The Beginnings of the Fedayeen 2 
As e a r l y as 1956 a new f a c t o r had appeared on the Arab 
p o l i t i c a l scene. This was the development among the P a l e s t i n -
ians themsfehlves of small clandestine groups dedicated t o r e -
gaining Palestine through armed s t r u g g l e . They had remained 
t o t a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t while Arab nationalism maintained i t s 
p o p u l a r i t y but i n the e a r l y 1960s the s i t u a t i o n became more 
fa v o u r a b l e . f o r t h e i r growth and acceptance. As w e l l as the 
d i s i l l u s i o n w i t h Arab Nationalism, there was the success of 
the A l g e r i a n armed struggle i n 1962. The defeat of the French 
army by popular warfare had a profound e f f e c t on the Arab 
world and gave impetus t o the new t h i r d world theories of 
n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n war. 
The most important of these new P a l e s t i n i a n groups was a l -
Fateh. 3 The o r i g i n a l c e l l s of t h i s movement were formed i n 
Gaza during I s r a e l ' s occupation of the area a f t e r the invasion 
o f Suez i n 1956. For the founders of al-Fateh, the invasion 
o f Suez was conclusive proof t h a t the Palestinians could not 
.depend on the Arab states t o prevent f u r t h e r I s r a e l i expansion. 
They t h e r e f o r e reasoned t h a t the Palestinians must i n the 
f u t u r e adopt a p o l i c y ' o f s e l f - r e l i a n c e and independent a c t i o n . 
The f i r s t stage i n t h e i r strategy was to reassert the P a l e s t i n -
i a n i d e n t i t y . When t h i s had been achieved i t would then be 
possible t o enter the second stage of t h e i r strategy, armed 
s t r u g g l e f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine. 
1 . See Ch. 2 pp. 3 0 - 3 2 . 
2 . The word " f e d a ' i " implies readiness to s a c r i f i c e ones 
l i f e . f o r a cause. I t i s more loosely used to mean 
p a r t i s a n or g u e r i l l a f i g h t e r , 
3 . The o r g a n i s a t i o n derived i t s name from the reverse of 
i t s i n i t i a l s , Harakat a t - T a h r i r al-Watani a ^ F a l a s t i n i 
( P a l e s t i n i a n N a tional L i b e r a t i o n Movement). The name 
i t s e l f means " v i c t o r y " i n the sense i n which the word 
was used i n the Qur'an. 
With the withdrawal of I s r a e l i forces from Gaza and the 
establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force along the 
border, al-Fateh was obliged t o t r a n s f e r i t s centre of a c t i v i t y 
elsewhere. Kuwait,was chosen, and more c e l l s were formed among 
Pa l e s t i n i a n s not only i n the Arab world but also i n Europe, 
e s p e c i a l l y West Germany. 1 Nasir accused the movement of being 
l i n k e d w i t h CENTO 2 i n an attempt t o destroy i t s r e p u t a t i o n 
before i t could e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f . At t h i s stage the existence 
of al-Fateh was not a t h r e a t to Nasir None of i t s c o l l e c t i v e 
leadership was known .by name. 
The basic p r i n c i p l e s of the movement were drawn up i n 1958 
by i t s C e n t r a l Comm.ittee. 3 They can be summarised as f o l l o w s : 
1. Revolutionary violence i s the only way to l i b e r a t e the 
homeland. 
2. This'violence must be exercised by the masses. 
3. The aim of t h i s violence i s t o l i q u i d a t e the Z i o n i s t e n t i t y , 
p o l i t i c a l l y , m i l i t a r i l y and economically, from the whole of 
occupied Palestine. 
1+. Revolutionary a c t i o n must be independent of any st a t e or 
p a r t y . 
5. Revolutionary a c t i o n should not interf^^pe i n the a f f a i r s 
of the Arab s t a t e s . 
6. Revolutionary a c t i o n w i l l be of long d u r a t i o n . 
7. Revolutionary a c t i o n w i l l be based upon a clandestine 
form of or g a n i s a t i o n . 
8. . The r e v o l u t i o n i s P a l e s t i n i a n i n o r i g i n and Arab i n i t s 
extension. 
9. The P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n i s an I n t e g r a l part of the Arab 
r e v o l u t i o n , which i s i t s e l f p a r t of the world r e v o l u t i o n . 
1 0 . The land of Palestine i s f o r those who a c t i v e l y f i g h t f o r 
i t s l i b e r a t i o n . 
1 1 . The f u t u r e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e w i l l be non-sectarian and 
democratic, where Jews, Muslims and Christians w i l l l i v e 
i n e q u a l i t y w i t h equal r i g h t s and d u t i e s , k 
* 
I n autumn 1959 as p a r t of the f i r s t phase of t h e i r strategy, 
al-Fateh began p u b l i s h i n g a magazine i n B e i r u t c a l l e d Fala-
stinuna (Our P a l e s t i n e ) , i n which i t expounded ideas of a 
separate P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y and the need f o r independent 
a c t i o n . Three main p o i n t s , c o n t i n u a l l y stressed i n t h i s 
p u b l i c a t i o n were: 
1. L e i l a S. Kadi, OP c i t . p. 16. 
2. i b i d , p. 17. 
3 . Author.'s i n t e r v i e w w i t h Abu Ibrahim, al-Fateh, summer I 9 6 9 . 
k» These p r i n c i p l e s have never been published as a manifesto 
or programme. They can be extracted from l a t e r p u b l i c a t i o n s , 
the pamphlets Dirasat wa Tu.larib Thav/riyyah e s p e c i a l l y the 
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f i r s t one.Min Kuntalagat al-'amal al-Feda'i. See also Risalah 
Min al-Fateh i l a ash-Sha'b al-Lubnani. 
F i r s t , e s t a b l i s h i n g a P a l e s t i n i a n .entity was ess e n t i a l f o r 
the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine since the Arab states had f a i l e d 
t o do anything towards t h i s end. 1 
"We, the P a l e s t i n i a n s , are enthusiastic and 
favourable towards the r e a l i s a t i o n of Arab 
u n i t y , but we re g r e t we cannot do anything 
under present circumstances, i n t h i s area 
because we have no E n t i t y to represent us 
on an equal f o o t i n g w i t h the Arab e n t i t i e s 
.-... Let the E n t i t y be f i r s t and the 
struggle f o r u n i t y f o l l o w ..." 2 
Second, the Palestinians should not side w i t h any p a r t y i n 
the i n t e r - A r a b disputes since t h i s would merely exacerbate 
the h o s t i l i t y of the opposing p a r t i e s . 3 
" I t i s unreasonable f o r us t o a l i g n our-
selves w i t h those who are conspiring 
against our cause since t h i s means 
n a t i o n a l treachery. I t goes without 
saying t h a t we are c a r e f u l to d i f f e r e n t -
iate, between l i b e r a l s and n o n - l i b e r a l s . 
Our b a t t l e i s not between regimes and 
b e l i e f s , i t i s a b a t t l e of a people 
scattered throughout the world." k 
T h i r d , the only s o l u t i o n t o the P a l e s t i n i a n problem would be 
the emergence of a fedayeen movement "... to destroy those 
t h i n g s considered e s s e n t i a l f o r l i f e support i n the usurped 
homeland ..." 5 
The magazine gave f i v e reasons f o r the importance of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a fedayeen movement: 
" F i r s t , the establisiiment of groups i n each 
• Arab country, independent of any p a r t i c u l a r 
l i n e , would give these countries no reason 
to ban them on the grounds t h a t they were 
working f o r a r i v a l government. 
Second, many non-Palestinian Arabs would 
-be prepared to help a l i b e r a t i o n movement 
provided i t d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
inter-Arab b i c k e r i n g . 
1 . , Falastinuna^ March 1962 p. 3» 
2 . i b i d , A p r i l I 5 t h 1963, p. 6 . 
3 . i b i d . March 1962, p. 3-
k, i b i d . A p r i l I 5 t h 1963, p. 2 0 . 
5 . i b i d , March 1962, p. 3 . 
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T h i r d , I s r a e l would have no i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 
recognised r i g h t t o r e t a l i a t e against any 
Arab s t a t e since i n i t i a l l y the movement 
• , would have no c e n t r a l d i r e c t i o n . I t would 
be simply groups of Palestinians t r y i n g 
f o r c i b l y t o r e t u r n home i n pursuance of a 
r i g h t long recognised by the UN.. 
• Fourth, once the E n t i t y had been established 
these groups would u n i t e spontaneously t o 
form a r e a l P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y based upon 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s . They would not accept 
any ephemeral p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y set up by the 
Arab s t a t e s . 
F i f t h , once t h i s u n i f i c a t i o n had occured the 
Pale s t i n i a n s could demand Arab resistance 
through t h e i r f r e e P a l e s t i n i a n Government, 
a r e a l not a nominal body, which would f i g h t 
t o regain Palestine w i t h force not w i t h 
words u n l i k e those who had h i t h e r t o claimed 
t r u s t e e s h i p over, the Palestine problem." 1 
Thus we can see t h a t al-Fateh recognised the bankruptcy of 
Arab nat i o n a l i s m as a p r a c t i c a l t o o l f o r regaining Palestine 
at a very e a r l y stage. By the e a r l y 196OS, when d i s i l l u s i o n 
was becoming general, al-Fateh had already developed i t s 
. theory and l a i d the foundations of i t s organisation which 
would u l t i m a t e l y provide an a l t e r n a t i v e to the o l d ideas 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Al-Fateh was not the only organisation of i t s k i n d at t h i s 
time. One other deserves mention i n s o f a r as i t continued to 
e x i s t i n various forms down t o the 1 9 7 0 s . 2 This was Jabhah 
a-t-Tahrir a l - F a l a s t i n i y y a h (Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Front) PLF. 3 
I t professed no p o l i t i c a l ideology of any kind other than the 
use of armed struggle t o l i b e r a t e Palestine. I t was an 
e s s e n t i a l l y m i l i t a r y group comprising some twenty Palestinians 
mainly ex-members of the regular Arab armies and mostly from 
S y r i a , h I t began clandestine organisation inside Syria during 
the UAR and f o r some time maintained l i n k s .with al-Fateh. 
1 . i b i d . 
2. There were many small groups of three or four people. 
These groups were of a t r a n s i e n t nature, 
3 . See Table I I . 
If. The leiaders of the group were Alnmed J i b r i l , ex-Sandhurst 
o f f i c e r i n the Syrian Army, and Ahmed Za'rur, f o r m e r l y 
an o f f i c e r i n the Jordanian Army and p o l i t i c a l l y a 
N a s i r i s t . Author's i n t e r v i e w s , 'amman, summer 1 9 6 9 . 
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At t h i s period i t explained i t s separate existence and develop-
ment on p u r e l y geographical grounds. 1 I t was b a s i c a l l y an un-
s t a b l e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l l y i n g i t s e l f w i t h other groups not on 
p r i n c i p l e but on the basis of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 2 
Al-Fateh and the PLF were the seeds of a new P a l e s t i n i a n -
based and P a l e s t i n i a n - o r i e n t e d Resistance movement, but these 
seeds were unable t o grow while Arab nationalism and Arab u n i t y 
maintained t h e i r popular appeal. There were a number of 
s p e c i f i c as' w e l l as general developments i n 1963 which favoured 
t h i s new P a l e s t i n i a n f e e l i n g , and which forced the o l d p a r t i e s 
and regimes to take a less h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e towards i t . 
Arab A t t i t u d e s to P a l e s t i n i a n Nationalism 
. I n June I 9 6 3 , Ahmed H i l m i , 3 the head of the moribund A l l 
Palestine Government h and the P a l e s t i n i a n representative t o 
the Arab League, died. The problem of his successor was d i s -
cussed at the kOth Session of the League held i n September. 
These discussions showed t h a t there were s t i l l deep d i v i s i o n s 
between the regimes over Palestine although there was an i n -
creasing desire to come to some ki n d of agreement. 
The p o s i t i o n s taken by the various states was consistent 
w i t h t h e i r past a t t i t u d e s . Nasir v/as not h o s t i l e t o the 
c r e a t i o n of a P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y , p r o v i d i n g he could ensure 
c o n t r o l o f i t . Lebanon favoured the idea since t h i s lessened 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the P a l e s t i n i a n refugees becoming i n t e g r a t e d 
i n t o Lebanon and u p s e t t i n g the Muslim-Christian balance there. 
On 12 th September the Foreign M i n i s t e r , P h i l i p Takla declared: 
"The concern of Lebanon i s always to main-
t a i n i n t a c t the P a l e s t i n i a n p e r s o n a l i t y , 
preventing t h e i r establishment i n another 
home and doing everything to allow the 
P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs to take f a t e i n t o t h e i r 
own hands and defend t h e i r i n t e r e s t s more 
e f f e c t i v e l y . " 5 
1 . Ai-Fateh was based i n the Gulf. The PLF noted other 
d i f f e r e n c e s , claiming m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y f o r themselves 
but a l l o w i n g t h a t al-Fateh was p o l i t i c a l l y more s o p h i s t i -
cated because i t s members were drawn from workers, admini-
s t r a t o r s , engineers and others employed p r o f e s s i o n a l l y 
i n the Gulf. Al-Fateh was also more v i a b l e f i n a n c i a l l y . 
Author's i n t e r v i e w s , 'amman, summer I969. 
2 . The PLF l a t e r l e f t al-Fateh and a l l i e d i t s e l f w i t h the ANM 
when the l a t t e r seemed t o be increasing i n p o p u l a r i t y . 
• I t l a t e r l e f t the ANM f o r al-Fateh again. See Tables I I & IV. 
3 . See Ch. 1 , p7"T7"l'n.'^j^, 
See Ch. 1 , p V j T V i 
5. L'Orient. 1 3 t h September 1963. 
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The new B a ' t h i s t regime i n Iraiq c a r r i e d on w i t h Qasim's p o l i c y 
and took the i n i t i a t i v e at the Arab League by submitting a 
r e s o l u t i o n which, i n a d d i t i o n t o pressing f o r the replacement 
of H i l m i , stated: 
"The I r a q i Government.considers t h a t the time 
has come f o r the Palestinians t o take t h e i r 
a f f a i r s and problems i n hand on a vast scale .... 
The I r a q i Government considers possible the 
meeting of representatives f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n 
people i n the form of a National Council 
charged w i t h choosing the P a l e s t i n i a n repre-
s e n t a t i v e to the League and on i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
l e v e l s .... The Council w i l l then ... choose 
members of an A l l Palestine Government to 
represent the P a l e s t i n i a n s . (This Government) 
w i l l be charged w i t h i n i t i a t i n g the f i g h t to 
l i b e r a t e P a l e s t i n e , t a k i n g as i t s example the 
Algerian s i t u a t i o n before independence .... 
( I t w i l l undertake) the formation of a 
Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Army . . . . " 1 
As on previous occasions the main obstacle t o acceptance of a 
P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y was not so much the r i v a l r y between Nasir and 
the B a ' t h i s t s as the down r i g h t h o s t i l i t y of Jordan. Now t h a t 
Arab u n i t y had been revealed as incapable of achieving anything 
w i t h respect t o Palestine King Hussein f e l t safe i n using the 
u n i t y argument t o combat the idea of a P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y : 
• "..., There must be a concerted Arab p o l i t i c a l 
e f f o r t to r a l l y the necessary i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
support ,.. to enable. ... authentic and funda-
mental u n i t y between the Arab s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y 
those bordering on Palestine ..." 2 
I n an attempt t o appease Jordan one Ahmed Shuqeiry, 3 who was 
1 . Orient No. 27. pp. 2 2 9 - 3 0 . 
2 . L'Orient, 2 7 t h August 1963« King Hussein's address to 
Arab students i n America. 
3 . Ahmed Shuqeiry had been a prominent n a t i o n a l i s t f i g u r e i n 
Palestine before 19'+8, where he p r a c t i s e d as a lav/yer. He v/as 
born i n Acre the son of a r e l i g i o u s sheikh who was an adherent 
of the Nashashibis. Alimed Shuqeiry himself supported K a j j 
Amin. He was w e l l known as an o r a t o r . A f t e r 19^-8 he became 
Assi s t a n t Secretary General to the Arab League, then a mem-
ber of the Syrian delegation to the UN and f i n a l l y Saudi 
Arabian delegate t h e r e . He has been described as "... a 
n a t i o n a l i s t of the o l d type l i n k e d to the upper s t r a t a of 
, society and t o the Arab governments w i t h no confidence i n the 
masses or t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n . He i s an i n d i v i d u a l i s t and a 
demagogue." Author's i n t e r v i e w w i t h Abu Fadi 'amman, 
• summer 1969« 
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becoming something of an u n o f f i c i a l spokesman f o r Palestine, was 
c a l l e d t o the League meeting. The general communique published 
at the. end of the session was s l i g h t l y less negative than 
previous, ones. I t a f f i r m e d the r i g h t f o r the Palestinians 
" t o take t h e i r cause i n t o t h e i r own hands and 
f o r the League to permit them t o a f f i r m t h e i r 
p e r s o n a l i t y and E n t i t y . " 1 
I t also accepted the p r i n c i p l e s upon which the I r a q i note was 
based. The p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t of t h i s meeting was the appointment 
of Shuqeiry to replace H i l m i . He was delegated to v i s i t the 
Arab states to discuss the P a l e s t i n i a n s i t u a t i o n and draw up 
p r a c t i c a l plans f o r "defence of the cause at the l e v e l of 
a c t i o n . " 2 
• The League meeting had thus gained l i m i t e d o f f i c i a l Arab 
approval f o r some form of P a l e s t i n i a n organisation and had 
appointed Shuqeiry t o undertake p r a c t i c a l measures to t h i s end. 
The meeting d i f f e r e d "from i t s predecessors i n one other respect. 
I t had been the subject of pressure from the Palestinians them- . 
selves i n support of the I r a q i p r o j e c t . The P a l e s t i n i a n students 
i n I r a q sent a manifesto to the League which stated: 
"The P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y can only be r e a l i s e d 
through the c o n s t i t u t i o n of popular 
P a l e s t i n i a n organisations based on a pro-
gressive p o l i t i c a l f r o n t commanding the 
P a l e s t i n i a n f i g h t e r s i n the place of 
combat ..." 
The manifesto condemned: 
"those corrupt elements who use the P a l e s t i n i a n 
problem f o r bargaining .... I t i s f o r the 
young people, sharpened by l i f e i n the 
refugee camps, to take a c t i o n which w i l l 
b r i n g v i c t o r y .. . "3 
At the end of 1963 two developments concerning Palestine 
hastened the process which had already s t a r t e d towards the 
establisliment of a P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y . F i r s t , i t was generally 
1. Al-Ahram, I 5 t i i September I 963 . 
2. i b i d . • 
3 . L'Orient, 1ktti. September 1963. 
5^  
believed t h a t when the UN debated the Annual Report of UNRWA 
t h a t year, the occasion would be used t o force a f i n a l s e t t l e -
ment of the Palestine problem through compensation of the 
refugees. 1 Only Jordan was not disturbed by t h i s rumour 
since settlement of the refugee problem would be a kind of 
guarantee f o r continued Jordanian possession of the West Bank. 
The popular regimes, on the other hand, could not a f f o r d to 
l e t t h i s happen without o f f e r i n g some kind o f opposition. By 
t h i s time S y r i a , as w e l l as I r a q and Egypt, had begun t o show 
. p u b l i c concern over Palestine. Thus i n November, when the 
UN C o n c i l i a t i o n Commission f o r Palestine announced t h a t the 
USA had begun contacts w i t h the Arab states and I s r a e l w i t h a 
view t o settlement of the Palestine problem, the Syrian Foreign 
M i n i s t e r declared: 
"... there i s no t r u t h whatever i n t h i s s t a t e -
ment .... I t i s clear t h a t t h i s i s consistent 
w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n already received to the e f f e c t 
t h a t the Palestine problem i s to be e x p l o i t e d 
. once more by American e f f o r t s to g r a t i f y 
American Jews i n view of the p r o x i m i t y of 
the P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . " 2 
This time, however, the defence of Palestine at the UN was not 
l e f t i n the hands of the Arab s t a t e s . The Arab League 
authorised Shuqeiry t o lead an l8-member P a l e s t i n i a n delegation 
t o put the P a l e s t i n i a n case before the General Assembly. I n 
the course of four major speeches, Shuqeiry made i t q u i t e 
c l e a r t h a t the Pa l e s t i n i a n s were no longer prepared to be con-
sidered simply as a problem of r e l i e f . At the end of his f i n a l 
speech he summarised the new a t t i t u d e which v/as developing 
among the P a l e s t i n i a n s : 
" F i r s t , r e p a t r i a t i o n i s our r i g h t without 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n or r e s e r v a t i o n .... 
Secondly, on the refugee question and on 
the Palestine question as a whole, the 
United Nations should address i t s e l f to 
us, the people o f Palestine .... The f i n a l 
d estiny of our people ... and the f u t u r e 
• of our country s h a l l be determined by our 
. people • o • o 
1 . Ania Francos, Les P a l e s t i n i e n s , p. 1^-9. 
2. Al-Ba'th, November 6 t h 1963-
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T h i r d l y , any r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r 
neg o t i a t i o n s between the Arab states and 
I s r a e l s h a l l be of no a v a i l . Such a 
• r e s o l u t i o n would be addressed to the 
wrong p a r t y .... The Arab states are no 
par t y to negotiate the n a t i o n a l r i g h t s 
o f the people of Palestine ... 
• F o u r t h l y , the only s o l u t i o n l i e s i n the 
-recognition of the r i g h t s of the people 
- . o f Palestine ... to l i v e i n t h e i r homeland 
i n d i g n i t y and l i b e r t y and w i t h n a t i o n a l 
sovereignty. 
F i f t h l y , should the United Nations con-
t i n u e a p o l i c y of i n a c t i o n ... we the 
people of Palestine s h a l l seek by a l l 
means to regain our homes, our land and 
our homeland.. 
As a c o l o n i a l issue the problem of 
Palestine can only be solved through 
an Algerian s o l u t i o n . . . . " 1 
The second, and most important development was the imminent 
completion o f the I s r a e l i scheme t o d i v e r t water from the 
Jordan r i v e r t o the Negev. This was viewed by the Arabs i n 
general and the P a l e s t i n i a n s i n p a r t i c u l a r as a h u m i l i a t i o n 
second only t o the defeat of 1 9 ^ 8 . Public opinion ran 
dangerously high c a l l i n g f o r a l l - o u t war i f necessary to 
prevent the p r o j e c t from being put i n t o operation. 
Although Arab nationalism and u n i t y had l o s t much of i t s 
popular appeal, Nasir's personal p o p u l a r i t y was s t i l l very 
high, i n times of c r i s i s the Arabs s t i l l looked to him f o r 
a s o l u t i o n . As on the previous occasion 2 when there had 
been a demand f o r war, he knew t h a t , i f such a war broke out, 
the Arabs would lose i t . He th e r e f o r e had to f i n d an a l t e r n a -
t i v e . His reluctance to f i g h t w i t h I s r a e l gave his opponents, 
both progressive and t r a d i t i o n a l i s t , the chance t o launch a 
b i t t e r propaganda campaign against him, accusing him of 
evading h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I n s p i t e o f these inter-Arab 
d i v i s i o n s , Nasir r e a l i s e d t h a t the only r e a l s o l u t i o n t o the 
immediate problem was t o draw up a p o l i c y of united a c t i o n 
w i t h which the other regimes would have to agree. Nasir d i d 
not want t o take sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r solving the problem. 
1 . UN, GA OR l 8 t h Year.'UN Doc. A/SPC/PV l f13. 
2 , See Ch.. 2 pp.- 3 ^ & 3 5 . 
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Thus, on 2 3 r d December 1963 he issued a c a l l f o r an Arab Summit 
Conference t o discuss the s i t u a t i o n : 
we are prepared to meet those w i t h 
whom we are i n c o n f l i c t . For the sake 
of P a l e s t i n e , we are prepared to s i t 
w i t h those w i t h whom we have a dispute .... 
We t e l l you t r u t h f u l l y t h a t we cannot 
use f o r c e today because our circumstances 
do not a l l o w us. Be p a t i e n t w i t h us, 
the b a t t l e of Palestine can continue .... 
Let us t r y to f o r g e t a l l the s t u p i d i t i e s 
and i r r i t a t i o n s o f the l a s t few years ..." 1 
The F i r s t Arab Summit Conference. January 196^. 
The summit met between 13th and 17th January 196^ . A l l the 
Arab Heads of State attended, i n c l u d i n g Ahmed Shuqeiry as 
rep r e s e n t a t i v e f o r Palestine. The two main subjects of d i s -
•cussion were the Jordan Waters Scheme and the possible 
establishment of a Pa l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y . 
Nasir's suggestion f o r s o l v i n g the problem of the Jordan 
waters wi t h o u t d e c l a r i n g or provoking war w i t h I s r a e l was tha t 
the Arab states should imjnediately begin t h e i r own schemes 
to d i v e r t the water from the t r i b u t a r i e s of the Jordan. This 
suggestion'was r e a d i l y accepted by the Arab states as an 
o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and Nasir's p o p u l a r i t y was s t i l l s u f f i c i e n t 
t o carry p u b l i c opinion i n i t s favour. Moreover, to pro t e c t 
the Arab schemes, a U n i f i e d Arab Command was set up as a 
m i l i t a r y s u b s t i t u t e f o r p o l i t i c a l u n i t y . 
The other important decision of the summit was the c o n f i r - -
mation of the Arab League decision of the previous September 
t o set up a P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y . Shuqeiry was confirmed i n h i s 
p o s i t i o n and agreed to undertake a f u r t h e r tour of the Arab 
st a t e s . The aim of t h i s tour would be to discuss and p u b l i c i s e 
two documents which he had drawn Up, the d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n 
f o r the e n t i t y , 2 and the d r a f t o f a P a l e s t i n i a n National 
Charter. 3 A f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h a l l i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s 
these documents would be submitted to a Pal e s t i n i a n National 
Congress f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
1 . American U n i v e r s i t y of B e i r u t , Chronology of Arab P o l i t i c s 
V o l i _ L N g ^ , p. 6 9 . 
2 . See Appendix I I . 
3 . See Appendix I . 
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Jordan had agreed to the establishment of the e n t i t y only 
under p r o t e s t and as an a l t e r n a t i v e to war w i t h I s r a e l . Hussein 
made h i s p o s i t i o n abundantly c l e a r : 
"... I wish a l l Arabs to understand my personal 
c o n v i c t i o n about the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y as the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the P a l e s t i n i a n people and the 
concentration of- i t s forces. I t i s a new force 
to be added t o the e x i s t i n g Arab forces and t o 
give them new vigour .... We want the r e a l i s a t i o n 
of t h i s e n t i t y , but i t must i n no way threaten 
our Jordanian u n i t y .... The P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y 
must not i n any way change the f a c t that 
Jordan, w i t h i t s two banks, i s the only base 
which can serve as a p o i n t of departure f o r 
l i b e r a t i o n of the usurped hom.eland." 1 
Hussein could only t o l e r a t e the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y as long 
as i t was merely a t o o l of Arab p o l i c y and had no inherent 
power or e f f e c t i v e n e s s . I n f a c t an e n t i t y w i t h r e a l independence 
of a c t i o n would not only have alarmed Hussein but also a l l the 
other Arab leaders i n c l u d i n g Nasir. Thus the e n t i t y was subject 
to considerable l i m i t a t i o n s i n i t s power and independence of 
a c t i o n . Ahmed Shuqeiry had been' c a r e f u l l y selected by the 
Arab states as someone upon whom they could r e l y not to 
embarrass them. He had great freedom of a c t i o n and held the 
e n t i r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r developing ..the e n t i t y . He drew up 
i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n and the P a l e s t i n i a n National Charter i n con-
s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Arab states and on h i s numerous v i s i t s t o 
d i f f e r e n t Arab countries he had the freedom to choose those 
w i t h whom he consulted. I n t h i s way any undesirable influence 
on the e n t i t y could be avoided. 
Shuqeiry spent much e f f o r t f o l l o w i n g the Summit i n a l l a y i n g 
the fears of the Arab establishment i n general: 
"... The Palestine Organisation w i l l not take 
• the form of a government and w i l l have no con-
s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y over the Palestinians ..." 2 
and King Hussein i n p a r t i c u l a r : 
"... I t i s not our i n t e n t i o n t o create a 
P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e i n Jerusalem or elsewhere, 
but t o launch l i b e r a t i o n ..." 3 
However, Shuqeiry was not so successful i n reassuring the new 
P a l e s t i n i a n groups whose fears were of q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t k i n d. 
1 . Speech before the Jordanian Parliament 2 5 t h February 196^ . 
2 . Proeres Egyptien. 2 0th January 196^ . 
3 . i b i d , 2 0 t h February 196^ . 
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The New P a l e s t i n i a n Organisations and the P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y 
By 196^+ the new P a l e s t i n i a n organisations, t h a t i s the 
unions of students workers etc. which had sprung up during the 
Qasim-Nasir dispute, and the new fedayeen groups, were becom-
ing an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the established Arab n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s . 
Three days before the-summ.it opened the PLF 1 issued a s t a t e -
ment warning against any attempt t o solve the Jordan waters 
problem by d i v e r t i n g the t r i b u t a r i e s . This would be a r e t u r n 
to the a b o r t i v e plans 2 of the 1950s. The statement asked 
the Arab states t o take a clear, stand against f o r e i g n i n t e r -
vention i n the event of an A r a b - I s r a e l i war. The PLF said 
t h a t the b a t t l e over the Jordan waters should be part of the 
l i b e r a t i o n b a t t l e demanding r e c o g n i t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
p e r s o n a l i t y and the r i g h t of the Palestinians to be the van-
guard of any armed r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n t o regain Palestine. 
I n a d d i t i o n , the PLF asked t h a t Western economic i n t e r e s t s , 
l i k e the o i l , be used as a weapon i n the b a t t l e . F i n a l l y the 
f r o n t warned t h a t a hundred m i l l i o n Arabs, i n c l u d i n g a m i l l i o n 
expelled P a l e s t i n i a n s , were looking to the summit: 
... w i t h hearts throbbing w i t h fear and un-
ease t h a t your decisions w i l l not be equal 
to the honour of t h i s n a t i o n which you 
represent." 3 
The f a c t t h a t the PLF f e l t able to make such a publi c 
d e c l a r a t i o n i n d i c a t e d b e t t e r than anything else the change 
i n the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere. I t showed the extent to which 
scepticism of Arab p o l i c y and i n t e n t i o n s had developed among 
some sections of the P a l e s t i n i a n s . The de c l a r a t i o n also 
revealed several f a c t s about the f r o n t i t s e l f . ' I t showed lack 
o f v i s i o n and a c e r t a i n degree of i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The only 
t h i n g to be gained from t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n was to p u b l i c i s e the 
f r o n t ' s existence, which, i n the p r e v a i l i n g state of Arab 
pu b l i c o p i n i o n , could hardly be designed to f u r t h e r any plans 
to launch a n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n war. D i s i l l u s i o n had not yet 
reached the stage where such a p o l i c y , i f p u b l i c l y s t a t e d , would 
be t o l e r a t e d , or could force t o l e r a t i o n through publ i c support. 
The PLF's a t t i t u d e was i n f a c t i n keeping w i t h t h a t of the Syrian 
1 . See above pp. 51 & 5 2 . 
2 . See Ch. 2 pp. 33 & 3 ^ . 
. 3 . I n s t i t u t e f o r Palestine Studies (IPS), Al-Kitab as°Sanawi 
111-Oadiah a l - F a l a s t i n i v v a h Vol. 1 196^. pp. 9 2 - 3 . 
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Ba'th. I n view of Ahjned J i b r i l ' s 1 o r i g i n s i n the Syrian Army 
i t i s not inconceivable t h a t the main aim of the d e c l a r a t i o n 
was simply t o add an element of P a l e s t i n i a n support t o Syria's 
stand against Nasir. 
I n c o n t r a s t t o the PLF, al-Fateh showed more caution. A l -
though the movement agreed w i t h the c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d against 
the s\immit, i t considered t h a t i f any response was to be f o r t h -
coming i t should be an e f f e c t i v e one, not j u s t a d e c l a r a t i o n . 
Al-Fateh t h e r e f o r e debated the p o s s i b i l i t y of immediately t r a n s -
f e r r i n g t o the stage of armed struggle but u l t i m a t e l y decided 
against i t . The time was not yet r i p e f o r such an undertaking 
and the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y was not yet f i r m l y established. 2 
Unless a c t i o n would be of maximum e f f e c t i t was thought pre-
f e r a b l e t o do nothing and say nothing t h a t could "obstruct 
o v e r a l l Arab p o l i c y " . 3 
Thus by the beginning of 196^ some P a l e s t i n i a n organisations 
were becoming a c t i v e pressure groups, openly expressing t h e i r 
views on the issues of the day. A t t h i s stage, the opinions 
expressed generally supported one or other of the Arab govern-
ments. I n s p i t e of t h i s , the established p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , 
t h a t i s , the Ba'th and the ANM, h began t o view the Palestinians 
as a serious t h r e a t t o t h e i r p o p u l a r i t y . The ANM i n p a r t i c u l a r 
since i t had c o n t r o l of no state or government, t r i e d to i n f i l -
t r a t e and gain c o n t r o l - o f the new P a l e s t i n i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s 
themselves, and i n i t i a l l y had considerable success i n t h i s . 
ANM i n f l u e n c e can be seen on the Union of P a l e s t i n i a n 
Students i n Gaza, 5 which held a conference on 17 th February 196^ 
1 . See above p. 51 f n . ^ . 
2 . Author' s i n t e r v i e w \ ^ i t h Abu Fadi (al-Pateh) 'amman, 
summer 1969. 
3 . Ania. Francos, op c i t , p. 1^9. 
k. That i s to say, the l e f t v/ing of the ANM. The r i g h t \Jlng 
had become v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from Nasir's Arab 
S o c i a l i s t Union and considered i t s e l f as a branch of the 
union outside Egypt, The l e f t wing was s t i l l pro-Nasir 
but tended t o c r i t i c i s e him from a l e f t i s t p o i nt of view. 
5, The union ofcourse also r e f l e c t e d i t s o r i g i n s as an i n s t r u -
ment of.Nasir's p o l i c y although i t had become more independ-
ent i n i t s t h i n k i n g . The Gaza union a t t h i s stage was s t i l l 
a separate organisation from P a l e s t i n i a n student unions i n 
other Arab coun t r i e s . The unions v;ere. not c e n t r a l i s e d t o be-
come the General Union of P a l e s t i n i a n Students (GUPS) u n t i l 
a f t e r the E n t i t y had come i n t o o f f i c i a l existence. The GUPS 
now operates on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l , not j u s t i n the Arab 
world. 
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t o discuss the summit. The conference accepted the summit 
decisions, but only on a r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r mean-
i n g . The d i v e r s i o n of the Jordan t r i b u t a r i e s should be taken 
to i t s extreme. V/ith respect to the e n t i t y , the conference 
s p e c i f i e d t h a t i t should be: 
"... a r e v o l u t i o n a r y democratic o r g a n i s a t i o n , 
throbbing w i t h l i f e and energy, to mobilise 
a l l the P a l e s t i n i a n f o r c e s , m a t e r i a l and 
s p i r i t u a l , i n order t h a t they may assume 
t h e i r r o l e as vanguard i n r e a l i s i n g the 
duty of a l l Arabs, the l i b e r a t i o n b a t t l e . 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t such an E n t i t y be 
founded on an organised r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
base, guaranteeing i t s advance w i t h a l l 
the determination and seriousness needed 
to achieve t h e i r aims." 1 
Representation w i t h i n the e n t i t y should not be on a numerical 
basis but on the basis of the organised m i l i t a n t forces and 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the unions and the f r o n t s . 2 
Thus the e n t i t y could play an e f f e c t i v e r o l e and face f u t u r e 
challenges w i t h "a new dynamic conscious m e n t a l i t y " and could 
a b o l i s h the trend of " i n h e r i t e d . l e a d e r s h i p " i n the P a l e s t i n i a n 
s t r u g g l e . Moreover, the e n t i t y should have: 
"independence and autonomy s p i r i t u a l l y and 
symbolically equal t o other Arab p o l i t i c a l 
e n t i t i e s ..." 3 
However, i t was the p r a c t i c a l recommendations of the students 
which r e a l l y revealed the ANM in f l u e n c e w i t h i t s N a s i r i s t and 
"Arab" o r i e n t a t i o n . The students demanded t h a t f i n a n c i a l back-
i n g f o r the e n t i t y should come from the Arab states and 
f a c i l i t i e s should be granted enabling the e n t i t y t o tax 
P a l e s t i n i a n s i n the various Arab countries. The e n t i t y should 
be authorised t o undertake m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g of the P a l e s t i n -
ians "under the auspices o f the Supreme Arab Command". I n 
a d d i t i o n i t should draw up i t s i n f o r m a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l 
p o l i c i e s i n co-operation and discussion w i t h the Arab st a t e s , k 
I n these important and fundamental p r a c t i c a l issues, the 
students recommendations were completely i n l i n e w i t h the 
1. . Al-Muharrer, 25th-28th March 196^. 
2. A r t i c l e 5 of Shuqeiry's d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n states t h a t u n t i l 
f r e e e l e c t i o n s are possible the National Congress of the 
E n t i t y w i l l represent " a l l P a l e s t i n i a n f a c t i o n s , emigrants 
and residents i n c l u d i n g organisations, s o c i e t i e s , unions, 
trade unions and representatives of P a l e s t i n i a n public 
opinion of various i d e o l o g i c a l trends. A r t i c l e 6. Gives 
Shuqeiry the r i g h t , a f t e r discussion, t o set up preparatory 
committees i n each country to, select representatives. See 
Appendix I I . 
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proposals of Shuqeiry's d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n , 1 eixcept i n t h e i r 
demand f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l representation. 
Thus the students were demanding the impossible. The 
E n t i t y was t o be based upon the new r e v o l u t i o n a r y P a l e s t i n i a n 
organisations but was to remain i n f a c t under Arab c o n t r o l . 
This r e f l e c t e d the dilemma of the MM at t h i s stage i n t r y i n g 
t o s a t i s f y both the Palestinians and Nasir. Even so, the 
p a r t y continued i t s e f f o r t s to gain c o n t r o l of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , and found an easy t a r g e t i n the PLF. 
On March 5th 196*+ a statement was issued i n B e i r u t over the 
j o i n t signatures of the ANM the students and the PLF. I t con-
t a i n e d more s p e c i f i c demands concerning the e n t i t y . Like the 
students conference, i t i n s i s t e d t h a t the e n t i t y be a r e v o l u -
t i o n a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d e i t h e r through general 
e l e c t i o n or representation on the basis of r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
bodies. The National Congress of t h e . e n t i t y should e l e c t an 
executive which should then e l e c t a leader. 
On the m i l i t a r y l e v e l , P alestinians i n Arab countries should 
be r e c r u i t e d i n t o regular u n i t s which should be subordinate 
t o a leadership which would be responsible t o the e n t i t y . 
This leadership would be represented on the U n i f i e d Arab 
Command and any movement of the u n i t s would be l i n k e d to move-
ments of the Command i n the context of a general Arab plan. 2 
Once again the p r a c t i c a l recommendations i n no way contradicted 
those of the d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n and amounted t o a v i r t u a l en-
dorsement of Shuqeiry's proposals, or i n other words of 
o f f i c i a l Arab p o l i c y . • 
The attempt of the ANM t o incorporate both P a l e s t i n i a n 
and Arab N a t i o n a l i s t sentiment produced clear c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
which became i n c r e a s i n l y d i f f i c u l t to reconcile as the s i t u a t i o n 
developed. Nasir had agreed to the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y as long 
as i t remained more or less under h i s c o n t r o l . At the same 
time there was a growing number of P a l e s t i n i a n groups demanding 
t h a t some r e a l l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n be taken. The ANM could 
not a f f o r d t o a l i e n a t e e i t h e r Nasir or the Palestinians and 
solved the problem by adopting r e v o l u t i o n a r y terminology i n 
g e n e r a l i t i e s , while i n p r a c t i c e demanding nothing which might 
1. See Appendix I I . 
2. Al-Muharrer y l 6 t h March 196M-. 
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undermine Nasir's p o s i t i o n . The strategy of the ANM t h e r e f o r e , 
before the f i r s t P a l e s t i n i a n National Congress, was one of close 
co-operation w i t h both Shuqeiry and the P a l e s t i n i a n groups i n 
the hope of gaining the support of the l a t t e r to execute the 
p o l i c i e s o f the former. On the eve of the congress t h i s p o l i c y 
seemed t o have succeeded. Four days before i t opened a s t a t e -
ment appeared issued by a body c a l l e d al-Maktab as-Siyasi l i l -
Qoa ath-Thawriyyah a l - F a l a s t i n i y y a h l i l - ' a m a l al-Muwahhad 
( P o l i t i c a l Bureau of the P a l e s t i n i a n Revolutionary Forces f o r 
United A c t i o n ) . This bureau was composed of six small m i l i t a r y 
groups i n c l u d i n g the PLF, 1 and, from the contents of i t s 
statem.ent ANM i n f l u e n c e would seem to have been paramount. 2 
The d e c l a r a t i o n a f f i r m e d the Arab character of Palestine 
and the necessity o f . l i b e r a t i o n through war, i n v o l v i n g the 
e n t i r e Arab n a t i o n w i t h the Palestinians i n the vanguard. 
The framework f o r l i b e r a t i o n would be the e n t i t y . The s t a t e -
ment stressed t h a t the e n t i t y was not the product of r e g i o n a l -
ism. 
The Bureau declared t h a t i t s members: 
base themselves on t h e i r undeclared 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y experience which was 
accumulated s e c r e t l y among the dark 
t e n t s through the p r a c t i c e and d i r e c t i o n 
of s i l e n t a c t i v e s t r u g g l e . These move-
ments w i l l proceed w i t h the execution 
of the a r t i c l e s of the National Charter". 3 
The Bureau agreed: 
"as the vanguard of Arab acti o n to l i b e r a t e 
P a l e s t i n e , and as one face of the Arab 
struggle f o r l i b e r a t i o n and u n i t y , to co-
operate w i t h a l l l o y a l Arab forces to the 
f u l l e s t e x t e n t , i n accordance w i t h the 
i n t e r e s t s of l i b e r a t i o n . " 
F i n a l l y the statement asserted t h a t the Bureau had not been 
set up to oppose Shuqeiry's attempt to b u i l d the P a l e s t i n i a n 
e n t i t y : 
"... but w i l l make every e f f o r t t o help 
Mr. Shuqeiry construct a r e v o l u t i o n a r y and 
e f f e c t i v e P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y , since the 
Bureau believes t h a t an o f f i c i a l e n t i t y 
based simply on i n d i v i d u a l contacts could 
never succeed i f i s o l a t e d from the r e v o l u -
t i o n a r y movements." k 
1. The other groups were: al-Jabhah ath-Thawriyyah l i l - T a h r i r 
F a l a s t i n (The Revolutionary Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of 
Palestine);' Jabhah a t - T a h r i r al-Watani a l - F a l a s t i n i y y a h 
( P a l e s t i n i a n Front f o r National L i b e r a t i o n ) ; Takkatul a l -
Feda'iyyeen a l - F a l a s t i n i v v e e n ( P a l e s t i n i a n Fedayeen Group); 
Jabhah a t - T a h r i r al°'arabivvah l i - F a l a s t i n (Arab Front of 
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L i b e r a t i o n f o r P a l e s t i n e ) ; al-Munathamah al-Qawmiwah l i l -
T a h r i r ( N a t i o n a l i s t Organisation f o r L i b e r a t i o n ) . 
2, I t i s l i k e l y t h a t one or more of these groups was of ANII 
o r i g i n . 
3, See Appendix I . 
k. IPS, K i t a b Vol. 1, pp. 100-101. . 
Thus, since i t s c r e a t i o n i n the' l a t e 1950s, the PLF had 
s h i f t e d , i t s ground several times.. The f r o n t had grown im-
p a t i e n t w i t h the caution and reticence of al-Fateh at the 
time of the f i r s t Summit,'and a f t e r a b r i e f f l i r t a t i o n w i t h 
the Syrian Ba'th had f i r m l y a l l i e d i t s e l f w i t h the new-style 
ANM. I t became one of the many pressure groups t r y i n g t o 
i n f l u e n c e the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y through declarations and 
manifestos. 
This brings us d i r e c t l y t o consider the a t t i t u d e of al-Fateh 
towards the summit and i t s decisions. Al-Fateh never deviated 
from i t s o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n of launching an armed struggle 
to l i b e r a t e Palestine when the circumstances were r i g h t . 
Having decided t h a t the time had not yet come f o r t h i s , the 
movement had nothing to gain by revealing i t s existence and 
p u b l i c l y declaring i t s i n t e n t i o n s , i n a vain attempt to i n f l u -
ence o f f i c i a l Arab p o l i c y . These months were used instead to 
continue b u i l d i n g the organisation and preparing i t s members 
f o r the task which confronted them. 
The movement was p a r t i c u l a r l y strong i n the Gulf states 
among the P a l e s t i n i a n s there. I t s influence i s noticeable i n 
a statement addressed t o Shuqeiry, issued by a body named 
"The Executive Committee of the P a l e s t i n i a n Conference i n Qatar.' 
The statement c r i t i c i s e d the form of P a l e s t i n i a n congress 
proposed i n Shuqeiry's d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 Such an assembly 
would not represent the Palestinians " r e v o l u t i o n a r y w i l l " . I t 
should be c o n s t i t u t e d through f r e e and d i r e c t general elections 
i n a l l places where Palestinians were r e s i d e n t . The Qatar 
conference i t s e l f was based upon such e l e c t i o n s . 
1. See Appendix I I . 
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On the m i l i t a r y l e v e l , the statement c r i t i c i s e d Shuqeiry's 
proposals as ambiguous, thus, by i m p l i c a t i o n also c r i t i c i s i n g 
the m i l i t a r y recommendations of the ANM and the FLF. The 
r a l s o n d'etre of the e n t i t y should be the cr e a t i o n of a Palestin-
i a n m i l i t a r y apparatus f r e e i n leadership, p o l i c y and planning 
to undertake the l i b e r a t i o n b a t t l e . I n the process a l l Palestin-
ians would become pa r t of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y fedayeen army. 1 
There are two basic d i f f e r e n c e s here from the statements 
and recom.mendations of the ANM dominated i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n the 
f i r s t place the demand f o r general e l e c t i o n s i n choosing 
members of the proposed National Congress i s made t o appear a 
concrete p o s s i b i l i t y , since the Qatar conference was c o n s t i t u t e d 
i n t h i s way. 
Secondly, the conference demanded tha t the P a l e s t i n i a n 
m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s must not be l i n k e d or subordinated t o 
Arab m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y . Furthermore, the type of army proposed 
by the conference would be based upon the e n t i r e P a l e s t i n i a n 
p o p u l a t i o n , which would re q u i r e the arming of th a t population. 
I n view of the demographic di s p e r s i o n of the Palestinians such 
a suggestion was h a r d l y designed to reassure the Arab leaders 
of P a l e s t i n i a n obedience to Arab p o l i c y . 
As a r e s u l t of i t s independent stand i n face of Arab 
attempts to assume d i r e c t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n movement,, a l -
Fateh was favourably looked upon by Syria during t h i s period. 
Statements from the Syrian Ba'th tended to support independent 
P a l e s t i n i a n a c t i o n r a t h e r than to support Shuqeiry's P a l e s t i n i a n 
e n t i t y . There were several reasons f o r t h i s . 
Since the f a i l u r e of the I963 u n i t y t a l k s , r e l a t i o n s between 
Nasir and the Ba'th, e s p e c i a l l y the Syrian Ba'th, s t e a d i l y 
worsened. Both aspired to leadership of the Arab world through 
a p o l i c y of progressive Arab nationalism w i t h a s o c i a l i s t con-
t e n t . Nasir s t i l l r e t a i n e d overwhelming popular support and 
the Ba'th t h e r e f o r e had to f i n d some issue of p r i n c i p l e upon 
which t o take a more r a d i c a l stand than Nasir. As on previous 
1. Al-Havat. 27th A p r i l 196^. 
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occasions the Palestine issue seemed to be the i d e a l choice. 
On the other hand, the Ba'th could not oppose the e n t i t y 
unless i t could o f f e r some v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e . Al-Fateh 
provided the model. The l o g i c o f the B a ' t h i s t p o s i t i o n forced 
them f u r t h e r than mere verbal support f o r al-Fateh which 
enjoyed a period of complete freedom of a c t i o n inside Syria. 
A communique issued by the National Revolutionary Command 
i n Damascus on March 5th 196^ i l l u s t r a t e d the p o s i t i o n : 
"To r e a l i s e i t s objectives f u l l y , the 
P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y should have the 
- f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
1. I t should be a single popular organi-
s a t i o n through which the Palestinians 
can express t h e i r v/ishes i n complete 
freedom. I t must also have the 
e f f e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y to exercise the 
sovereign r i g h t s of the P a l e s t i n i a n s . 
2. I t should, have an army composed of and 
commanded by Palestinians under the 
d i r e c t i o n of the organisation of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n people. This army w i l l be 
a r e v o l u t i o n a r y organisation capable of 
f u l f i l l i n g i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n 
agreement w i t h other Arab armies. The 
formation of an e s s e n t i a l l y P a l e s t i n i a n 
army i s the p r i n c i p a l c o n d i t i o n f o r the 
success of an e f f e c t i v e P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y . 
3" The Arab states have a duty to support 
the e n t i t y m o r ally and m a t e r i a l l y . They 
must not put pressure on i t or hinder 
the accomplishment of i t s mission." 1 
Eight days before the National \c6ngress opened the Syrian 
Ba'th produced an a l t e r n a t i v e to Shuqeiry's plan f o r organising 
the e n t i t y . The Ba'th asked t h a t the Congress be c o n s t i t u t e d 
through general e l e c t i o n . I t suggested t h a t these e l e c t i o n s 
could be supervised by a committee drawn from the Arab states' 
highest j u d i c i a l bodies. 2 The e n t i t y i t s e l f should be b u i l t 
on three e f f e c t i v e bases, the t e r r i t o r y , the people and sovereign-
t y , P a l e s t i n i a n sovereignty should extend oyer a l l of mandatory 
Pa l e s t i n e , 3 
1. Al-Ba'th. 5th March 196^. . , 
2.. MEJ V o l . 18 No. ^. p, 339. 
3. C a h i e r s V o l , 55. pp, 206-7. 
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The Syrian Ba'th was thus suggesting the impossible, t h a t 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s should have power over t h e i r own a f f a i r s i n -
cluding the t e r r i t o r y of the West Bank and Gaza, This 
suggestion was indeed an a l t e r n a t i v e to Shuqeiry's e n t i t y , 
and at the same time an i n d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m of both Jordan 
and Egypt. Even al-Fateh, w i t h i t s independence of thought, 
did not ask such concessions, r e a l i s i n g t h e i r i m p o s s i b i l i t y . 
However, such an extremist stand suited the Ba'th's purposes 
a t t h a t time, and t h e i r patronage was u s e f u l to al-Fateh on 
the p r a c t i c a l l e v e l . 
This was the p o s i t i o n on the eve of the f i r s t P a l e s t i n i a n 
N a t i o n a l Congress. The Arab states were as d i s u n i t e d as ever. 
Nasir and the B a ' t h i s t s were at loggerheads and both were 
h o s t i l e t o the Jordanian regime. On the P a l e s t i n i a n l e v e l 
hew groups and organisations were coming i n t o existence 
th r e a t e n i n g the p o s i t i o n of the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s . A l l these 
forces were a c t i n g upon the Congress and much depended upon 
the outcome. 
The f i r s t P a l e s t i n i a n National Congress 
I n s p i t e of overwhelming pressure from a l l sides t h a t the 
Congress should be c o n s t i t u t e d through general e l e c t i o n , the 
s e l e c t i o n of members was made b a s i c a l l y as s t i p u l a t e d i n 
Shuqeiry's d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a t i s , by preparatory com-
mittees appointed by him i n each Arab country. 1 
As a r e s u l t , when the Congress met, a l l the p o l i t i c a l and 
m i l i t a r y r a d i c a l groups together w i t h the various unions, 
formed, between them, less than 10^ of the membership. The 
m a j o r i t y o f representatives came under the category of "public 
opin i o n of various i d e o l o g i c a l trends" 2 and had been chosen 
by Shuqeiry i n agreement w i t h the Arab governments to ensure 
t h a t the o f f i c i a l v e r s i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y would be 
r a t i f i e d w ithout too.many fundamental and perhaps dangerous 
a l t e r a t i o n s . 3 
1. See above p. 6 l f n . 2. 
2. As s p e c i f i e d by a r t i c l e 5 of the d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n . See 
Appendix I I . 
3. This i s the g e n e r a l l y accepted version of what happened 
according to members of the various Palestinianssresistance 
P a l e s t i n i a n resistance movements. Authors i n t e r v i e w s ^ 
'amman and B e i r u t , summer I969. 
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The Congress opened on 28th May 196^ i n Jerusalem. The f i r s t 
session, which was attended by Arab states representatives, 1 
was given over t o formal speeches of welcome. The opening 
address was given by King Hussein. V/hen the f o r m a l i t i e s were 
over the work of the Congress began. On t h i s , f i r s t day Shuqeiry 
was voted president of the Congress and the d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n 
of the e n t i t y was adopted without amendment, bri n g i n g i n t o 
existence Munathamah T a h r i r F a l a s t i n i y y a h . (The Palestine 
L i b e r a t i o n Organisation - PLO). 
Congress was then s p l i t i n t o a number of committees each 
dealing w i t h one aspect of the work, 2 Great care was taken 
t o ensure t h a t r a d i c a l elements d i d not have a m a j o r i t y i n 
any of.these committees. 3 The most important committees 
were those dealing w i t h f inance, m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , and the 
P a l e s t i n i a n National Charter. 
With respect t o finance, congress had already set up a 
P a l e s t i n i a n N ational Fund (PNF) and l a i d down the basic 
r e g u l a t i o n s f o r i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , k The Fund would be 
composed from a t a x imposed on a l l P a lestinians over 18 5 
plus an income tax of 2~6fo on merchants, employees, companies 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s . 6 P a l e s t i n i a n Bonds and L i b e r a t i o n Stamps 
would also be issued. Hov/ever, by f a r the l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u -
t i o n t o the fund would come from the annual a l l o c a t i o n s of 
the Arab Governments. 7 I n a d d i t i o n t o these basic regula-
t i o n s , the Finance committee recommended tax on o i l exports. 
1. Only Saudi Arabia boycotted the Congress. The reasons f o r 
t h i s were t h a t the previous August Shuqeiry had resigned 
from h i s post i n the Saudi a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n prote s t over 
the Yemen dispute. Secondly, Saudi Arabia was nov/ backing 
what was l e f t of K a j j Amin's Higher Committee which also 
boycotted the Congress, i n s i s t i n g t h a t the o l d A l l Palestine 
Government was the only t r u e representative of Palestine. 
2. As s p e c i f i e d by a r t i c l e 8 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . See 
Appendix I I . 
3. •AuthbfSi i n t e r v i e w s , 'amman and B e i r u t , summer 1969* 
k. A r t i c l e s 20 and 21 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
5. The tax would be 250 f i l s per head. 
6. Rules f o r c o l l e c t i n g these taxes would be dr^wn up by the 
l o c a l bureaux of the PLO i n each country, according to the 
s i t u a t i o n . Agreements were drawn up w i t h governments, com-
panies and i n d i v i d u a l employers. 
7. IPS. Kitab Vol, 1, pp. 8 l - 2 . 
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on a i r p o r t s and seaports. Such recommendations would n a t u r a l l y 
depend upon the goodwill of the Arab states f o r t h e i r imple-
mentation. 
I n the m i l i t a r y sphere the basic guidelines were l a i d down 
by the c o n s t i t u t i o n , 1 g i v i n g u l t i m a t e c o n t r o l t o the U n i f i e d 
Arab Command. The m i l i t a r y committee made f u r t h e r recommenda-
t i o n s , requesting immediate m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g f o r Palestinians 
and the formation of both regular and fedayeen P a l e s t i n i a n 
brigades. I t asked the U n i f i e d Command t o assume i t s f u l l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h respect to Palestine. F i n a l l y steps 
should be taken to ensure t h a t the f a m i l i e s of any P a l e s t i n -
ians k i l l e d i n b a t t l e , be taken care of. 2 Once again the 
agreement o f the Arab states was a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o the imple-
mentation of any of these suggestions. 
The committee set up t o study the Draft National Charter 3 
recommended i t s acceptance-without amendment. The charter 
l a y down the basic p r i n c i p l e upon which the e n t i t y was to be 
founded. I t s e s s e n t i a l task was t o define the e n t i t y w i t h 
respect to t e r r i t o r y and population, k and t o place i t f i r m l y 
w i t h i n the context o f Arab nationalism and u n i t y . 5 I t con-
demned Zionism 6 and provided f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine 
from i t s grasp, but l i b e r a t i o n only i n "the various p o l i t i c a l 
spheres". 7 To t h i s end i t established the PLO. 8 
The ch a r t e r was c a r e f u l t o emphasise t h a t the PLO would 
have no a u t h o r i t y to p r a c t i c e sovereignty over the West Bank 
or Gaza. 9 T h i s , together w i t h the p r o v i s i o n t h a t the PLO 
1. A r t i c l e s 1'8 and 19 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
2. IPS, K i t a b Vol. r . p. 82. 
3. See Appendix I . 
ho A r t i c l e s 2, 6 and 7. 
5. A r t i c l e s 1, 3, 11, 12, 13 and 1^ -. 
6. A r t i c l e s 17-20. 
7. A r t i c l e 25.. 
8. A r t i c l e 23. 
9. A r t i c l e 2h, 
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would not i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the Arab 
states 1 e f f e c t i v e l y rendered the e n t i t y impotent except insofar 
as the Arab states agreed w i t h i t s . a c t i v i t i e s . The lack of 
any r e a l independence manifested i n the various comm.ittee 
proposals can be seen as a simple r e f l e c t i o n of a fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e . 
Other committee recommendations concerned i n f o r m a t i o n , 
propaganda, and the establishment of unions f o r women, students, 
workers e t c . The Arab states were requested to allow P a l e s t i n -
ians freedom of movement and work i n t h e i r countries and even 
p r i o r i t y of work. The word la.liyyun (refugees) was not t o 
be used i n f u t u r e and would be replaced by the.term a'idun 
( r e t u r n e r s ) . National days were i n s t i t u t e d and the decision 
made t o issue i d e n t i t y cards t o a l l P a l e s t i n i a n s . 2 
The decisions of the congress and the recommendations of 
the various committees a l l revealed the t o t a l i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n r a d i c a l groups i n i n f l u e n c i n g developments 
w i t h i n the e n t i t y . By the end of the congress they were 
t h o r o u g h l y • d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h the PLO" and w i t h t h e i r own i n -
a b i l i t y t o .make any impression on the proceedings. 
On the f i n a l day, Shuqeiry was elected president of the FLO 
and, at h i s own request, contrary t o the express wishes of the 
popular groups he was given sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n choosing 
the members of. t h e Executive Committee. The congress then 
transformed i t s e l f i n t o .the National Council of the PLO 
thereby gaining a mandate f o r the next two years i n i t s 
e x i s t i n g form. By t h i s move the popular groups were deprived 
of any opportunity t o change the balance of power i n t h e i r 
favour w i t h i n the e n t i t y u n t i l the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a new 
congress.' 
The f i r s t congress t h e r e f o r e , r e s u l t e d i n the cre a t i o n of a 
number of i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r expression of the Pal e s t i n i a n 
i d e n t i t y . These i n s t i t u t i o n s subsequently received o f f i c i a l 
Arab r e c o g n i t i o n from the second Arab summit which was held 
i n the f o l l o w i n g September. 3 Palestine thus ceased t o be 
merely a refugee.problem and t o t h i s extent t h i s f i r s t congress 
1. A r t i c l e 26. 
2. IPS, K i t a b Vol, 1. pp. 83-lf. AUB, Arab Doc, ^ 96k^ pp. 235-8. 
3. The second Summit was-held t o assess progress made since 
the previous January, I t marked ne i t h e r any change of 
p o l i c y ^ lior any change of a t t i t u d e on the part of the par-
t i c i p a n t s . I t was, however, the l a s t expression o f any 
r e a l i n t e r - A r a b co-operation. From September 196^ the 
s i t u a t i o n d e t e r i o r a t e d again, 
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can be viewed as a success. 
On the other hand, the P a l e s t i n i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s born of 
the congres.s had a b u i l t - i n guarantee of i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s . 
They were m a t e r i a l l y and s p i r i t u a l l y dependent upon the 
Arab states and had freedom t o act only w i t h i n the context 
o f o v e r - a l l Arab p o l i c y . Any power which d i d accrue t o the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s was concentrated i n the hands o f Shuqeiry. 
The representatives of r a d i c a l P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism had 
heen denied any p o s i t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the e n t i t y . 
These groups thus had to reassess t h e i r p o s i t i o n s v i s - a - v i s 
the-PLO, and decide t h e i r a c t i o n accordingly. Their 
c r i t i c i s m s began almost immediately. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RISE OF THE FEDAYEEN 
^9eh - 1967 
I n the l a s t h a l f of the 1960s, the Palestinians r a p i d l y 
gained s t r e n g t h . Even the ANM-based groups c r i t i c i s e d the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which the Arab states had set up f o r them. 
Al-Fateh, not content w i t h mere c r i t i c i s m , refused t o have 
any part i n P a l e s t i n i a n organisations sponsored by the 
Arab establishment. The movement pushed a l l the other 
groups t o be more c r i t i c a l than would otherwise have been 
the case.-
Reassessment of the P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y 
From September 196^, when the Second Summit endorsed the 
PLO, u n t i l the Second P a l e s t i n i a n National Congress i n June 
1965j Shuqeiry was busy con s o l i d a t i n g both h i s p o s i t i o n 
v i s - a - v i s the PLO.and the PLC's p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the Arab 
sta t e s and the P a l e s t i n i a n popular groups. 
Among other t h i n g s , Shuqeiry established contact w i t h 
the Communist bloc, i n p a r t i c u l a r China. He v i s i t e d Peking i n 
March 1965 where he received promises o f m a t e r i a l help and 
was accorded o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f the PLO as representative 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e . 1 This v i s i t strengthened 
Shuqeiry's p o s i t i o n i n three ways. F i r s t , he gained a source 
of arms f o r the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA) which gave 
him an advantage over new r i v a l s f o r h i s power who were 
emerging w i t h i n the PLA. 2 Second, i t . h e l p e d him to keep. 
1. A j o i n t communique between the PLO and China was issued 
on 22nd March and published i n Peking Review^ 26th March 
1965. 
2, These were not r i v a l s f o r Shuqeiry's personal p o s i t i o n . 
I t was r a t h e r t h a t the PLA was becoming an a l t e r n a t i v e 
focus of a u t h o r i t y t o the PLO. . 
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mass support w i t h the PLO rather than l o s i n g i t t o the new 
movements. 1 T h i r d , i t placed him i n a more independent 
bargaining p o s i t i o n w i t h the Arab governments by weakening 
h i s m a t e r i a l dependence upon them. 
Whilst the PLO was thus e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f as a new 
f o r c e i n the arena of Arab p o l i t i c s , the s i t u a t i o n i n the 
Arab world was beginning to d e t e r i o r a t e again. The b r i e f 
period of. Arab co-operation which followed the f i r s t 
summit was coming t o an end and i t was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y 
d i f f i c u l t t o seal over the fundamental d i v i s i o n s i n i n t e r -
Arab r e l a t i o n s . The causes of t h i s break-down were e i t h e r 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o Palestine. 
F i r s t , the Arab pr o j e c t s , f o r d i v e r t i n g the Jordan 
t r i b u t a r i e s had reached a point of deadlock. Work on a l l 
p r o j e c t s had stopped because i t had been found impossible 
t o form a j o i n t Arab f o r c e f o r p r o t e c t i o n against I s r a e l i 
r e t a l i a t i o n . 
Second, President Bourguiba of Tunisia p u b l i c l y began t o 
advocate peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem. He 
wanted settlement on the basis of the ^^h7 P a r t i t i o n r e s o l u t i o n , 
r e p a t r i a t i o n of the refugees and a negotiated settlement 
w i t h I s r a e l . 2 Tunisia began t o boycott Arab meetings. 
The other Arab states had t o decide t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards 
Bourguiba, and the d i f f e r e n c e s between these a t t i t u d e s 
caused f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n . 
1. I t was l a t e r learned t h a t al-Fateh had already established 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Author's i n t e r v i e w w i t h Abu Fadi 
(al-Fateh) 'amman, summer 1969-
2. Speech d e l i v e r e d 3rd March i n Jericho. Al-'amal^ 
5th March 1965.. 
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T h i r d , the•development of the PLO i t s e l f , and i t s contacts 
w i t h China, though supported by "progressive" states l i k e the 
UAR and S y r i a , began t o a l i e n a t e others l i k e Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia. 
I n s h o r t , the o l d d i v i s i o n s between conservative and pro-
gressive regimes, and d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n each camp, reappeared, 
f o r c i n g Shuqeiry t o perform a d e l i c a t e balancing act between 
them. At the popular l e v e l , r e c o g n i t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
e n t i t y , disappointment over the f i r s t congress and the general 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n of Arab co-operation," l e d t o a massive increase 
i n the number of small fedayeen groups, most of t h e i r e f f o r t s 
were channelled i n t o i s s u i n g declarations and manifestos. The 
s i t u a t i o n v/as one of growing confusion on both the P a l e s t i n i a n 
and Arab l e v e l s . 
I n s p i t e o f the m u l t i p l i c i t y of P a l e s t i n i a n groups, the 
main i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s on the P a l e s t i n i a n l e v e l were 
between the ANM the Ba'th and al-Fateh. Of a l l the P a l e s t i n -
i a n groups o n l y al-Fateh had a c l e a r l y defined ideology and 
thus the others e i t h e r remained e s s e n t i a l l y m i l i t a r y 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , were e a s i l y won over by the ANM or the Ba'th, 
or a l t e r n a t i v e l y j o i n e d w i t h al-Fateh, A f t e r the f i r s t 
congress these three main i d e o l o g i c a l groups had to decide 
t h e i r f u t u r e p o l i c y towards both the PLO and Shuqeiry. 
The ANM found i t s e l f i n an even more c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s i t i o n 
than before. I t s t i l l needed the support of the popular 
organisations but was l o a t h to condemn o f f i c i a l UAR p o l i c y . 
I t l^herefore , condemned the proceedings of the f i r s t congress 
w i t h o u t condemning the PLO i n p r i n c i p l e , and moderated i t s 
c r i t i c i s m s of Shuqeiry, since such c r i t i c i s m might imply d i s -
approval of Nasir's support f o r him. A statement issued by 
the ANM on l ^ t h June 196^ i l l u s t r a t e d these p o i n t s . I t began 
7^ 
by p r a i s i n g the Summit decision to.recognise the P a l e s t i n i a n 
e n t i t y . I t said the "P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements" 
had w'orked f o r m.onths t h a t the e n t i t y might be acceptable 
and e f f e c t i v e , 
" p u t t i n g much e f f o r t i n t o backing Shuqeiry 
against the many obstacles he i s faci n g 
from the r e a c t i o n a r i e s who do not want 
the e n t i t y to be more than a form.ality 
t o abort r e a l P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
a c t i o n , and t o give these reactionary 
forces the opportunity of crushing the 
P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y forces under 
the name of the e n t i t y . " 
.The d e c l a r a t i o n said t h a t Shuqeiry was a ta r g e t f o r many 
pressures from the "reactionary Arab Governments" but t h a t h i s 
c a p i t u l a t i o n t o these pressures c o n s t i t u t e d "a d e v i a t i o n and 
an a b o r t i o n of the e n t i t y " . I t accused the Jordanian Govern-
ment of "c o n t i n u a l harrassment and t e r r o r i s i n g " of some of the 
members of the Jerusalem Congress and also of. . " t y r a n n i c a l l y 
p r o h i b i t i n g " some congress members from entering Jordan w i t h -
out any reason. The d e c l a r a t i o n c r i t i c i s e d the proceedings of 
the congress i n i t s r e f u s a l to discuss some c o l l e c t i v e l y 
approved committee recommendations and i t s r e j e c t i o n of others. 
The a r b i t r a r y manner i n which the congress was transformed 
i n t o a Na t i o n a l Assembly, and the a u t h o r i s i n g of Shuqeiry to 
choose the Executive Committee were also severely c r i t i c i s e d . 
The d e c l a r a t i o n said t h a t the congress had r e s u l t e d i n the 
c r e a t i o n o f , --s.n '' 
"an o r g a n i s a t i o n which has no r e l a t c n 
w i t h the masses, without the base which 
i s e s s e n t i a l to any r e a l L i b e r a t i o n 
Organisation, t h a t i s , the m i l i t a r y 
organisation- and the establishment of 
a National Council able p r a c t i c a l l y to 
discuss, p l a n , decide and supervise. 
I t has r e s u l t e d i n an Executive Com-
mitte e which does not represent the 
masses but i s appointed from elements 
whos e . a b i l i t y and work can only he 
judged by Shuqeiry." . 
The d e c l a r a t i o n said there were i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t Shuqeiry i n -
tended to "continue i s o l a t i n g the r e v o l u t i o n a r y organisations" 
and i t concluded th a t i t was the ANM's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
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" t o r e g i s t e r t h a t t h i s organisation and 
congress were unable t o r e a l i s e the accept-
able minimum demands of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
masses .... The c r i p p l e d r e s u l t s of the 
Jerusalem Congress prove again t h a t the 
masses are the s t a r t , the t o o l and the 
aim, and t h a t e f f e c t i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
o r g a n i s a t i o n i s the road. Thus the r e v o l -
u t i o n a r y forces and elements should take 
t h e i r , h i s t o r i c r o l e on the path to u n i t e d 
and serious a c t i o n . " 1 
This d e c l a r a t i o n was obviously intended to impress the 
P a l e s t i n i a n popular organisations. While c r i t i c i s i n g the 
congress, i t avoided f o s t e r i n g any discontent w i t h Arab 
p o l i c y i n general. The accusation t h a t the PLO was being 
used simply to c o n t r o l the P alestinians was aimed only at 
the " r e a c t i o n a r y " governm.ents and i n p a r t i c u l a r Jordan. 
Had the congress been held on UAR t e r r i t o r y , i n t e r f e r e n c e 
would probably have been of a less b l a t a n t nature, but wherever • 
the congress met some k i n d of pressure would have been exerted 
on i t s members, to ensure t h a t the e n t i t y d i d not get out of 
hand. However, the ANM by i t s s e l e c t i v e c r i t i c i s m , exonerated 
the UAR from any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the s t u n t i n g of the PLO. 
I n s p i t e of i t s appeal t h a t the popular organisations 
should u n i t e and assume t h e i r " h i s t o r i c r o l e " , the ANM at 
t h i s stage d i d not seem to contemplate the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
independent P a l e s t i n i a n armed s t r u g g l e . I t continued to 
p e t i t i o n and pressure the Arab states through i t s various. 
sympathisers l i k e the PLF, the students unions, and the 
p o l i t i c a l Bureau. 2 The l a t t e r sent a memorandum to the 
second Summit i n September 196*+ asking t h a t various measures, 
already accepted i n p r i n c i p l e , l i k e the t r a i n i n g of P a l e s t i n i a n s , 
be put i n t o immediate e f f e c t . 3 The P a l e s t i n i a n students i n 
December 196*+ went as f a r as declaring t h e i r p u b l i c approval 
.of the PLO, the two summits' decisions and Nasir's p o l i c y 
i n general. ^ Thus the c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n the ANM and 
1. Al-Hurriyah. I 5 t h June 196^. A s i m i l a r d e c l a r a t i o n 
c r i t i c i s i n g the Congress was issued by the GUPS on l 8 t h 
June 196^ and published i n Al-Hurriyah on 29th June 196^-. 
(GUPS was s t i l l ANM dominated at t h i s time - , 
2. See above Ch, 3 p. 63 f n , 1. 
3. Al°Hayat, kth September 196^. 
k. Al-Ahram, l 6 t h December 196^, 
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w i t h i n those organisations under i t s i n f l u e n c e , continued to 
grow. 
The a t t i t u d e of the Ea'th was less equivocal. I t had con-
s i s t e n t l y maintained a more r a d i c a l stand than Nasir on the 
P a l e s t i n i a n issue, advocating strong and v i o l e n t a c t i o n t o 
l i b e r a t e Palestine. I t found no r.eason t o change t h i s a f t e r 
the congress. Syria's p o s i t i o n during the Second Summit was 
p r e d i c t a b l e . I t held t h a t Palestine was the a f f a i r of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s and should be f r e e from Arab i n t e r f e r e n c e . Like 
the AM, the Syrian Ba'th also had t h e i r " P a l e s t i n i a n " 
sympathisers, to act as a pressure group i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t . 
At the time of tLe second summit the newspaper al-Ba'th 
published, a d e c l a r a t i o n by a group c a l l i n g i t s e l f Al-Jabhah 
ath-Thawriyyah a l - F a l a s t i n i y y a h (The P a l e s t i n i a n Revolutionary 
F r o n t ) . 1 The. ideas contained i n t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n were i n ' 
l i n e i ^ i t h those of t i i e Ba'th and nearer to al-Fateh than t o 
the ANM: . . " . 
"... spontaneous growth from w i t h i n the ranks 
of- the masses i s an e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n f o r 
the establishment of any r e v o l u t i o n a r y organ-
i s a t i o n . Popular organisations, capable of 
being both r e v o l u t i o n a r y and e f f e c t i v e can 
never be imposed from above or created by 
decision. They must spring from the develop-
ment of the d a i l y s t r u g g l e ..." 
The d e c l a r a t i o n said t h a t the second summit through i t s 
decisions could never 
"... r e a l i s e the a s p i r a t i o n s of the Arab 
masses t o l i b e r a t e Palestine, i n the 
face of a l l the demands and l i m i t e d 
• t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e r e s t s , without entering 
the wilderness of minor b a t t l e s and 
g r a d u a l l y c a p i t u l a t i n g t o defence of 
the status quo^ transforming the slogan 
' u n i t y o f ranks' t o one of 'unity of 
defeat'." 
The s o l u t i o n t o t h i s dilemma v/as t o : 
"... launch the l i b e r a t i o n b a t t l e through 
the r e v o l u t i o n a r y method of exploding 
the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the Arab people 
and i n v o l v i n g the masses i n the heart 
of the b a t t l e . " 2 
1 . The existence of t h i s Front except as a vehicle f o r 
B a ' t h l s t propaganda i s a matter of conjecture. 
2 . Al-Ba'th. 7 t h September 1 9 6 ^ . ' 
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For reasons we have already discussed, 1 the Syrian Ba'th was 
able t o take a f a r more l o g i c a l and consistent a t t i t u d e than 
the ANMi I t could r e j e c t o f f i c i a l Arab p o l i c y and bear no 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s f a i l u r e s . I t could support P a l e s t i n i a n 
independence without any r i s k t o i t s own p o s i t i o n . 
This leaves only al-Fateh. The movement made no p u b l i c 
c r i t i c i s m of the congress or the second summit, although i t s 
members who had attended the congress were as d i s i l l u s i o n e d 
as the members of other m i l i t a n t groups. 2 Ey the end of 
1 9 6 ^ , w i t h Shuqeiry increasing h i s power, I s r a e l d i v e r t i n g 
the Jordan unopposed and the number of fedayeen groups grow-
in g d a i l y , al-Fateh could see only one course of a c t i o n . I t 
began m i l i t a r y operations on New Years eve 3 i n order t o : 
" . 0 . d i s t i n g u i s h the sincere movements and 
slogans from the demagogic'and f a l s e ones 
and t o put an end to the chaos and s t a l e -
mate .... " 
Thus, on the f i r s t of January 1 9 6 5 a number of men from a l -
' a s i f a h (The Storm) 5 crossed i n t o I s r a e l and blew up a 
water pump at the v i l l a g e of Eit a n . Six days l a t e r they 
achieved t h e i r main o b j e c t i v e and destroyed, some of the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s of the I s r a e l i water d i v e r s i o n scheme. 6 
1 . See above Ch. 3 pp. 6 ^ & 6 5 . 
2 . Based on Author's i n t e r v i e w s . 
3 . The decis i o n was taken a t a meeting on December l 8 t h 
1 9 6 ^ . Free Palestine (Suppl,). 8 t h January 1 9 7 0 , p. 3 1 . 
ko Author's i n t e r v i e w ^ Abu Ibrahim ( a l - F a t e h ) , 'amman, 
summer 1 9 6 9 . 
5 . Al-Fateh used the name a l - ' a s i f a h f o r t h i s f i r s t operation 
so t h a t any f a i l u r e v/ould not r e f l e c t on the movement as a 
whole. M i l i t a r y preparations were s t a r t e d i n I 9 6 2 and 
arms gra d u a l l y c o l l e c t e d through i n d i v i d u a l purchase on 
the home market, or through smuggling across the border. 
Arms stores were located i n the areas from which i n i t i a l 
operations would be launched. 1 9 6 2 - 5 the emphasis was on 
t r a i n i n g and reconnaissance. By 1 9 6 5 the movement v/as 
organised i n t o 1 0 squads t o t a l l i n g 8 2 men. These covered 
s i x regions of the occupied t e r r i t o r y , 2 i n the north} 2 
around Deir Nakhas; 2 around Tulkarm; 2 i n the south; 1 
at B e i t J i b r i l and 1 i n Jerusalem. The f i r s t operation 
r e s u l t e d i n one f e d a y i being captured (Kaimoud I l a j j a z i ) 
who was-later t r i e d i n I s r a e l , and one k i l l e d by the Jordan-
ia n army (Ahmed Kusa Ibrahim) on r e t u r n i n g . Free Palestine 
(Suppl.), 8 t h January 1 9 7 0 , p. 2 . 
6 . The i n s t a l l a t i o n destroyed was p a r t of the Eilabun tunnel. 
The operation was c a r r i e d out by 1 1 men. 
7 8 
The f i r s t m i l i t a r y communique described t h i s operation and 
warned I s r a e l against any r e p r i s a . 1 - a c t i o n "because our forces 
w i l l r e p l y t o aggression i n k i n d . " A l - ' a s i f a h also warned the 
Arab states against i n t e r f e r i n g i n the i n t e r e s t s of the enemy 
" f o r our forces w i l l r e p l y t o . t h i s a c t i o n by exposing the 
i n t e r e s t s o f the state concerned to r u i n , wherever they are." 
This was the f i r s t of 3 9 such communiques issued i n 1 9 6 5 -
A l - ' a s i f a h ' s f i r s t p o l i t i c a l statement was issued on 2 8 t h 
January. 
"For sixteen-years iDur people have l i v e d 
•, a l i e n a t e d from t h e i r cause, tr e a t e d by 
the UN as a problem of displaced refugees. 
Meanwhile, the enemy has pursued h i s plans, 
l o c a l l y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , f o r an ex-
tended stay i n our homeland ... 
"... a l - ' a s i f a h forces have taken a c t i o n 
t o show the enemy and the world at large 
t h a t our people are not dead, and t h a t 
armed r e v o l u t i o n I s the road t o r e t u r n 
and v i c t o r y ... 
"Our p o i n t of departure i s Palestine, 
the s o i l of our.nation. Our d i r e c t i n g 
f o r c e i s our b e l i e f t h a t t h i s i s the 
c o r r e c t way t o e x t r i c a t e our cause 
from the v i c i o u s c i r c l e i n which i t i s 
caught. V/e expect support from the Arab 
n a t i o n i n i t s common.struggle as w e l l as 
. from forces of l i b e r a t i o n throughout the 
world." 
Having f i n a l l y entered the second stage of i t s strategy, 
t h a t i s , armed s t r u g g l e , al-Fateh sought the greatest possible 
p u b l i c i t y f o r i t s a c t i o n s . The extent t o which i t con-
s t i t u t e d , a new and dangerous element on the P a l e s t i n i a n scene 
can be deduced from the near-panic reactions of the Arab 
s t a t e s . Old charges of connections w i t h CENTO were repeated 
and p u b l i c a t i o n o f a l - ' a s i f a h communiques, p r o h i b i t e d . A few 
newspapers evaded these r e s t r i c t i o n s by publishing I s r a e l i 
communiques about the operations. 1 
1 . Al-Fateh, Dialogue w i t h Fateh. ( T r a n s l a t i o n of a dialogue 
between Salah Khalaf (Abu Eyad) of the Central Committee 
and a t - T a l i ' a h magazine published monthly i n Egypt. June 
1 9 6 9 , pp. 3 6 - 7 . 
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I n p r o t e s t at the censorship, a l - ' a s i f a h sent a long 
jifemorandum t o the f i r s t Congress o f Arab pressmen, held i n 
Kuwait i n February 1 9 6 5 . I t accused the Arab press of: 
"... a lazy , i n c o r r e c t a t t i t u d e i n repress-
ing news of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y events which 
announced our armed struggle .... We believe 
t h a t the great Arab r e v o l u t i o n can only be 
• achieved at the reg i o n a l l e v e l . The l i b e r a -
t i o n of any Arab region w i l l not begin unless 
t h i s region moves of i t s own accord ... 
through the growth of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y e l e -
ments i n s i d e i t ...; Our work i s ther e f o r e 
devoted t o developing P a l e s t i n i a n Arab 
e f f o r t s on the basic problem, the L i b e r a t i o n 
of Palestine .... The Palestine b a t t l e w i l l 
decide the Arab destiny. I t needs u n i t y 
of the Arab r e v o l u t i o n a r y forces, based 
upon u n i t e d P a l e s t i n i a n e f f o r t . Thus i t 
; w i l l confirm the Algerian experience and 
prove t r u e the concept of armed struggle 
r? ... 
The memorandum acknowledged the Summit's support f o r Palestine 
but stated t h a t : 
"... t o plan, on the basis of a defence 
str a t e g y puts the r e i n s i n the hands of 
the enemy ( w h i l e the involvement of the 
•Palestinian people and t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n -
ary vanguards could) ,.. remove Arab 
s t r a t e g y from these c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l i m i t -
a t i o n s ... t h a t i s , Arab strategy could 
become an o f f e n s i v e s t r a t e g y thanks to 
the Palestinians ..." 
Turning t o Arab u n i t y , the memorandum continued: 
"The slogan of Arab u n i t y i s a r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
slogan, but i t can only be achieved 
through the b a t t l e t o decide the Arab 
desti n y when a determined section of the 
. Arab r e v o l u t i o n a r y forces rush forward 
w i t h moral and m a t e r i a l support. Then 
the slogan of Arab u n i t y will.become a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y slogan i n the context of 
l i b e r a t i o n . (The new slogan should be) 
... ' L i b e r a t i o n of Pal e s t i n e , the road 
to u n i t y ' not 'uni t y the road to l i b e r a t i o n ' . " 
The memorandum emphasised t h a t time was on the' side of I s r a e l . 
• A f t e r three years i t would achieve a c e r t a i n population 
density and might have a nuclear d e t e r r e n t . F i n a l l y a l - ' a s i f a h 
i n s i s t e d t h a t i t d i d not wish to i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l 
• a f f a i r s of the Arab s t a t e s . On the other hand, i t had under-
taken t o l i b e r a t e Palestine and vfould not be deflected from 
t h i s , path, though i t would never " r a i s e arms against any Arab 
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arm.y or government." A l - ' a s l f a h requested t h a t the t e x t of 
,. the memorandum be c a r r i e d i n the coming issues of a l l Arab 
Vnewspapers. 1 
The d i f f e r e n c e between al-Fateh and the other groups i s w e l l 
i l l u s t r a t e d by these docum.ents. Al-Fateh considered popular 
armed str u g g l e as the only way to l i b e r a t i o n and e x p l l c i t e l y 
relegated Arab u n i t y t o second place. The movement showed a 
unique determination of purpose and a quiet confidence. 
Declarations were only Issued t o support actions or explain 
them not. as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r them. The r i s e of al-Fateh to . 
a degree of prominence i n 1 9 6 5 provided Shuqeiry w i t h a r i v a l 
who would not compromise, u n l i k e the ANM and the Ba'th.' 
By the time of the second P a l e s t i n i a n congress i n May 
1 9 6 5 J the pressures upon Shuqeiry both on the Arab l e v e l and 
from the Pa l e s t i n i a n s themselves, were f o r c i n g him t o actions 
he might otherwise' have deemed inadvisable. He walked out of 
a meeting of Arab Heads of State i n A p r i l when i t refused to 
expel Tunisia from the Arab League because of Bourguiba's 
a t t i t u d e on Palestine. 2 He could hardly have done otherwise 
i n the face o f the growth o f r a d i c a l P a l e s t i n i a n opinion. I t 
was thus i n an atmosphere o f suspicion and u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t 
the second congress opened i n Cairo a t the end of May. 
The Second P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l Congress 
The membership of the congress was the same as on the 
previous occasion g i v i n g l i t t l e r e presentation t o the new 
P a l e s t i n i a n organisations. Nasir's opening speech revealed 
the many c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which had appeared i n the Arab world 
since the f i r s t congress. He c r i t i c i s e d Bourguiba "who 
wishes t o s e l l the Arab land t o the Z i o n i s t s and I m p e r i a l i s t s . " 
He c r i t i c i s e d Syria f o r a t t a c k i n g the U n i f i e d Arab Command 
and, the summit conferences on the grounds t h a t such c r i t i c i s m 
"means t h a t we are despairing .... There e x i s t problems 
"between the PLO and c e r t a i n Arab states 
and t h i s should not surprise you f o r there 
i s suspicion and complication, but t h i s 
must not lead us t o despair ..." 3 
1 . IPS, K i t a b 1 9 6 5 Vol. 2 , pp. I I I - I I 3 . 
2 . Keesings ( 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 2 0 7 - ^ 5 . 
3 . Orient No. 3 ^ , ( 1 9 6 5 ) , PP. l 8 l - 9 5 . 
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But perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , much of h i s speech was devoted 
to r e j e c t i n g the stand of al-Fateh, although the movement was 
not mentioned by name. He said, 
"Certain people see the f u t u r e i n terms of 
the past ... these people declare t h a t the 
Pa l e s t i n i a n cause l a s t e d . 1 6 years and i t i s 
now time t o act and stop t a l k i n g . They say 
the PLO has been i n existence f o r a year 
and a h a l f and has done nothing but confer, 
and t h a t i t must act. These people con-
sider t h a t the co n t r a d i c t i o n s which 
surround the Palestine problem are a 
matter f o r despair .... They claim t h a t 
the aim of the summit was to l i q u i d a t e 
• the Palestine problem. We have one 
a l t e r n a t i v e , e i t h e r proceed i n t h i s way 
or f i n i s h c o l l e c t i v e Arab a c t i o n .... 
They say 'we must t h i s very day make war 
w i t h I s r a e l ' . Why? I s r a e l would wel-
come an at t a c k today f o r she knows t h a t 
revdutionary Arab a c t i o n and c a p a b i l i t y 
w i l l grow." 1 
Nasir's speech was followed by an address from Shuqeiry i n 
which he explained h i s a t t i t u d e towards the Arab O f f i c i a l s ' * 
meeting i n A p r i l . He had walked out because of the weakness 
of Arab c r i t i c i s m of Bourguiba, and f o r the same reason, he 
o f f e r e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n t o t h i s congress. However, the con-
gress postponed discussion of t h i s m.atter u n t i l the l a s t 
session so t h a t Shuqeiry could present h i s r e p o r t . lie was 
again elected president. 2 . 
Shuqeiry's r e p o r t o u t l i n e d the a c t i v i t i e s of the l a s t year. 
He said s p e c i a l importance had been given t o developing the 
m i l i t a r y r o l e of the PLO. Units of an Army had been formed 
i n Gaza and the UAR^  and i n the form.er a law had been passed 
making general m o b i l i s a t i o n compulsory. Trainin g camps and 
o f f i c e s had been established i n many Arab countries. With 
respect to popular o r g a n i s a t i o n , 5 0 o f f i c e s had been opened 
i n v i l l a g e s , .towns and refugee camps t o t r a i n the people i n 
c i v i l defence. On the f i n a n c i a l side an executive had been 
appointed f o r the Na t i o n a l Fund and Arab governments had been 
askied to tax a l l P a l e s t i n i a n s . Response to an. appeal f o r 
funds had r e a l i s e d 1 0 0 0 0 0 dinars 3 from the Palestinians 
1 . i b i d . 
2 . IPS, OP c i t Vol. 2 1 9 6 5 , pp. • + 8 - ^ 9 . 
3 . A dinar was a l i t t l e - m o r e than £ 1 s t e r l i n g . 
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themselves. 1 
The congress divided as before i n t o committees. Their 
recommendations d i f f e r e d l i t t l e from the previous year and 
deserve no comment. At the end of the congress Shuqeiry's 
r e s i g n a t i o n was refused and he was re-elected President of 
the PLO. He asked the Arab Governments t o make possible 
e l e c t i o n s to both the PLO and t o the congress. 2 
Among the d e c l a r a t i o n s and manifestos d i s t r i b u t e d by the 
various groups at the congress, the most notable were those 
from the ANM, the P o l i t i c a l Bureau and alrFateh. They show 
the main c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d against the congress and the 
•PLO as w e l l as d i f f e r e n t suggestions'for reform. 
The P o l i t i c a l Bureau 3 offered- the most detaied but l e a s t 
fundamental c r i t i c i s m . I t can be summarised as follov;s: 
1 . The Organisation's lack of d i r e c t e d planning and i t s 
pursuance of a confused and improvised p o l i c y , i f con-
t i n u e d , would lead t o a d e t e r i o r a t i o n of hopes placed 
i n the Organisation. 
2 o Since they f a i l e d to r e a l i s e t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n a c t i v i t y 
should be based on -the P a l e s t i n i a n people,., and t h e i r 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y cadres, and since they lacked sound 
popular o r g a n i s a t i o n and planning, every o f f i c i a l 
behaved l i k e a d i r e c t o r of the o r g a n i s a t i o n , working 
according t o h i s own personal judgement. 
3 . The spontaneous issue of emotive speeches, instead of 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of the t r u e f a c t s and d i f f i c u l t i e s would 
not prepare the people t o meet the necessary challenge. 
k. The a t t i t u d e towards the Arab countries sometimes 
f l a t t e r i n g , and sometimes abusive, would lead t o the 
l i q u i d a t i o n of the Palestine problem and bargaining 
over i t . 
5 . The l u x u r y , comfort and e x o r b i t a n t s a l a r i e s of the 
Organisation o f f i c i a l s would create a bourgeios class 
among the Palestinians l i v i n g o f f the Organisation 
instead of s a c r i f i c i n g f o r i t . 
6 . Appointments depending on f a m i l y t i e s and personal 
r e l a t i o n s were being made Instead of on the basis of 
l o y a l t y and competence. 
1 . i b i d , pp. ^ - 9 - 5 0 . 
2 . i b i d , pp. 5 2 - 5 5 . 
3 . The P o l i t i c a l Bureau was now composed of J i b r l l ' s group; 
Jabhah a t - T a h r i r al-*arablyyah a l - F a l a s t l n i y y a h (Palestine 
Arab L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ) ; Al°Jabhah ath-Thawrivvah l i - T a h r l r 
F a l a s t i n (Revolutionary Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of Pale-
s t i n e ) ; Jabhah al-Feda' (Fedayeen F r o n t ) * ; Jabhah a t - T a h r i r 
al-Watanl a l - F a l a s t i n i (Front f o r National P a l e s t i n i a n 
L i b e r a t i o n ) * ; Al-Jabhah al°Qawmiyyah l i l - T a h r l r a l - F a l a -
s t l n l ( N a t i o n a l i s t Front f o r P a l e s t i n i a n L i b e r a t i o n ) * ; 
T a k a t t u l al-Feda'iyyeen a l - F a l a s t i n i y y e e n ( P a l e s t i n i a n 
Fedayeen Group). Compared w i t h the previous year the 
•Bureau had l o s t two organisations and gained three ( * ) . 
In. a d d i t i o n t o t h i s J i b r l l ' s group had s p l i t i n t o two,-
both c a l l e d Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Front but d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
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by using the i n i t i a l s L.P. ( L i b e r a t i o n of Palestine) and PLF. 
This i s a good, i n d i c a t i o n of the increase and i n s t a b i l i t y 
among the fedayeen groups. Their number was such t h a t f i n d i n g 
names was becoming impossible. 
7 . Personal struggles w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were attempt-
ing to i n v o l v e the masses i n t h e i r q u a r r e l s . 
8 . There was no c o n t r o l over the bureaux opened i n d i f f e r e n t 
c o u n t r i e s , allowing some of them t o undertake useless 
work, l i k e the t r a i n i n g of school boys as assistants on 
the b a t t l e f i e l d while there were no so l d i e r s f o r them to 
a s s i s t . 
9 . The Executive Committee m.embers were f o l l o w i n g a p o l i c y 
of f l a t t e r i n g the P o l i t i c a l Bureau and other elements, 
without any serious i n t e n t i o n of a r r i v i n g a t arrange-
ments w i t h them to co-ordinate a c t i v i t i e s . 
At the end, the memorandum asked t h a t an Executive Com-
mi t t e e be formed based on c o l l e c t i v e leadership and a 
c e n t r a l i s e d clear p o l i c y guaranteeing, a vanguard r o l e f o r 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s a t a l l l e v e l s , working through the Arab 
League and u n i t e d leadership w i t h equal status to the Arab 
s t a t e s . F a i l i n g t h i s they should be content t o co-operate 
w i t h those Arab states which d i d accept the p r i n c i p l e of 
e q u a l i t y . As long as the o r g a n i s a t i o n did not recognise 
the P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements these groups would 
have to work alone and t h i s would impede any progress. 
Otherwise the P o l i t i c a l Bureau expressed i t s i n t e n t i o n of 
"continued co-operation w i t h a l l ' P a l e s t i n i a n sincere e l e -
ments headed by the PLO." 1 
This memorandum was i n t e r e s t i n g from two points of view. 
I n the f i r s t place i t gave a d e t a i l e d p i c t u r e of the admini-
s t r a t i v e aspects of the PLO which were g i v i n g r i s e to con-
cern. Second, i t showed t h a t the P o l i t i c a l Bureau was 
s t i l l not prepared to give up any chance of gaining a hold 
i n the PLO and of working w i t h i n the context of an o v e r a l l 
Arab s t r a t e g y , i n s p i t e of i t s c r i t i c i s m of the organisation. 
1 . IPS^.OP c i t Vol. 2 1 9 6 5 . pp. 1 3 2 - 3 5 . 
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.The p o s i t i o n of the ANM was e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r although i t s 
o b j e c t i o n s were f a r less d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h the a c t u a l 
working of the PLO and f a r more concerned w i t h the form v/hich 
the popular o r g a n i s a t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y should take. 
"... the org a n i s a t i o n i s a popular organisation 
and popular organisation i s not merely one of 
the o f f i c e s of the organisation but i s the 
organ i s a t i o n i n i t s e n t i r e t y . " 1 
The L i b e r a t i o n b a t t l e 
"... means a determined f i g h t i n t o which 
the whole Arab n a t i o n w i l l be plunged 
w i t h the Palestinians i n i t s vanguard .... 
The o r g a n i s a t i o n must be the context 
w i t h i n which the power of the P a l e s t i n -
ians i s mobilised and which pushes them 
f o r c e f u l l y t o the, b a t t l e f i e l d ..." 2 
The ANM considered t h a t the basic p r i n c i p l e s of the organisa-
t i o n must be: 
1 . The o r g a n i s a t i o n i s a popular r e v o l u t i o n a r y organisation 
to m o b i l i s e the power of the P a l e s t i n i a n people and en-
l i s t them f o r the b a t t l e . 
2 . The o r g a n i s a t i o n must be based upon the organised 
P a l e s t i n i a n people, who w i l l choose t h e i r leadership 
and hold i t responsible. They w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
planning at a l l l e v e l s . 
3 . The o r g a n i s a t i o n w i l l be b u i l t upon a system of c e n t r a l -
ised democracy ... leaders at a l l l e v e l s w i l l work on 
the c o l l e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , responsible to the congresses 
which choose them. 
The o r g a n i s a t i o n w i l l be founded upon two bases: 
1 . Unions of a l l kinds. 
2 . Geographical areas. 
The N a t i o n a l Congress would be the highest a u t h o r i t y , i t s 
members chosen by r e g i o n a l congresses. 3 The Executive Com-
mi'ttee m.ust be formed upon the c r i t e r i o n of e f f i c i e n c y of the 
members although i t must represent the d i f f e r e n t unions, h 
This memorandum of the ANM can be seen as a complement t o 
t h a t of the P o l i t i c a l Bureau. While the l a t t e r concentrated 
upon c r i t i c i s i n g the e x i s t i n g system, the former o f f e r e d an 
1 .. i b i d , p. 1 3 0 . 
2 . i b i d . 
3 . The ANM gave a d e t a i l e d breakdown of hov/ members v/ould be 
selected on the basis of one per 5 0 0 P a l e s t i n i a n s . IPS, 
OP c i t 1 9 6 5 . p. 1 3 1 . 
ko i b i d , pp. 1 2 9 - 1 3 2 . 
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a l t e r n a t i v e system i n considerable t h e o r e t i c a l d e t a i l . How-
ever, n e i t h e r group showed any i n c l i n a t i o n t o repudiate o v e r a l l 
Arab r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Palestine, and the ANM's recommenda-
t i o n s , although a t t r a c t i v e on paper, stood no chance at a l l of 
. being put i n t o e f f e c t without r a d i c a l change of the e x i s t i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s . ' The ANM made no suggestion as t o how they could 
be put i n t o e f f e c t even w i t h i n the P a l e s t i n i a n context, l e t 
alone the Arab or i n t e r n a t i o n a l context. The movement was 
making suggestions i n a vacuum.. 
By c o n t r a s t , the statement d i s t r i b u t e d t o the congress by 
a f i F a t e h 1 contained a d e t a i l e d analysis of the s i t u a t i o n i n 
a l l i t s dimensions before o f f e r i n g reforms. I t i s i n t e r e s t -
i n g f o r t h i s reason alone, q u i t e apart from the l i g h t i t 
throws upon STrFateh's own p o s i t i o n . 
the statement began by d e f i n i n g membership of the congress 
as a duty and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , not as honour and pres t i g e ; 
I t severely c r i t i c i s e d the committees, bureaux, declarations 
and h i s t o r i c a l pamphlets which had appeared i n the l a s t year. 
" I f we speak i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y terms we must 
prove our words w i t h p r a c t i c e , otherwise 
our w i l l becomes paralysed and we cannot 
e f f e c t r e a l i t y . We become professionals 
w i t h words and without work opening the 
door to opportunism w i t h i n the ranks of 
the leadership." 
I t continued by c r i t i c i s i n g the l e g a l i s a t i o n accorded to 
the PLO by the Arab states while the r e a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
o r g a n i s a t i o n f i g h t i n g i n the occupied land faced a l l kinds 
of persecution and t o r t u r e . 
Following t h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n the statement was divided i n t o 
separate sections each dealing w i t h a d i f f e r e n t subject. I t 
ended w i t h a possible programme of ac t i o n to r e c t i f y the 
mistakes made at the beginning. 
The f i r s t s e c t i o n , e n t i t l e d "Our e n t i t y and the reasons 
f o r our beginning," began by r e s t a t i n g al-Fateh's basic b e l i e f 
t h a t armed str u g g l e was the road t o v i c t o r y and th a t t h i s 
1 . Al-Fateh, Wahdat ath-Thav/rah a l - F a l a s t l n i y y a h (Dirasat 
No. 9 ) , pp. 1-H-1. 
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struggle must be based on the masses. I t continued by i n s i s t i n g 
t h a t the o v e r - r i d i n g aim at t h a t time was f o r P a l e s t i n i a n u n i t y . 
The cadres of the movement 
"... are from d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l trends 
who l e f t t h e i r p a r t i e s i n f u l l consciousness. 
I t was not easy f o r the Movement to v/ork 
w i t h a l l these trends, but p r a c t i c a l 
experience and a c t i o n were the main 
' u n i t i n g f a c t o r ..." 1 
U n i t y was t o be achieved through a c t i v e s t r u g g l e . Al-Fateh 
next r e s t a t e d i t s b e l i e f t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n was 
l i n k e d t o the great Arab r e v o l u t i o n , and re-emphasised i t s 
p o l i c y of non-interference i n the a f f a i r s of the Arab states. 
Turning t o more s p e c i f i c matters i t said that, at f i r s t 
accusations of regionalism were made against Al-Fateh, yet: 
"... when the Summit Conference gave b i r t h 
t o the PLO as a r e g i o n a l organisation i t 
proved' our p o l i c y c o r r e c t .... Vie sympathise 
w i t h the c r e a t i o n of the PLO but f e e l i t s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s may become a danger i f they 
remain unchanged, because the PLO i n i t s 
e x i s t i n g form may freeze P a l e s t i n i a n 
e f f o r t s and p o t e n t i a l . " 
The statement said t h a t although everyone agreed t h a t armed 
st r u g g l e was the only method of regaining the homeland there 
were disagreements about the t i m i n g . 2 Al-Fateh's decision 
t o begin armed struggle i n 1 9 6 5 was not the r e s u l t of a 
formula 
"... but the r e s u l t of an o v e r a l l study of 
the s i t u a t i o n , the correctness of which 
could only be proved i n p r a c t i c e . From 
our analysis we found jpositive encourag-
ing elements and negative discouraging 
elements ... and by comparing these 
through the course of time we proved to 
ourselves t h a t our t i m i n g was c o r r e c t ..." 
Having j u s t i f i e d . i t s existence and a c t i o n , Al-Fateh proceeded 
t o the second section of the statement, e n t i t l e d "The Arab 
S i t u a t i o n " . This d e a l t w i t h I s r a e l and the Arab states i n 
very general terms. I t said the Z i o n i s t danger had existed 
f o r a long time, while the Arab Revolutionary forces had become 
1 . During the summer of 1 9 6 9 the author met al-Fateh members 
who had p r e v i o u s l y been members of r e l i g i o u s p a r t i e s , the 
Ba'th and the Communist p a r t y . 
2 . One of the main accusations made against al-Fateh was that 
by s t a r t i n g t h e i r armed str u g g l e i n 1 9 6 5 they would draw the 
Arab states i n t o a war before the necessary preparations 
had been made. 
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i n v o l v e d i n i d e o l o g i c a l b a t t l e s and."the Palestine cause was 
f o r g o t t e n except i n n a t i o n a l i s t slogans ra i s e d by each country 
and group." I t added t h a t the problem was now urgent because 
of I s r a e l ' s imminent a c q u i s i t i o n of the Atomic Bomb. However, 
".... I t i s due time t o raise our voices 
i n the face of our brother Arab countries 
(asking them) t o postpone or freeze t h e i r 
problems and launch w i t h us the b a t t l e 
to l i b e r a t e Palestine, Arab U n i t y ... 
cannot be achieved except through a 
b a t t l e of destiny l i k e the Palestine 
b a t t l e which imposes of necessity the 
u n i f i c a t i o n of a l l Arab r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
forces ..." 
This s e c t i o n ended w i t h a s p e c i f i c condemnation of Bourguiba. 
The t h i r d s e c t i o n , and perhaps most important and e s s e n t i a l 
t o the statement was headed "The PLO and the Armed Revolution". 
I t began: 
"No problem can f i n d s o l u t i o n except i n the 
hands of the people and i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
forces. L i b e r a t i o n causes therefore have 
a popular content and whoever imagines t h a t 
complete l i b e r a t i o n can be achieved by 
armies I s o l a t e d from the masses i s wrong. 
The armies without the masses can do nothing. 
The r o l e of the army i s i n the f i n a l stages 
of the mass s t r u g g l e . We need a r e v o l u t i o n -
ary transformation i n our d a l l y l i v e s t o r i d 
ourselves of sickness, apathy, defeatism 
and f a c t i o n a l i s m . This transformation can 
only be achieved i n the course of the 
armed s t r u g g l e . The stages of preparation 
and o r g a n i s a t i o n and the b u i l d i n g of cadres 
may prepare the masses to a c e r t a i n extent 
to accept r e v o l u t i o n a r y -thought but w i l l not 
create the necessary consciousness f o r b a t t l e . 
We must run before events to d i r e c t them, 
otherwise events w i l l d i c t a t e t o us ..." 
Thus f o r al-Fateh armed str u g g l e v/as not j u s t a method f o r 
l i b e r a t i n g Palestine. I t was something more than t h a t , the 
means through which the P a l e s t i n i a n and Arab m e n t a l i t y could be 
r e v o l u t i o n i s e d . Moreover, u n l i k e the other groups, when a l -
Fateh discussed arm.ed st r u g g l e i t was on the basis of experience 
not mere theory. 
The statem.ent then c r i t i c i s e d the PLC's strategy more d i r e c t l y : 
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" I t i s wrong f o r any r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement 
to d w e l l upon b u i l d i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y cadres 
at the l e v e l of a c l a s s i c a l army. The 
r e v o l u t i o n f o r m i l i t a r y cadres of a l i b e r a -
t i o n m.overoent depends upon experience and 
armed p r a c t i c e . 
To deceive the P a l e s t i n i a n masses by the 
I l l u s i o n of c r e a t i n g a l i b e r a t i o n army i s at 
t h i s 'stage a ^ r e a t crime f o r t h i s a c t i o n acts 
' as a drug t o the masses i s o l a t i n g them from 
the s t r u g g l e , because the army w i l l take 
sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " 
The charge then was t h a t the PLO by creating a c l a s s i c a l - t y p e 
army was i n f a c t c r e a t i n g an e l i t e and thereby avoiding the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of I n v o l v i n g a l l the people consciously i n the 
com.ing l i b e r a t i o n war. 
The next p a r t of the statement was d i r e c t e d at the ANM and 
a t i t s proposals f o r reforming the PLO, although the ANM was not 
e x p l i c i t e l y named. 
" I f you adopt the p r i n c i p l e s of democracy as one. 
o f the features of the PLO you are wrong. Any 
democracy based upon representatives and 
e l e c t i o n s w i t h i n a l i b e r a t i o n r e v o l u t i o n i s 
f a l s e democracy because i t w i l l b r i n g to the. 
f o r e the opportunist elements and defunct 
t r a d i t i o n a l leadership. The p a r t y , the f a m i l y , 
t h e p r o f e s s i o n , and m a t e r i a l considerations 
w i l l govern the r e s u l t s of the e l e c t i o n s and 
even the nomination of the representatives. 
Some consider t h a t we should organise the 
masses through r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e 
unions .... I n r e a l i t y you won't be organising 
the masses but c r e a t i n g skeletons and organising 
i n s t i t u t i o n s without a popular content, headed 
by leaders elected upon a f a l s e basis. I n t h i s 
way you freeze the general development and drug 
the masses by g i v i n g them the r i g h t of e l e c t i o n s 
and nominations, while the e l e c t o r a l process 
w i l l push forward unrevolutlonary leadership 
i n the name of democracy and transform the 
popular organisations and consciousness i n t o 
l e c t u r e s on the h i s t o r y of Palestine and a 
philosophy of u n r e a l i s t i c s t r u g g l e . " 
The.section ended w i t h a more s t i n g i n g condemnation of the PLO, 
than any of the other groups or organisations dared to give. 
"The PLO cares f o r the form and not the content. 
The PLO takes and does not give. I t takes taxes, 
p a r t s of s a l a r i e s , and donations and spends 
l i b e r a l l y on delegations, bureaux and s a l a r i e s . 
This i s a r e v o l u t i o n on i t s head. What has the 
PLO given the people except words, d e c l a r a t i o n s , 
conferences and emotion? .... Many of us preach 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r i n c i p l e s ... but they are rare who 
p r a c t i s e them. The m o b i l i s a t i o n of the masses 
needs the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the masses i n r e v o l u -
t i o n a r y a c t i o n and armed struggle. I f such a c t i o n 
c o n t r a d i c t s the Arab s t a t e s , what i s the use of the 
PLO as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y organisation when i t takes 
i t s r i g h t t o act from the Arab countries." 
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The l a s t p a r t of the statement concerned "The s i t u a t i o n of 
the enemy i n the occupied land". I t described the e f f e c t s of 
the fed.ayeen actions upon I s r a e l and l i s t e d I s r a e l ' s main 
t a c t i c a l and.strategic o b j e c t i v e s . 1 Al-Fateh again stressed 
the need t o involve a l l the Palestinians a c t i v e l y w i t h i n the 
e n t i t y : 
" I t i s b e t t e r t o hold a small candle than 
to curse .the darkness a thousand times. 
Let each P a l e s t i n i a n group l i g h t a small 
candle t o chase the darkness from our 
l i v e s , and show the road of r e t u r n l i t 
by the candle of armed r e v o l u t i o n . The 
roads of degeneration are num.erous, but 
at t h i s stage we should not use armed 
violence against everyone who takes these • 
paths. On the other hand, t r a i t o r s and 
deviators must be punished without delay." 
The statement ended wi-th recommendations, though much less 
d e t a i l e d than those of the ANM or the Bureau, On the P a l e s t i n -
i a n l e v e l al-Fateh demanded t h a t the PLA be fr e e t o act i n -
dependently and be transformed i n t o a fedayeen-type army. 
Na t i o n a l u n i t y should be promoted through the active i n v o l v e -
ment of a l l the people and the w a l l of silence surrounding 
fedayeeh actions should be broken so they might become "a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y example f o r the people." The d i v e r s i o n of the 
t r i b u t a r i e s m.ust not be a s u b s t i t u t e f o r d i r e c t a c t i o n against 
I s r a e l . The e n t i t y should be a r e a l l y popular organisation 
and i t s executive should maintain continuous contact w i t h the 
congress. A committee should be established immediately to 
study possible r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n . Remuneration f o r service w i t h i n 
the e n t i t y should be on the basis of need only. 
S t r a t e g i c aims, according to al-Fateh, included increas-
i n g population density; f r e e i n g the economy from 
dependence on f o r e i g n investment. I n d u s t r i a l i s i n g and 
populating the Negev w i t h immigrants; b u i l d i n g a canal 
from Ashdod to Aqaba to compete w i t h the Suez canal etc. 
T a c t i c a l aims include widening the r i f t s i n the Arab 
world; - maintaining tension i n the area t o mobilise 
world opinion; reducing Palestine t o a problem o f 
refugees. 
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On the Arab l e v e l , the reorganisation of the e n t i t y should 
mark the end of Arab guardianship and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
Palestine problem.. The Arab states must begin to prepare f o r 
the r e a l b a t t l e and understand i t s dim.ensions. Calls t o im-
plement UN r e s o l u t i o n s on Palestine should cease and the r i g h t 
o f the P a l e s t i n i a n s t o regain t h e i r ;iLand by force be recog-
nised. 
F i n a l l y , on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l the Palestinians should 
announce t h e i r stand on the side of a l l people s t r u g g l i n g f o r 
t h e i r l i b e r a t i o n . 
Of the three statem.ents considered here, t h a t of al-Fateh 
alone shows evidence o f r e a l study of the s i t u a t i o n i n a l l i t s 
aspects. H i s t o r i c a l study had shown tha t there was nothing 
to be gained from r e l y i n g upon the Arab states to solve the 
problem of Palestine. Al-Fateh thus r e j e c t e d any attempts 
by the Arab states t o l i n k the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine t o 
o v e r - a l l Arab.strategy. L i b e r a t i o n was henceforth the pro-
vince of the P a l e s t i n i a n s and t h i s was the foundation of a l l 
al-Fateh's c r i t i c i s m s and recommendations. Study of the 
e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n on a l l l e v e l s i n c l u d i n g the s i t u a t i o n of 
the enemy was the basis of al-Fateh's own strategy and t a c t i c s . 
By the time of the second congress the movement's armed 
str u g g l e was underway and i t was on the basis of actions and 
experience t h a t the statement d i s t r i b u t e d t o the congress 
members was drawn up. The statement was not framed i n a 
vacuum. I t d i d not hide defence of the status quo behind 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y terminology. I t asked the congress t o reform 
i t s e l f and to adopt an independent and e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y . 
The N a t i o n a l Congress closed without so l v i n g any of the 
fundamental c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which were surrounding the 
P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y . D i s i n t e g r a t i o n at the Arab l e v e l i n -
creased d a i l y and the PLO although s u p e r f i c i a l l y growing 
stronger through the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , was 
l o s i n g m.oral a u t h o r i t y over the popular organisations. Perhaps 
the one t h i n g to be i l l u s t r a t e d through the Congress was the 
increasing importance of al-Fateh. 
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This o r g a n i s a t i o n was proving i t s e l f both through i t s theory 
and i t s p r a c t i c e t o be something e n t i r e l y new. Moreover, i f 
t h i s was not yet f u l l y r e a l i s e d by the Palestinians themselves 
i t was c e r t a i n l y r e a l i s e d by the Arab s t a t e s , f o r of a l l the 
organisations alriFateh was the one against which the Arab 
governments 1 were t a k i n g the severest a c t i o n . 2 I t s members 
were subject to a r r e s t , imprlsonm.ent, t o r t u r e and even death 
a t the hands of the Arab s t a t e s , and i t s communiques were s t i l l 
banned.from p u b l i c a t i o n . Were i t not f o r t h i s , i t s mass 
f o l l o w i n g could have grown more q u i c k l y than i t d i d . 
The T h i r d Arab Summit Conference 
I n the course of 1 9 6 5 Shuqeiry found i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t 
t o continue h i s d e l i c a t e balancing act between the d i f f e r e n t 
Arab s t a t e s , the d i f f e r e n t popular organisations and h i s personal 
r i v a l s . He was f a c i n g increasing pressure from the competition 
o f f e r e d by ;al:^Fateh and increasing apathy from the Arab states 
sometimes verging on h o s t i l i t y . 
I n t h i s atmosphere, i n September 1 9 6 5 , "the t h i r d summit 
conference was held. As on the previous occasion Bourguiba 
boycotted the meeting because of the dispute caused by h i s 
stand on Pales t i n e . Also, as on the previous occasion, Shuqeiry 
attended, to give a r e p o r t about the PLO a c t i v i t i e s and submit 
a l i s t of demands. He had p u b l i c l y announced th a t h i s i n t e n -
t i o n i n going to the conference was t o "overcome the d i f f i c u l t i e s " , 
He said he hoped the summit would transform the FLO from i t s 
e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n of "working under l i c e n c e " t o one i n which i t 
•could work f r e e l y . 3 
Shuqeiry's r e p o r t r e f l e c t e d the growing d i f f i c u l t i e s of the 
PLO w i t h the Arab s t a t e s . He claimed t h a t the Arab states had 
not co-operated w i t h him on the question of residence, t r a v e l 
and work permits f o r Palestinians nor had they f a c i l i t a t e d r e -
cruitment or movement of P a l e s t i n i a n troops. None of the states 
had paid t h e i r dues t o the PLA and some had even defaulted i n 
.1 o With the exception of S y r i a , although at one p o i n t most of 
the leadership were arrested i n Syria on charges of having 
assasslriated another member of the organisation. Author's 
i n t e r v i e w v/lth Abu Ibrahim, 'amman, summer I 9 6 9 . 
2 . This a c t i o n was taken on the e x p l i c i t orders of the U n i f i e d 
Arab Command. These orders were executed overzealously by 
both Jordan and Lebanon, i b i d j 
3 . Al-Manar^ 1 2 t h September 1 9 6 5 . 
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t h e i r payments to the PLO. I n p a r t i c u l a r he accused Lebanon 
of p l a c i n g obstacles before the PLO i n not allov/ing Palestinians 
t o t r a i n oh Lebanese s o i l . He asked t h a t an a d d i t i o n a l tax 
f o r the. PLO be l e v i e d on the o i l states and demanded special 
t a x a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y over the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s . Both.these requests were refused. 1 
M i i l e the conference was i n session the PLO Bureau i n 
Damascus sent telegrams t o a l l heads of s t a t e demanding: 
1. A serious plan f o r l i b e r a t i o n i n c l u d i n g finance and 
t r a i n i n g . 
2. Complete freedom of a c t i o n i n a l l Arab countries. 
3. Recognition of the PLO's complete freedom of d i r e c t i o n . 2 
None of these demands was granted and the conference was no 
more successful i n other respects. Work on the Arab Jordan 
water p r o j e c t s was s t i l l deadlocked and cracks i n the facade 
of Arab u n i t y were becoming wider each day. I t would seem 
t h a t the main obstacles t o any s o r t of progress on the 
P a l e s t i n i a n demands came from Jordan, whose period of co-
existence V7lth the P a l e s t i n i a n e n t i t y was r a p i d l y drawing to 
a close. 
To t h i s t h i r d and a b o r t i v e summit conference al-Fateh sent 
a long memorandum. 3 This was the f i r s t time the movement had 
d i r e c t l y communicated w i t h the Arab states and i t was more a 
d e c l a r a t i o n of defiance than a request f o r favours: 
"Al-Fateh i s embarrassed t o address the summit 
since the t r a d i t i o n of such memoranda demand 
pol i t e n e s s and p r o t o c o l .... Our movement 
has no b i g army, huge budget or i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c a p a b i l i t i e s . We are thus embarrassed t o 
address the kings and presidents of the Arab 
homeland' - one of the l a r g e s t , most s e n s i t i v e 
and most dangerous areas I n the world. VJe 
cannot make long speeches or o f f e r t h e o r e t i c a l 
analyses f o r two reasons: 
F i r s t , we know, and the masses know, t h a t i n 
such h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s as t h i s the b u l l e t 
i s what w i l l d i s p e l i n j u s t i c e and i t i s 
r i d i c u l o u s t o work through speeches and 
memoranda ... 
1. Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine problem, 
pp. 176-7. ^ [ 
2. • L'OrientT ^5th September 1965. 
3 . Al-Fateh, Mawaaif wa Muntalaaat Thax^riwah (D i r a s a t No. 
10) , pp. 5=15. 
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Second, our movement does not have the 
apparatus f o r w r i t i n g speeches and 
f a b r i c a t i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s , not through 
impotence but because our members 
refuse to do such work " 
Having dispensed w i t h the opening f o r m a l i t i e s al-Fateh r e -
a f f i r m e d i t s b e l i e f t h a t l i b e r a t i o n required armed struggle 
based on the masses, t h a t tim.e favoured the enemy, and t h a t ' 
popular l i b e r a t i o n war was the only s o l u t i o n t o inter-Arab 
d i f f e r e n c e s . The f i r s t h a l f of the memorandum ended w i t h a 
condemnation of the PLO: 
"The PLO was created as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o 
f o r c i b l y preventing the Z i o n i s t d i v e r s i o n 
of the Jordan. I t ended by t u r n i n g the 
eyes ( o f the people) away from t h i s f a t e f u l 
problem which has now become a r e a l i t y .... 
We s t i l l declare our readiness t o co-
operate w i t h any P a l e s t i n i a n or Arab group 
which wishes a c t i v e l y to l i b e r a t e P alestine, 
but on two c o n d i t i o n s : 
F i r s t , meeting and co-operation should occur 
. on the b a t t l e f i e l d not i n o f f i c e s and con-
ferences. 
Second, leadership must be i n the hands of 
the P a l e s t i n i a n people, f a r from the 
h o s t i l i t i e s and c o n f l i c t s i n the Arab world." 
The r e s t of the memorandum c r i t i c i s e d the Arab s t a t e s ' 
a t t i t u d e . t o w a r d s and treatment of al-Fateh. I t described 
the persecution, a r r e s t s and t o r t u r e to which the Arab 
governments had subjected Fateh members. I t condemned again 
the ban on p u b l i s h i n g a l - ' a s i f a h communiques: 
"Our m.ovement was s i l e n t i n the face of t h i s 
a n t i - n a t i o n a l i s t h o s t i l i t y and t r i e d to ' 
: solve the d i f f i c u l t i e s through personal con-
t a c t s and by o f f e r i n g proof o f our good 
i n t e n t i o n s towards the Arab regimes .... 
"We have decided t o remain s i l e n t no longer 
a f t e r showing r e s t r a i n t f o r more than nine 
months r e s u l t i n g only i n increased pressure 
upon us .... We w i l l accept i n f u t u r e o n l y 
p r a c t i c a l proof of good w i l l towards us, 
•namely: 
F i r s t , an end t o persecution of a l - ' a s i f a h 
forces i n the Arab countries ... and the 
Immediate release o f a l l those arrested. 
Second, an end t o the ban on a l - ' a s i f a h 
news i n many Arab countries. 
T h i r d , an end t o the o b s t r u c t i o n of a l -
'asifah men undertaking operations ... or 
•seeking refuge i n a neighbouring country. 
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Fourth, Arab defence of a l - ' a s i f a h men 
arrested i n I s r a e l . 1 
This was the minimum the Arab states could do. I n a d d i t i o n they 
should make a v a i l a b l e t o the movement the accumulated stocks 
of arms and ammunition they held i n q u a n t i t i e s at le a s t equal 
t o the o f f e r s made t o A f r i c a n and Asian l i b e r a t i o n movements. 
The t h i r d summit achieved nothing i n i t s e l f other than 
marking.the end of any semblance o f inter-Arab co-operation, 
and r e v e a l i n g the beginning of di f f e r e n c e s between the Arab 
states and the PLO. I t marked also the end of al-Fateh's 
u n o f f i c i a l attempts t o come t o some degree of understanding 
w i t h the Arab governments over i t s a c t i v i t i e s . From now on 
the movement protested p u b l i c l y against any o f f i c i a l attem.pts 
t o suppress i t . 
The PLO and Jordan 
The t h i r d summit, and i n p a r t i c u l a r Jordan, had refused 
a l l of Shuqeiry's requests. He could not a f f o r d t o ignore 
t h i s i n s u l t i n the face of the growing p o p u l a r i t y of other 
organisations l i k e al-Fateh which might prove an a l t e r n a t i v e 
t o the PLO. His r e a c t i o n t o the i n s u l t s was the standard one 
of t h r e a t e n i n g t o r e s i g n . 2 On a r r i v i n g i n Be i r u t a f t e r the 
conference the PLO bureau there confirmed t h i s i n t e n t i o n : 
"... the negative a t t i t u d e of Jordan i s the 
main reason behind the proposed r e s i g n a t i o n , 
because Jordan refused o b l i g a t o r y r e c r u i t -
ment t o the PLA and popular organisation of 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s i n i t s t e r r i t o r y . The 
work of the PLO i n Jordan i s therefore 
paralysed." 3 
On 30th'September 1965 over Voice of Palestine radio from 
Cairo, Shuqeiry expressly condemned the Summit: 
"... a l l the demands presented to the 
Casablanca conference h by the PLO were 
refused ... the PLO w i l l not become a t o y . 
I f e v e r y t h i n g . i s closed t o us i n some 
countries the Palestinians w i l l seek other 
. ways, outside Arab conferences. We 
announced the d i v e r s i o n of the Jordan 
t r i b u t a r i e s , i n loud voices, and now v;e 
are paralysed. Time works i n I s r a e l ' s 
• favour, not ours." 
1. During 1965 al-Fateh had been using a l l the diplomatic 
methods a t i t s disposal t o get good l e g a l defence f o r 
Kahmoud H a j j a z i who was arrested during a l - ' a s i f a h ' s 
f i r s t operation i n January 1965. IPS, Kitab Vol. 2. p. 121. 
2. Al-Ahrar. 19th September I965. 
3 . Al-Nahar, 21st September I965. 
The T h i r d Summit was hel d i n Casablanca. 
95 
He placed the main blame on Jordan f o r the p a r a l y s i s , a l l e g i n g 
t h a t Jordan: 
"... refused to allow Saudi and I r a q i forces 
to enter Jordan, leaving the Arab p r o j e c t s 
... without defence ..." 1 
As usual the executive refused Shuqeiry's r e s i g n a t i o n 2 and 
a v i r u l e n t press and radio campaign began i n Jordan against the 
PLO, I t was ended only by the i n t e r v e n t i o n of Nasir's Govern-
ment a few weeks l a t e r and mediation attempts continued through-
out the r e s t of 1965. 
At the same time, r e l a t i o n s w i t h I r a q and Syria remained 
a t l e a s t s u p e r f i c i a l l y good. 3 Shuqeiry held a meeting w i t h 
Amin H a f i z , the Syrian President i n December which he des-
cr i b e d as "very u s e f u l " . He said there had been a "very s i n -
cere and deep response". The head of the FLA i n Syria said 
the army had become a r e a l i t y there due t o the help and co-
operation of Syrian Arm.y. k 
There was s t i l l no PLA i n Jordan and on December 8th the 
Jordanian Government sent notes to.diplomats i n a l l the Arab 
cou n t r i e s s t a t i n g t h a t i t had: 
"... supported a l l PLO requests but there 
was no question of p e r m i t t i n g the 
c r e a t i o n of an independent P a l e s t i n i a n 
Army." 5 
The dispute had not been solved and mediation e f f o r t s were inte n -
s i f i e d ' i n e a r l y 1966. I n March a t e n t a t i v e agreem.ent was 
f i n a l l y reached and i t s terms published. The agreement showed 
Jordan's determination t o maintain c o n t r o l over, any m i l i t a r y 
a c t i v i t i e s undertaken on Jordanian s o i l , while o f f e r i n g c e r t a i n 
freedom on the p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l l e v e l s . 6 The m i l i t a r y 
p r o v i s i o n s were ambiguous and vague. For instance, c o n s c r i p t i o n 
f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n s "would be studied on the basis of the 
1. Al-Havat. 28th September 1965. 
2. Al-Muharrer. ^ t h October 1965. 
3. Oh 12th November I r a q waived a l l customs duties on m i l i t a r y 
goods f o r the PLO and on 19th December the PLO announced 
t h a t N a t i o n a l Service f o r Palestinians would be i n s t i t u t e d 
i n S y r i a . L'Orient. 12th November 1965 and 20th Dec. 1965. 
k, Al-Ba'th, 1 3 t h - l t o - December 1965. 
5. L'Orient.•9th December 1965. 
6. For example the freedom t o levy taxes and make c o l l e c t i o n s , 
and freedom of residence, t r a v e l and work. . 
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d i r e c t i v e s of the U n i f i e d Arab Command", and any summer t r a i n -
i n g camps which might be run f o r the Palestinians would have 
Jordanian i n s t r u c t o r s . 1 
. C l e a r l y , any r e a l xmderstanding between the two sides i n 
t h i s dispute was impossible f o r i t would need to reco n c i l e 
the i n t e r e s t s of two separate e n t i t i e s , the P a l e s t i n i a n 
and the Jordanian, based upon the same land and the same 
people. By A p r i l , the s i t u a t i o n had d e t e r i o r a t e d again, and 
attempts t o reach agreement were shelved. The Jordanian 
Government, began s y s t e m a t i c a l l y to a r r e s t P a l e s t i n i a n a c t i v i s t s 
both from the PLO and from other groups, using the p r e t e x t 
t h a t they were members of i l l e g a l p a r t i e s , 2 On l ^ t h May 
King Hussein declared: 
"The PLO i s i n the hands of subversive agents 
who. have become the instruments of d e s t r u c t i o n 
w i t h i n the ranks of Arab u n i t y and u n i f i e d 
a c t i o n . The or g a n i s a t i o n has become the 
cause of discord among the Arabs," 3 
A b a t t l e of words began to rage once more. On 8th June 
Shuqeiry announced t h a t : 
"The PLA was born of the summit conference 
but i t w i l l not end w i t h the ending of 
these conferences, k I declare t h a t the 
army w i l l remain. This i s what w i l l end 
the summit conference." 5 
The f o l l o w i n g week the PLO accused Jordan of non-co-operation 
and v i o l a t i o n of the March accord, and requested t h a t the 
Jordanian Government r e s i g n . At the end of June during a 
meeting of Arab heads of s t a t e i n Cairo, Jordan demanded t h a t 
the Arab states withdraw t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of the PLO accusing 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n of tending towards Communism. Shuqeiry f o r 
h i s p a r t presented a r e p o r t t o the meeting denying the a l l e g a -
t i o n s and demanding Hussein's abdication. 6 
1. ' Al-Hayat. 2nd March 1966. 
2. The Communist p a r t y and the various n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s 
were s t i l l i l l e g a l in,Jordan, 
3. L'Orient. I5th May 1966. . . 
•+0 I t was already suspected i n many quarters t h a t the f o u r t h 
Summit scheduled f o r September would not i n f a c t be h e l d . 
5. L'Or l e n t . . 9th June 1966. 
6. i b i d . 
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The s i t u a t i o n came to a head I n July. More arrests were made 
of Palestinian a c t i v i s t s and on 17th July the Prime Minister 
of Jordan before an extraordinary session of the Parliament 
declared: 
"Jordan was the f i r s t nation to defend the 
Palestinian e n t i t y and to support the PLO 
under Shuqeiry. However, the l a t t e r has 
exceeded the l i m i t s of his authority I n 
the organisation which he has placed under 
the influence of subversive p o l i t i c a l 
parties I n the o r b i t of certain I n t e r -
national p o l i t i c a l blocs. We have ceased 
connection with the PLC." 1 
The following day Parliament r a t i f i e d the suspension of 
Jbrdan-PLO re l a t i o n s . 
The end of Jordanian recognition was also the end of the 
summit conferences. A few days l a t e r President Naslr 
announced that the UAR would boycott the coming summit. He 
said 
"We cannot s i t down at the same table with 
the reactionary forces. For t h i s they 
must leave the zones of Imperialist I n f l u ^ 
ence and put an end to thei r plans against 
the Arab revolution .... We are not losing 
sight of our essential objective which I s 
the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine. We shall co-
ordinate our e f f o r t s with a l l Arab revolu-
tionaries with a view to l i b e r a t i n g 
. Palestine by the revolutionary road not 
the t r a d i t i o n a l road." 2 
Naslr then requested the postponement of the summit and t h i s was 
accepted by the other states almost immediately. The postpone-
ment was l a t e r made permanentitey the Arab League. Shuqeiry 
said that the PLO would I n any case not have participated I n 
the summit as most of the Arab states had defaulted on t h e i r 
payments to the organisation. I n future the PLO would r e l y on 
b i l a t e r a l agreements with each separate state. 3 
1o Le Monde. .19th July 1966. 
2. Keesings Contemporary Archives (1966), p. 21663. 
3. i b i d . 
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I t I s not surprising that the f a i l u r e of the summit conferences 
should have coincided with Jordan's r e j e c t i o n of the PLO. I t was 
only the change i n Jordan's h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e towards the 
Palestinian Entity which had made the summits possible i n the 
f i r s t place. Jordan had accepted the PLO only as an alterna-
t i v e to m i l i t a r y action against Israel's diversion of the water. 
Now the c r i s i s surrounding the diversion had died down tolera-
t i o n of the PLO was no longer necessary. I n addition to t h i s , 
Jordan had assumed that the PLO would simply be a formal 
i n s t i t u t i o n or at worst a t o o l of the UAR, but the development 
of the fedayeen was forcing Shuqeiry to take an increasingly 
Independent stand. 
The growing strength of al-tateh 1 was obliging Shuqeiry 
to seek a l l i e s among the other Palestinian groups. From 
February 1966 the PLO began negotiations with the ANM, the 
Ba'th (Palestinian branch) and other groups with a view to 
some sort of unity. These groups eventually formed "The 
Preparatory Coimnittee f o r United Palestinian Action," 2 which 
almost immediately began Issuing statements and declarations 
couched i n extremely revolutionary language. On 12th February, 
f o r Instance, i n protest against the sale of American tanks 
to I s r a e l , the PLO Bureau Director i n Lebanon on behalf of the 
committee, stated that t h i s event: 
"... placed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the shoulders of 
a l l revolutionaries, both Palestinian and 
Arab, to act immediately, declaring t h e i r 
anger against t h i s American c o l o n i a l i s t 
state by means other than telegrams of de-
nunciation and statements of regret." 3 
Al-Fateh had participated i n the i n i t i a l negotiations on unity 
but refused to Join the committee i n s i s t i n g that m i l t y must occur 
1. Al-Fateh was l i v i n g up to i t s decision not to remain s i l e n t 
any longer i n the face of Arab persecution. I n the f i r s t 
months of 1966 the Movement had gained a l o t of p u b l i c i t y 
over the arrest of some of her members I n Lebanon, and the 
subsequent death of one of them while under investigation. 
Massive demonstrations were held i n Damascus and Beirut i n 
protest and a public enquiry held as a r e s u l t . L'Orient^ 
January l6th and 21st. 
2. They included the Palestinian section of the ANM} the Pal-
estinian branch of the Ba'thj representatives of various 
left-wing groups*, and the PLF ( J i b r l l ) . 
3. IPS, ot c i t Vol. ^ 1966. p. 125. 
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"on the b a t t l e f i e l d of Palestine and not i n offices and bureaux". 1 
Al-Fateh wanted r e a l u n i t y based upon action, not formal unity 
based upon declarations. By mid-1966 Al-Fateh had issued over 
f i f t y communiques. Their operations increased i n spite of 
Jordan's punitive measures to stop them. This i n turn increased 
tension between I s r a e l and the Arab states giving Jordan yet 
another reason f o r h o s t i l i t y against the Palestinians. Al-Fateh 
was producing the very s i t u a t i o n the PLO had been created to 
avoid. 
As a.result of these developments the Palestinians were 
gradually isolated from the Arab states and lost the Arab 
support they had previously enjoyed. The PLO and the other 
groups were therefore obliged to adopt at least i n part the 
logic behind Al-Fateh's analyses of the si t u a t i o n . This was 
i l l u s t r a t e d at the t h i r d Palestinian National Congress held i n 
Gaza i n May 1966. 
The Third Palestinian National Congress 
The proceedings and membership of t h i s congress were l i k e 
those of i t s predecessors, but the changed situation resulted 
i n some s i g n i f i c a n t differences. The congress Insisted as 
before that the Arab states should honour t h e i r commitments 
to the e n t i t y 2 but i n addition to t h i s , many of the decisions 
made were based upon preparation f o r immediated m i l i t a r y action 
of some kind, regardless of o f f i c i a l Arab plans. Four of the 
decisions suggested by the p o l i t i c a l committee of the congress 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s s h i f t of emphasis. 
F i r s t , congress undertook to make preparations f o r an armed 
clash while ensuring protection from the rear. I t emphasised 
that t h i s action would not "challenge the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of 
the Arab world except i n the event of an attempt to prevent i t s 
free expression . . . a r r e s t s , expulsion or persecution of 
n a t i o n a l i s t elements i s the worst kind of transgression," 
I0 i b i d . 
2, This Congress was again not constituted by election, 
i b i d , p. 93. 
3. Appeals were made to the Arab states to honour t h e i r f i n -
ancial obligations, allow m i l i t a r y recruitment (directed at 
Lebanon and Jordan), and allow freedom of work, t r a v e l and 
residence, - i b i d , pp, 95-8. • 
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Second, congress declared that freedom of Palestinian action 
was necessary for l i b e r a t i o n , and appealed f o r the immediate 
release of a l l n a t i o n a l i s t elements and an end to persecution 
of the Palestinians everywhere. 
Third, congress sought u n i t y of the revolutionary forces 
i n s i s t i n g that c o l l e c t i v e revolutionary leadership should 
spring from united revolutionary action. Co-operation should 
be sought u n t i l u n i t y could be effected. 
Fourth, congress asserted the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the battle 
and suggiBsted transfer to the f i n a l stages of preparation. To 
avoid launching the b a t t l e would be equivalent to losing i t . 1 
The change i n a t t i t u d e of the congress revealed i n these 
decisions was the l o g i c a l r e s u l t of the PLC's estrangement 
from the Arab states i n particular Jordan. They did not 
r e f l e c t any direct Influence by al-Fateh although the form of 
the decisions would perhaps indicate such influence. They 
refl e c t e d only the f a c t that al-Fateh's actions had forced the 
PLO in t o a position where some change of att i t u d e was un-
avoidable. 
The Acceptance of the Fedayeen 
Through the l a s t months of 1966 the si t u a t i o n continued to 
deteriorate as al-Fateh raids Increased and were joined by raids 
of other groups. 2 Partly i n response to t h i s , I s r a e l launched 
a massive attack on the Jordanian villages of as-Sammu* 3 on 13th 
November. I t developed i n t o a b a t t l e involving the Jordanian 
Army and Ai r Force, although the Jordanian forces did not arrive 
u n t i l the v i l l a g e had been devastated. 
Massive, demonstrations broke out throughout the West Bank 
with the people taking to the streets and demanding arms to 
protect themselves, k- I n Nablus when the Jordanian Army began 
to f i r e on the crowds the people f i r e d back from behind b a r r i -
cades. Curfews were imposed and stringent security measures 
1. IPS, Kitab Vol. 3. pp. 93=6. 
2. The ANM had set up a group called Abtal al°'audah which had 
conducted one operation before November. See below page 
See Table IV, 
3. As=Sammu' was situated on the V/est Bank near the I s r a e l i 
border. 
ho Keesings (1966), pp. 2l8l9-20. 
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enforced, but to no a v a i l . The demand f o r arms spread, backed 
by a genera:! s t r i k e . A p e t i t i o n supporting the demand was sent 
to Hussein by the mayors and o f f i c i a l s of the West Bank. 1 
Support also came from Palestinian students i n other Arab 
countries. 2 Disturbances continued int o December i n spite of 
the severest security measures. On one occasion Palestinian 
flags were f l y i n g from a l l the main buildings i n Hebron 
while the army was conducting a search f o r arms there. 3 
The effects of the as-Sammu' r a i d were f e l t at a l l levels. 
At the Arab level i t provided an opportunity for the expression 
of progressive-conservative contradictions, Syria claimed 
that the r a i d was merely a diversionary t a c t i c to draw 
atte n t i o n away from a planned I s r a e l i attack on Syria and 
that i t s main aim was to strengthen the reactionary regime i n 
Jordan, k The UAR accused Hussein of collaborating with I s r a e l 
by preventing fedayeen raids by the Palestinians, 5 Jordan, 
f o r her part accused Syria of sending i n f i l t r a t o r i s i n t o the 
country to i n c i t e disturbances and accused the DAR of f a i l i n g 
t o provide necessary a i r cover during the r a i d . 6 
The e f f e c t of the r a i d on the PLO was very profound. At f i r s t 
Shuqeiry's at t i t u d e was conciliatory. He suggested that the 
PLA should be allowed to protect the border and prevent future 
raids. 7 King Hussein preferred to accept help from the 
Saudi Arabian Army rather than permit the PLA on Jordanian s o i l . 
He said " I do not see why I should o f f e r my head to the 
executioner," 8 
Shuqeiry's response was to a f f i r m that the Palestinians 
would continue to attack I s r a e l , but he added "... i n order to 
li b e r a t e Tel-Aviv we must li b e r a t e 'amman", 9 The PLO hence-
1. i b i d . 
2 . i b i d . 
3 o L'Orienty 5th December I 9 6 6 . 
Al-Ba'th, November ^hth 1966. 
5, Al-Ahram. November 19th 1966. 
6, Keesings ( 1 9 6 6 ) , p. 21820. 
7. Keesings ( 1 9 6 6 ) , p. 21820, 
8. Le Mondey November 2^th 1966. 
. 9 , Keesings ( I 9 6 6 ) , p. 21820. 
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f o r t h participated openly i n the anti-government demonstrations 
i n Jordan. Shuqeiry appealed to the Jordanian army to stay 
i n t h e i r barracks and ... "allow the popular revolution to 
li b e r a t e the homeland." Communiques were Issued c a l l i n g on 
the government to resign and asking the army to Join the 
revolution. 1 
Shuqeiry's brave statements during t h i s period were 
necessary f o r his survival as a "progressive" figure i n Palestin-
ian p o l i t i c s . The as-Sammu' c r i s i s resulted i n a general 
radical!sation of the PLO and a certain measure of re-organisation, 
The Executive Committee was replaced by a Revolutionary Council. 
I t s a c t i v i t i e s and personnel were not revealed, since i t s 
task was to prepare f o r war. 2 Shuqeiry warned I s r a e l that 
a c t i v i t i e s would continue. He said the new Council was based 
upon the Algerian experience and advised that the Jordanian 
army be re-organised along the lines of the North Vietnamese, 
Cubans and Algerians. 
On 3rd January 1967 Shuqeiry announced that the PLO had 
formed special commando uni t s to work within Jordan and on 
the same day several explosions took place i n Jerusalem and 
'amman. As a r e s u l t of t h i s , on the following day a l l the 
PLO o f f i c e s were closed and many of i t s senior members 
arrested. 3 
The reorganisation w i t h i n the PLO marked the Palestinian 
e n t i t y ' s formal acceptance of the concept of armed struggle, h 
At the same time i t sharpened personal antagonisms which had 
developed w i t h i n the organisation. Both Shaflq al-Hout 
(d i r e c t o r of the.Beirut o f f i c e ) and Wajih al-Madanl (head of 
the PLA) c r i t i c i s e d Shuqeiry f o r his unconstitutional methods 
I n executing these reforms without consulting the National 
Congress. 5 A further minor re-organisatlon settled these 
differences at least temporarily. 
1., i b i d , P» 21820-1. 
2. IPS, Kitab Vol, h, p. 97. 
3 o Keesings (1967), p. 21821. 
k. The fou r t h National Congress, scheduled for May was never 
held due to the Imminent war with I s r a e l , and therefore 
could not r a t i f y the p r i n c i p l e . 
5. IPS, Kitab Vol. tf. p. 98. 
103 
The PLO by 1967 was f i r m l y committed to the Palestinians 
since the as-Sammu' r a i d and the subsequent events had shown 
them to be an important and growing force, Al-Fateh's i n f l u -
ence had been considerable i n encouraging the demands of arms 
fo r the people, and while Shuqeiry was issuing statements from 
the safety of Cairo, al-Fateh's members were marching i n the 
demonstrations d i s t r i b u t i n g pamphlets and facing the guns of 
the Jordanian, army, 1 Popular support and recruitment to a l -
Fateh increased rapidly and the ANM and Ba'th were put i n the 
position of having to accept the principle of armed struggle, 
or lose t h e i r popularity. 
Both these parties had taken a step i n t h i s d i rection before 
the as-Sammu' r a i d . The ANM had set up Abtal al-'audah (Heroes 
of the Return), though i t did not acknowledge connection with 
the group at this; time, 2. The ANM was s t i l l having d i f f i c u l t y 
reconciling Palestinian and Arab nationalism. I t could not 
ignore the popular trend i n favour of the former, while to 
deny the l a t t e r would be to deny the rationale behind the 
movement's existence. After the r a i d the ANM j u s t issued a 
vague, revolutionary statement condemning Jordan, e x t o l l i n g 
the fedayeen, and demanding freedom of action. The statement 
also, true to form, demanded the r i g h t of the people to 
depend on the revolutionary Arab states and t h e i r armies, 3 
I n early 1967, Abtal were obliged to l i n k themselves with 
the PLA f o r f i n a n c i a l reasons, k The f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y 
of the movement was to the advantage of Shuqeiry i n his search 
for a l l i e s against the increasing popularity of al-Fateh, 
At the same time the ANM wanted to r e t a i n some independence 
and set up another group called Shebab ath-Thar (Youth of 
Revenge), 5 Thus by 1967 the ANM had developed a revolutionary 
form f o r i t s ideology although the content was s t i l l basically 
the same. The t i t l e s of i t s new groups strongly reflected 
the o r i g i n a l ideas of the movement. Unity, Liberation and 
Revenge. I t s t i l l lacked any social content whatever. 
1. i b i d Vol..3, p. 117. 
2. See above p. 101 f n . 2. 
3. IPS, Kitab Vol. 3. p. 12ko 
k-o Kadi, OP P i t (Resistance). p. . 23. 
5. This may not have been a new group but simply the Nationalist 
Front f o r the Liberation oi" Palestine (a member of the 
P o l i t i c a l Bureau) renamed. The connection between the 
Nationalist Front and the ANM was never declared at any 
time. 
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The Ba'th, at i t s ninth congress i n September I966, agreed 
i n p r i n c i p l e to set up i t s own fedayeen group but by the end 
of the year no action had been taken. 1 However, we have seen 
that the Syrian Ba'th's a t t i t u d e towards Palestine placed i t 
i n a less contradictory position than the ANM with respect to 
fedayeen action. The Congress decision was f i n a l l y put i n t o 
e f f e c t i n early 1967 with the formation of as-Saiaah (Thunder-
b o l t ) , o f f i c i a l l y e n t i t l e d Tala'i Harb at-Tahrir ash-Sha'biyyah 
(Vanguard of. Popular Liberation War). 
Al-Fateh used the as-Sammu' r a i d to prove the correctness 
and consistency of i t s position. On 10th December 1966 i t 
Issued a long statement analysing the post-Sammu' sit u a t i o n . 2 
There were nine main aspects of the new situation which a l -
Fateh considered s i g n i f i c a n t . 
F i r s t , escalation of al-'asifah a c t i v i t i e s inside the occupied 
t e r r i t o r y . 
Second, increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Palestinians i n the 
armed struggle. 
Third, PLO backing for the fedayeen a c t i v i t i e s . 
Fourth, the heroic stand of the Palestinians i n the face of the 
as-Sammu' r a i d . 
F i f t h , the Palestinians' public endorsement of armed struggle 
and the fedayeen. 
Sixth, the attempts of I s r a e l and the West to a t t r i b u t e the 
fedayeen to Syria, i n an e f f o r t to hide the newly emergent 
Palestinian movement. 
Seventh, the fear and t e r r o r caused i n I s r a e l by the fedayeen 
actions. 
Eighth, the appearance of the American Sixth Fleet and the 
B r i t i s h Fleet during the disturbances following.as-Sammu'. 
Ninth, the transfer of Palestine from an issue of refugees, 
borders and r e l i e f to one of national l i b e r a t i o n . 
I n l i s t i n g and expanding upon these new elements i n the 
s i t u a t i o n , al-Fateh sought to prove i t s c r i t i c s wrong. Fedayeen 
action had already produced r e s u l t s , converting Palestine i n t o 
a question of national l i b e r a t i o n , creating economic and psy-
chological insecurity i n I s r a e l , and most Important, restoring 
the self-confidence of the Palestinians themselves. 
1 . QSPAAL. Palestine C r i s i s and Liberation, p. 197. 
2 . Al-Fateh, Mawaoif wa Muntalaoat Thawriwah (Dlrasat 10 ) , 
pp. 29-37. 
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With respect to the PLO the statement acknowledged i t s 
i n i t i a t i v e i n backing the fedayeen and asked that the PLA should 
be sent to j o i n the armed struggle. New fedayeen groups were 
requested to co-operate with al-Fateh i n the exchange of i n f o r -
mation on the b a t t l e f i e l d . 
F i n a l l y the statement denounced: 
"... the pompous speeches, conferences and 
broadcasts i n Jordan which attacked the 
fedayeen. We say to these lackeys i n 'amman 
that our people are bored with these empty 
words and cowardly speeches about mobilisa-
t i o n and planning. Where.is t h i s planning 
a f t e r nineteen years?" 
Thus al-Fateh was f i n a l l y i n a position of strength from 
which i t f e l t able to c r i t i c i s e the regimes. I t had attracted 
the people to i t s cause by i t s armed struggle and i t s refusal 
to compromise. Now i t faced Jordanian persecution on the basis 
of i t s growing popular support. As-Sammu' had shown the 
Palestinians that they could not depend upon the Arab states 
to protect them. Al-Fateh was proving that they were capable 
of defending themselves. 
For the f i r s t months of 1967 the s i t u a t i o n continued to 
develop i n t h i s way. The PLO extolled the virtues of armed 
struggle and did a l l i t could to consolidate i t s position 
alongside the ANM i n an e f f o r t to stem the increasing i n f l u -
ence of al-Fateh. Al-Fateh f o r i t s p a rt, continued with 
i t s m i l i t a r y operations 1 and became the focus of international 
a t t e n t i o n i n May when I s r a e l o f f i c i a l l y complained to the UN 
about i t s a c t i v i t i e s . 2 
I n three years,-the face of the Palestinian problem had 
changed beyond recognition. The myth that united Arab action 
would some, day liberate Palestine had been destroyed. The 
Palestinians under pressure from al-Fateh were finding t h e i r 
own methods. The Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s , whether embodied i n party 
or state were being forced to swim with the t i d e . Al-Fateh 
achieved t h i s through the possession of a new Palestine-
oriented ideology. This showed i t s e l f i n a l l of the movement's 
statements and declarations. The underlying important be l i e f 
1 o Al-Fateh published 11 m i l i t a r y communiques i n the f i r s t 
f i v e months of 1967. 
2. IPS, K i t a b = V Q l ^ , p. 1.27.. 
106 
of. the' movement was that only independent Palestinian action 
would ever l i b e r a t e Palestine. Restrictions placed on the 
Palestinians by the Arab states, with t h e i r Arab Nationalist 
ideology, should be resisted to the end. I n t h i s context of 
increasing Palestinian a c t i v i t y and increasing Arab-Israeli 
tension, war broke out. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
The Development of the Fedayeen 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 0 
The General Effects of the June War 1967 1 
One of the reasons given by I s r a e l for her part i n the June 
war of 1 9 6 7 was the Increase i n g u e r i l l a a c t i v i t y by Palestinians 
from the surrounding states. However, the war i t s e l f was, i n 
large part, responsible f o r developing a situ a t i o n favourable 
to a fu r t h e r increase i n such a c t i v i t y . 
After only six days of f i g h t i n g , no Palestinian t e r r i t o r y 
remained i n Arab hands. The Palestinians i n the West Bank 
and Gaza were faced with the choice of either remaining under 
I s r a e l i occupation or fleeing to neighbouring states. For 
many t h i s meant becoming refugees f o r the second time I n t h e i r 
l i v e s . The war resulted i n some 9 0 , 0 0 0 displaced persons, 
6 0 ^ of whom had been registered refugees since 1 9 ^ 8 , leaving 
about kOfo homeless f o r the f i r s t time. Ten emergency camps 
were set up by the UN, six i n East Jordan and four i n Syria. 2 
The defeat demoralised the Arab leaders and established 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , discrediting them i n the eyes of the people. 
I n addition, the Arab states suffered loss of arms, men and 
t e r r i t o r y , Nasir's reputation was i n the greatest danger since 
he had for so long been the accepted leader of the Arab nation. 
However, i t seems that his self-confidence suffered more than 
h i s public image. Massive demonstrations throughout the Arab 
world followed his o f f e r to resign. 3 I n addition to s e l f -
confidence,' Naslr l o s t large sections of t e r r i t o r y (Gaaa and 
Sinai) as w e l l as his control over the Suez Canal from which 
Egypt derived a substantial portion of i t s income. 
King Hussein's reputation suffered less, since h i s popularity 
i n the Arab world and among the Palestinians i n Jordan had 
never been great. His d i f f i c u l t i e s were of a more p r a c t i c a l 
1 . I t i s not proposed to undertake an account of the i/ar as 
th i s has been extensively dealt with I n many other places. 
Unless s p e c i f i c a l l y stated, h i s t o r i c a l and factual material 
f o r t h i s chapter was tsiken from general sources such as 
Cahiersj Keesingss The Arab World, and The Arab Report 
and Record. 
2. See Table I . 
3 . N&sir offered to resign on 9 t h June. 
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nature. He had l o s t the most f e r t i l e part of his country, 
as well as most of Jordan's t o u r i s t attractions. The drop i n 
h i s food supply was not compensated by a drop i n population. 
On the contrary the majority of the refugees from Gaza and the 
West Bank came to the £ast Bank expecting to be fed and housed. 
Some brought money, as i n 1 9 ^ 8 , but some brought nothing at a l l . 
The Palestinians i n Jordan's population reached 70% with the 
new i n f l u x , making Jordan the obvious base f o r any attempts at 
organised resistance. 
Syria suffered considerable loss of face. After persistent 
c a l l s to war i n the preceding years, the Syrian Army collapsed 
before I s r a e l i attack. I t was widely believed that only 
minimal resistance had been offered. Moreover, Syria l o s t 
t e r r i t o r y of considerable strategic importance (The Golan Heights). 
The entire population of t h i s area f l e d towards Damascus creating 
a Syrian as w e l l as Palestinian refugee problem. 1 
During the atmosphere of tension preceding the war, Nasir 
and Hussein had found i t i n t h e i r mutual interest to sink 
differences and sign a j o i n t defence pact. 2 I n the atmosphere 
of despair which followed the defeat, i t was t a c i t l y accepted 
that a continuation of the truce would be mutually beneficial. 
Other inter-Arab differences were also, moderated. Syria s t i l l 
took a more radi c a l stand than Nasir but was no longer i n a 
position to o f f e r such severe c r i t i c i s m . Thus at the end of 
August i n Khartoum a fourt h Summit conference was held. I t was 
attended by a l l the Heads of State or t h e i r representatives, 
including Ahmed Shuqeiry as head of the PLO,. I t s aim was to 
define a common Arab policy i n face of the new situation and i n 
t h i s i t was moderately successful. A number of inter-Arab 
problems were solved 3 and some constructive proposals made 
wi t h respect to Palestine. I t was decided that Arab o i l should 
be used i n a positive way i n that a proportion of the revenue 
1 . The problem was managed more e a s i l y t h a n i n Jordan. Syria 
had never had a problem of over=;'population, quite the 
reverse, 
2 . The pact was signed on May 3 0 t h 1 9 6 7 » 
3 o The Yemen dispute between the UAR and Saudi Arabia was 
solved and i n exchange for Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia offered f i n a n c i a l assistance. 
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should go to those states most affected by the war. 1 I n 
addition a social and economic fund was set up f o r recon-
s t r u c t i o n and development. 2 I t was also decided that 
Immediate m i l i t a r y preparations should be made for future 
confrontations and that i n the meantime steps should be taken 
to remove a l l foreign bases from Arab s o i l as soon as possible. 
The Arab states had suffered heavy m i l i t a r y defeat but the 
Summit showed t h e i r determination not to be forced i n t o a 
humiliating settlement with I s r a e l . Partly as a sign of t h i s 
defiance and p a r t l y as a result of t h e i r weakness the Arab 
states openly re-emphasised t h e i r collective support for the 
Palestinians. However they s t i l l intended to keep the reins 
of control f i r m l y i n t h e i r hands and i n concrete terms gave 
nothing to the PLO. Shuqelry quarrelled with King Hussein 
during the conference because the l a t t e r s t i l l refused to 
allow the PLA to enter Jordan, h I t was not only Hussein 
who was unco-operative with Shuqeiry. The PLO presented 
si x demands to the conference based on the principle that no 
state should have the r i g h t to make separate peace settlements 
and that any such decisions should have the unanimous agree-
ment of a l l the Arab states and the PLO. 5 When these demands 
were rejected Shuqeiry withdrew from the conference and i t was 
said, that the Arab states had decided to "freeze" the PLO 
u n t i l f u r t h e r notice. 
The att i t u d e s of i n d i v i d u a l Arab states towards the 
Palestinians was much as before. The UAH supported the Resist-
ance with the in t e n t i o n of using i t as an instrument of pressure 
1 . A Conference of Economic and Finance Ministers i n Baghdad 
had suggested that o i l be used as a weapon against the West 
and I s r a e l . Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to give 
£1*+0m a year to those states affected by the war. 
2 o This suggestion was made by Kuwait, 
3 . IPS, OP c i t 1 9 6 7 , pp. 5 6 - 7 . 
*f. During the war the PLA had fought under UAR orders and had 
shown great courage, especially i n Gaza. Walter Laqueur, 
The Road to War. p. 
5 o IPS,j OP c i t 1 9 6 7 . pp. 5 6 - 7 . 
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on I s r a e l to obtain favourable settlement terms. Syria 
supported the Resistance v i r t u a l l y unconditionally. Jordan was 
s t i l l h o s t i l e but i n view of the defeat was obliged to moderate 
t h i s h o s t i l i t y . No Arab state was i n a position to openly 
c r i t i c i s e Palestinian a c t i v i t y or to apply the p r e - 1 9 6 7 
decisions of the Unified Arab Command. 1 
The issues with respect to settlement were basically the 
same as i n 1 9 ^ 8 , peace, recognition of I s r a e l , border adjust-
ment and refugees. On November 22nd 1 9 6 7 as a result of a 
compromise peace formula drawn up by B r i t a i n , the United 
Nations passed a resolution ou t l i n i n g the terms of a possible 
agreement. 2 The a t t i t u d e of both I s r a e l and the Arabs made 
any settlement v i r t u a l l y impossible at t h i s stage. Although 
both I s r a e l and the UAR accepted the resolution, t h e i r i n t e r -
pretation of i t s terms were r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . Jordan also 
accepted the resolution, but I r a q , Syria, Algeria and the 
Palestinians t o t a l l y rejected i t . 
The Effect of the June War on the Palestinians 
The June defeat thoroughly demoralised and bewildered the 
Palestinians. I t dispelled any l a s t hope that.the Arab armies 
might eventually l i b e r a t e Palestine. 
I n July 1 9 6 7 a series of conferences was held between the 
fedayeen organisations to decide on future policy and f i n d some 
formula f o r u n i t y . 3 The conferences had no positive result 
since al-Fateh refused mere formal u n i t y , s t i l l i n s i s t i n g that 
any u n i f i c a t i o n should take place on the b a t t l e f i e l d . The 
movement had f o r too long been carrying the burden of action 
inside I s r a e l while other organisations benefitted from the 
ref l e c t e d glory. 
1 . See above Ch. k p, 92 f n . 2. 
2 o See Appendix I I I . 
3. Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance), pp. 23-if. 
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Al-Fateh stressed that the most important thing at t h i s stage 
was to r e s t a r t operations i n order to raise the sinking morale 
of the Palestinians. The other organisations refused and a l -
Fateh began operations alone on August 29th. Preparations 
had been l a i d f o r t h i s immediately after the war. A l l the 
movement's members who foiind themselves outside the occupied 
t e r r i t o r y were ordered back inside before the borders could 
be properly sealed. I n t h i s way al-Fateh ensured that there 
was a nucleus of men positioned to organise resistance inside 
the, recently expanded I s r a e l . The intention was to set up 
bases i n these regions. I n addition to t h i s , al-Fateh care-
f u l l y collected some six thousand small arms l e f t behind by 
the retreating Arab armies. 1 
The movement benefitted considerably from the war both 
materially and psychologically. As a result of i t s i n i t i a t i v e 
i n r e s t a r t i n g the armed struggle, the Palestinians' s e l f -
confidence was steadily restored and th e i r desire to r e s i s t 
increased. Al-Fateh gained popularity at the expense of the 
other groups which appeared to have been t o t a l l y immobilised 
by the defeat. 
While al-Fateh was beginning m i l i t a r y operations again, and 
building up i t s organisation, the various factions of the ANM 
continued w i t h t h e i r u n i t y t a l k s . I n October 1967, the 
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y sections of the ANM Joined with J i b r i l ' s 
Palestine Liberation Front to form Al-Jabhah ash-Sha'biyyah 
l i - T a h r i r Falastin (The Popular Front f o r the Liberation of 
Palestine- PFLP). 2 The Front was a tenuous amalgamation of 
many dissimi l a r elements with no coherent ideology. J i b r i l ' s 
group was s t i l l p r i m a r i l y m i l i t a r y with no deep p o l i t i c a l 
commitment and no compunction about co-operating with the Arab 
governments. I t had already changed allegiance several times 
1. - i b i d , p. 39. 
2. Kadij op c i t (Resistance)^ p. 2k. 
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w i t h i n the Palestinian f i e l d . 1 The r i g h t wing of the ANM, 
led by George Habbash, was becoming increasingly alienated from 
the l e f t centred on Naif Hawatmeh, 2 For the moment, however, 
these groups managed to hold together and the f r o n t followed 
al-Fateh i n r e s t a r t i n g m i l i t a r y operations. The f i r s t PFLP 
communique was issued i n December. 
The PLO, a f t e r the defeat, was i n a sad state and Shuqeiry's 
position as figurehead was shaken to i t s foundation, following 
the h y s t e r i c a l statements a t t r i b u t e d to him during the war 
threatening to "throw the Jews i n t o the sea". 3 F i n a l l y on 
December 2^th as a result of the combined pressure of other 
Palestinian organisations, d i s a t i s f i e d elements within the 
PLO and the PLA together with public opinion i n general, 
Shuqeiry was forced to resign, k He was replaced by Yahya 
Hammouda, a known l e f t i s t . 5 I n February the PLO set up t h e i r 
own commandos, Qoat TahrirSha'biyyah (Popular Liberation 
Forces - PLFs). 
Al-Fateh*s Unity Congress 
I n January 1968 al-Fateh decided that i t was time to attempt 
some r e a l u n i t y . I t called a congress i n Cairo i n v i t i n g a l l 
groups to p a r t i c i p a t e . 6 Both the PLO and the PFLP refused. 
1. See previous chapter. The PLF had changed alliances from 
al-Fateh to the Syrian Ba'th to the ANM. 
2. See above Ch. 3 p. ^7 f n . 3 o 
3 . A t t r i b u t e d to Shuqeiry on 1st June. He strenuously denied i t . 
If, IPS, Kitab Vol. pp. 108-12. Shuqeiry's f i n a l action which 
gave his opponents the chance to oust him, was to set up a 
niminal organisation called "Council of Revolution f o r the 
. l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine". I t s formation was announced on 7th 
December 1967 and communiques concerning non-existent opera-
tions were issued i n i t s name. 
5 . Hammouda was born i n L i f t a v i l l a g e near Jerusalem about 191O. 
He was a prominent lawyer before ^^k8 supporting the I s t i q l a l 
and HaJJ Amin. I n 1951 and 195^ he unsuccessfully stood for 
the Jordanian parliament, the l a t t e r time with Communist back-
ing. I n 1956 he supported the Communists i n the election and 
the following year f l e d with them to Iraq and Syria. He then 
went to Czeckoslovakia where he remained u n t i l 1965, when 
following a dispute with the Communists he returned to Jordan. 
Al-Fateh, al-Kitab as-Sanawi. I968, p. 127. 
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but eight other groups attended including the Ba'thlst as-Salqah 
and J l b r i l ' s group. 1 A certain measure of u n i f i c a t i o n was 
affected. 
On the m i l i t a r y l e v e l a co-ordinating council was formed 
called the Permanent Office of Commando Action. Closer m i l i t a r y 
u n i t y was achieved between al-Fateh, J i b r i l , and two more 
groups. 2 Two other groups united with as-Saiqah 3 and one 
remained independent, k 
On the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l i t was decided to create a general 
executive secretariat resident i n Cairo with branches i n Damascus 
and elsewhere. The congress drew up a charter embodying nine 
p r i n c i p l e s . 
F i r s t , the present stage was one of armed struggle against the 
enemy and the only v a l i d u n i t y was u n i t y on the b a t t l e f i e l d . 
Second, armed struggle was the only road to l i b e r a t i o n . 
Third, a l l p o l i t i c a l solutions must be rejected. 
Fourth, the leadership of the armed struggle should seek a 
posi t i v e r e l a t i o n with the Arab states on condition t h i s did not 
a f f e c t the security or escalation of the armed struggle. 
F i f t h , the Palestinian personality and i t s revolutionary con-
tent must be promoted on the International l e v e l . 
S i x t h , a f i r m stand must be taken against any attempt by the 
counter-revolutionary forces to liquidate the revolution. 
Seventh, i t should be stressed that armed struggle was a strategy 
and not j u s t a t a c t i c . The Palestinian people and t h e i r 
revolution were the decisive element i n l i b e r a t i o n from Zionism. 
Eighth, a l l f r i e n d l y states and forces throughout the world 
should denounce the Zionist occupation and i t s Nazi methods. 
Ninth, a l l states, especially those i n Arab Af r i c a , should put 
an end to Jewish emigration to I s r a e l . . 5 
1 . Although J i b r i l ' s group was part of the PFLP at t h i s time 
i t seems that i t did not accept the front's policy on the 
Unity Congress. I t would appear that u n t i l J i b r i l s p l i t 
from the f r o n t l a t e r i n the year 
he was active both i n the PFLP and the Permanent Office. 
2 o i b i d . That i s , the m i l i t a r y wing of Harakah ash-Shebab ath-
Thawri (Revolutionary Youth MovementJ^ and the m i l i t a r y 
wing of al-Havat al°'amilah 11-da'am ath-Thawrah. (Action 
Organisation for the Support of the Revolution). 
3 o i b i d . That i s , the m i l i t a r y wing, of Jabhah Thawar Falastin 
(Front of the Rebels of Palestine); and m i l i t a r y wing of 
Jabhah at-Tahrlr ash-Sha'blyyah al-Falastiniyyah (Popular 
Palestinian Front f o r Liberation). 
ho i b i d . This was, Munthamah Tala'i al-Feda'l (Organisation 
of the Vanguard of the Fedayeen). 
5 c i b i d j P« 1 2 8 . 
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The Congress also formulated some demands concerning the 
PLO and the Palestine National Congress (PNC). I t suggested 
that a preparatory committee should be formed from those 
attending the unity congress, the PLO Executive and representa-
ti v e s of the unions. This committee would select members for 
the forthcoming PNC meeting at which a plan f o r the u n i f i c a t i o n 
of the revolution would be drawn up. Reduction of the 
administrative costs and o f f i c i a l s ' salaries i n the PLO was 
recommended so that more money could be given to the armed 
struggle. The PLO was warned against doing anything which 
might fragment the revolution and the PLA was asked to co-
ordinate i t s a c t i v i t i e s with the new Permanent Office. Members 
of the u n i t y congress regretted the absence of the PLO and 
expressed t h e i r readiness to co-operate with any' w i l l i n g 
organisation or group. 1 
After affirming the generally accepted Palestinian na t i o n a l i s t 
principles the congress stated i t s aims. These were: 
F i r s t , complete l i b e r a t i o n and l i q u i d a t i o n of the Zionist e n t i t y . 
Second, the establishment of a democratic state guaranteeing 
the legitimate r i g h t s of the o r i g i n a l citizens without dis-
crimination of r e l i g i o n or b e l i e f . 
Third, creation of a progressive society guaranteeing human 
ri g h t s and freedoms. 
Fourth, active p a r t i c i p a t i o n to achieve the aims of the Arab 
nation, i t s l i b e r a t i o n and the establishment of a united pro-
gressive Arab society. 
F i f t h , support f o r a l l peoples i n t h e i r struggle for l i b e r a t i o n 
and building world peace on a Just basis. 2 
This u n i t y congress was no more than one stepin the r i g h t 
d i r e c t i o n . Obviously i t could achieve very l i t t l e without the 
PLO or the.PFLP. Further steps had to await the development 
of events. I t i s obvious from the principles and aims of the 
congress that al-Fateh was the dominant force, although the 
influence of as-Saiqah can also be seen i n the social content 
of the t h i r d and f i f t h aims. 
1. i b i d o V . 
2 . i b i d , p. 1 2 9 . 
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Continued Tension with Jordan 
Al-Fateh was by f a r the most effective and active of a l l the 
groups especially i n terms of m i l i t a r y operations. The success 
and growth of the movement had become a r e a l embarrassment 
to King Hussein's regime. For the f i r s t three months after 
the war al-Fateh t r i e d to establish secure bases inside the 
occupied t e r r i t o r y , but t h i s proved Impossible: 
"... a secure base Implies that the revolution-
aries can work i n i t openly and without 
I n t e r r u p t i o n . I t implies that i t should be 
located amidst the masses but i n contact with 
the enemy so that i t s members can learn 
warfare by actual practice. I t also implies 
that i t can be defended. Fateh realised that 
occupied Palestine constituted the actual 
b a t t l e f i e l d rather than the secure base." 1 
Al-Fateh thus began to establish bases i n the Aghwar area of 
Jordan and i n consequence had to face renewed e f f o r t s on the 
part of the Jordanian Government to suppress t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
On l 6 t h February 1968 King Hussein announced over radio 'amman: 
"As Head of State, responsible f o r my country 
and perfe c t l y conscious of my duties, I cannot 
permit anyone to furnish the enemy of my 
country and people w i t h the pretext for 
attacking Jordan ..." 2 
The following day the Minister of the I n t e r i o r announced that: 
"... i t would be forbidden henceforth f o r 
anyone to expose Jordan to enemy reprisals 
i n Jordanian t e r r i t o r y . " 
The police immediately began taking action against the fedayeen, 
conducting searches and confiscating arms caches. The solution 
f o r the fedayeen was supplied by I s r a e l i n the attack on the 
town of al-Karamah on 21st March 1968. 
The Battle of al-Karamah and i t s Effects on the Palestinians 
Al-Karamah i s situated on the East Bank of the Jordan River. 
I t was established a f t e r the ^^k8 war as a centre f o r refugees 
who had f l e d from Palestine i n the course of the f i g h t i n g . By 
1967 i t had become a f l o u r i s h i n g market town. Following the 
1. Fateh Vol. I I No. 2. January 19th 1970, p. 8. 
2. The Times. 17th-18th February 1968. 
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1 9 6 7 war i t was the target of several I s r a e l i shelling and 
bombing attacks 1 on .the grounds that i t had become a base for 
the fedayeen. This allegation had a certain factual basis 
insofar as the population was especially sympathetic to the 
fedayeen and provided a useful r e c r u i t i n g centre f o r the 
organisations. 
On March 1 9 t h al-Fateh issued a statement warning of I s r a e l i 
troop concentrations along the r i v e r . The General Command of 
the organisation met to consider reports from members inside 
the occupied t e r r i t o r y concerning other troop movements. From 
these reports i t was apparent that an attack of very large 
scale against al-Karamah was imminent. 2 
I t i s considered standard practice i n a guerilla-type war 
to avoid any r e a l confrontation with the enemy i n the early 
stages and to r e t r e a t before enemy advance. This was the 
position taken by most of the g u e r i l l a organisations including 
the PFLP. Al-Fateh, on the other hand, decided that i n t h i s 
instance, there was more to be gained by standing f i r m before 
the I s r a e l i Army. The aim was to raise the morale of the 
Palestinians and at the same time destroy the enemy's self 
assurance. I n addition to t h i s i t was hoped that such action 
would provide an opportunity f o r rapprochement between the 
fedayeen and the Jordanian Army. A confrontation i f successful, 
would dis c r e d i t the c r i t i c s of the fedayeen on the East Bank 
and also d i s c r e d i t proponents of a p o l i t i c a l solution by showing 
that popular l i b e r a t i o n war was possible. I t was hoped that t h i s 
action would test the a b i l i t i e s of the fedayeen themselves and 
i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r readiness to move from the stage of mere " h i t 
and run" operations to the stage of " l i m i t e d confrontation." 3 
1 . Attacks took place on November 2 0 t h 1 9 6 7 , January 8 t h 
and 2 5 t h 1 9 6 8 , February 9 t h , 1 1 t h and I 5 t h 1 9 6 8 . 
2 . Al-Fateh, Revolution U n t i l Victory^ p. 9 . 
3 . Al-Fateh, Revolution U n t i l Victory^ pp. 9 - 1 0 . 
1 1 7 
Having taken t h i s decision al-Fateh prepared to face the 
I s r a e l i Army. 1 During the course of the f i g h t i n g which 
lasted over f i f t e e n hours, al-Fateh was reinforced by some 
f i f t y members of the Popular Liberation Forces (PLO) and 
sections of the Jordanian Army. 2 Losses were heavy on both 
sides but f i n a l l y the I s r a e l i s withdrew defeated and shaken 
by.the unexpected resistance. 
The v i c t o r y showed that al-Fateh had taken the r i g h t 
decision and had analysed the s i t u a t i o n correctly. The 
position of the fedayeen was f i n a l l y established as a new 
power i n the Arab world and acknowledged by the Arab leaders. 
King Hussein had to retreat from the stand he had taken the 
previous month. He even f e l t obliged to declare i n a press 
conference a few days l a t e r "We are a l l fedayeen". 3 
The psychological effect of the battle on Palestinians of 
both Banks was positive. I n 'amman, massive demonstrations 
attended the fiuierals of the k i l l e d f i g h t e r s . The Arab 
population of the West Bank realised what had happened when 
they saw the nervous behaviour of the I s r a e l i soldiers k and 
hospitals i n Jerusalem 5 being evacuated to make room for the 
woundedi 6 The s p i r i t of defeat which had resulted from the 
June war began to disappear. The myth of the invi n c i b l e I s r a e l i 
soldier had been dispelled. 
1 . Al-Fateh evacuated most of the women and children from the 
town and positioned some ^ 0 0 fighters i n the area on the 
expectation that I s r a e l i forces would advance from the north, 
south and east simultaneously using ground troops, tanks 
and parachutists. The s i t u a t i o n developed as anticipated 
and the I s r a e l i army v i r t u a l l y walked i n t o a trap. General 
Sources, also al-Fateh, Ma'arakah al-Karamah. 
2 . According to al-Fateh, the involvement of the JordanianiiArmy 
was against specific orders to the contrary, but i n the event 
the Government had to accept i t . I t was l a t e r exploited by 
ai-Fateh i n an attempt to consolidate l i n k s between the 
Resistance and the Army. One of the current revolutionary 
songs which i s very popular begins "Wahadna Damm Ya Karamah" 
(Our blood unites us 0 Karamah). 
3 . Financial Times. 2 5 t h March 1 9 6 8 . 
This Information i s based on the author's interviews with 
refugees at al-Baqa'a Refugee Camp in.Jordan i n summer I969. 
The refugees had l e f t the West Bank shortly after the b a t t l e 
of al-Karamah. 
5 . For example the Augusta Vi c t o r i a Hospital on the Mount of Olives, 
6 . Al-Fateh, Ma'arakah al-Karamah. 
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The e f f e c t of the v i c t o r y on the fedayeen organisations, 
especially al-Fateh was to increase membership to a point where 
i t was impossible f o r such numbers to be absorbed. Al-Fateh's 
membership increased from about 7 0 0 to several thousand, pre-
senting the movement with a problem of t r a i n i n g . 1 Training 
became the main preoccupation throughout 1 9 6 8 2 and the number 
of operations had to be r e s t r i c t e d i n consequence. 3 
Not only did membership of existing organisations increase, 
but the number of organisations i t s e l f rocketed, bringing them 
to nearly f i f t y . Every party and regime found i t advisable 
to set,up t h e i r own group rather than lose what influence they 
had l e f t over the Palestinians.^ Thus, although the number of 
groups increased, no new ideological element's entered the 
Palestinian scene. I f the groups were not simply m i l i t a r y 
organisations, they were linked to one of the Ba'th parties or 
the ANM. The main ideological differences therefore remained 
those between the Ba'th, the ANM and al-Fateh. 
The Ba'th-based groups 
The Syrian Ba'th, as the r u l i n g party i n Syria, had supported 
al-Fateh from the beginning and given i t considerable freedom 
of action. However, aft e r as-Sammu' the party began to realise 
that al-Fateh while accepting Syrian support was not prepared 
to become a t o o l . The Ba'th therefore formed as-Saiqah to 
perform t h i s r o l e . 'I 
As-Saiqah was formed mainly from Palestinian members of the 
Ba'th, although i t s leaders were Jordanian. 6 By establishing 
1 . Fateh." Vol. I I No. 2 . January 1 9 t h 1 9 7 0 , p. 9 . 
2 . Some were sent to Algiers and China. Author's interview 
with Abu Dahoud, Summer 1 9 6 9 « 
3 . Even so, the increase over previous years was substantial. 
See Table I I I . 
k. Author * s•interview with.Abu.Fadi, 'amman summer 1 9 6 9 . 
5 o See above Ch. k p.. 1 0 5 . 
6 . Dafi al-Jamani (Abu Musa) and Mahmoud al-Ma'ita were 
Jordanian o f f i c e r s . They were convicted i n 1 9 5 7 of con-
spiracy against the Jordanian regime. 
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t h e i r own fedayeen section, the Syrians gained three things, 
a voice f o r the Ba'th within the Palestinian revolution, an 
Increase i n popularity, and the strengthening of the party 
element i n Syria against the m i l i t a r y , Because of the old 
h o s t i l i t y between the Ba'th and the ANM, as-Saiqah co-operated 
closely w i t h al-Fateh, although ideologically i n many respects 
they were closer to the ANM, that i s to say, the PFLP. 1 
Tension between the Ba'th and the ANM reached a peak i n March 
1968 when the Syrian Ba'thlst government arrested and im-
prisoned three members of the PFLP, including the leader, 
George Habbash. 2 The charge against them was p l o t t i n g to 
overthrow the Syrian government. 3 
As-Salqah never entered int o any r e a l l y detailed ideological 
discussions with the other groups, simply stating i t s basic 
aims, as b r i e f l y as possible whenever necessary. The organisa-
t i o n d i f f e r e d from al-Fateh on several points. While pro-
claiming the unity of the Arab and Palestinian revolutions, 
as-Salqah's p r i o r i t y was always the Arab revolution. I n 
addition the organisation insisted that the revolution should 
have a s o c i a l i s t content. 
To quote one of i t s leaders: 
"As-Saiqah believes i n the unity of the Arab 
homeland, i n achieving i t s l i b e r a t i o n and 
building a s o c i a l i s t system there. I t believes 
' that anyone facing Zionism and Imperialism 
must Inevitably take a l e f t i s t path. As-
Saiqah has no programme f o r i n t e r f e r i n g i n 
the I n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the Arab states but 
believes i n the ideology of the Arab 
s o c i a l i s t Ba'th party. The Palestinian 
l i b e r a t i o n movement i s part of the Arab 
l i b e r a t i o n movement and has only l i m i t e d 
tasks, that i s , to l i b e r a t e the Palestinian 
region. Through t h i s and through mobilising 
the masses i t w i l l have an In d i r e c t influence 
on other Arab regions." k 
1 . See above pp. 112 & I I 3 . See also Table I I . 
2 . The others were Fayez Qaddurah and ' a l l Bushnaq. 
3 . They were released by the PFLP i n November I968 during an 
attack on the j a i l . I t i s widely believed that the release 
was a r e l i e f to the Syrians also, as the prisoners were 
becoming an embarrassment to them. 
•^. Al-Muharrer. 2nd January 1970. 
120 
Like Syria, Iraq also offered f a c i l i t i e s to al-Fateh f o r a 
while but f a i l e d to gain control of the movement. Thus after 
the Eakr coup i n 1 9 6 9 , the I r a q i Ba'thists set up t h e i r own 
fedayeen section, Jabhah at-Tahrir al-'arabiyyah (Arab Libera-
t i o n Front - ALF). The motives f o r establishing the ALF 
were much l i k e Syria's motives i n setting up as-Saiqah, 
though there was the additional reason, by that time, of 
r i v a l r y between the two Ba'thist regimes. This led Iraq and 
the ALF to support and co-operate with the PFLP, Syria's long 
standing opponent. Relations between the PFLP and Iraq had 
become very strong by 1 9 7 0 . 1 
The ALF was essentially Ba'thist, l i k e as-Saiqah, but with 
less concern over the s o c i a l i s t content of the revolution. 
The ALF stressed the n a t i o n a l i s t nature of the Palestinian 
struggle i n an Arab context. I t emphasised the danger of the 
Palestinian revolution becoming isolated from the Arab masses: 
"The task of t h i s popular war i s to r e c r u i t 
a l l the Arab people v o l u n t a r i l y and f r e e l y 
and put them beside the popular, struggling, 
courageous Arab armies. The b a t t l e required 
that every Arab participate .... The Arab 
n a t i o n a l i s t character of the popular 
struggle w i l l guarantee the spread of con-
sciousness to a l l parts of the nation ..." 2 
Thus the Ba'th was represented i n the Palestinian revolution 
by two movements which were basically" h o s t i l e to each other 
and which formed alliances on the basis of t h i s h o s t i l i t y . 
The ANM-based groups 
The ANM had already set up at least two fedayeen groups 
before the June war, Abtal al-'audah and Shebab ath-Thar. 3 
After the war these two groups, together with the Palestinian 
section of the ANM, and J i b r i l ' s Palestine Liberation Front 
united to form the PFLP. k The ANM i t s e l f was divided along a 
r i g h t - l e f t axis. 5 These diverse constituent parts of the 
PFLP made any f i r m ideological stand impossible. The f r o n t 
could be distinguished from al-Fateh at t h i s stage mainly by 
i t s lack of any integrated, coherent theory, or decisive action. 
1 . Joint operations were conducted by the PFLP and the ALF 
i n early 1 9 7 0 and Habbash paid several v i s i t s to Baghdad. 
• Al-Kadaf f iM-th March 1 9 7 0 , 
2 o ALF, P o l i t i c a l declaration 3rd August 1 9 6 9 » quoted i n Naji 
'allush, Munaaishat hawl ath°Thawrah al-Falastinivvah. 
3 o See above Ch. k p. 1 0 ^ + . 
h. See above p. 1 1 2 . 
5 . See above Ch. 3 P» ^ 7 f n . 3 . 
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The f r o n t recognise and admit t h e i r early inadequacies: 
. " I n i t s f i r s t stage, the Popular Front lacked 
a defined, l e f t p o l i t i c a l l i n e , but on the 
other hand i t was progressive and d e f i n i t e l y 
wanted to regain Palestine. That i s to say, 
when i t was founded the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine did not have a l l 
the ideological, p o l i t i c a l and organisational 
characteristics that the Palestine section 
of the ANM claimed." 1 
" The f r o n t was not only weak p o l i t i c a l l y , but also m i l i t a r i l y . 
I t propounded armed struggle, but i n the event showed l i t t l e 
p r a c t i c a l understanding of g u e r i l l a warfare. On the basis of 
classical theory, the f r o n t refused to participate i n the 
b a t t l e of al-Karamah believing that i t was too early f o r re a l 
confrontation with the enemy. 2 I t did not realise that the 
rules of g u e r i l l a warfare should always be adapted to the 
specific s i t u a t i o n . The front's m i l i t a r y actions were mainly 
t e r r o r i s t i c and t h e i r targets often c i v i l i a n . 3 Such tac t i c s 
could never lead to a popular war of l i b e r a t i o n . They needed 
only a few well trained cadres and no mass pa r t i c i p a t i o n . 
I n the l a t t e r h a l f of 1968 the p o l i t i c a l and ideological 
condition of the f r o n t Improved. Two events led to t h i s 
improvement. F i r s t , J i b r i l and his group l e f t to form a 
separate organisation and second, the left-wing of the ANM 
began to. apply pressure. 
From the beginning J i b r i l had had some sort of l i n k with 
the Syrian regime, k When Habbash and the others were arrested 
by Syria, 5 J i b r i l refused to condemn t h i s action. 6 A s p l i t 
became v i r t u a l l y unavoidable. 
1. -Quoted i n OSPAAL, OP c i t . p. 192. 
2o This information i s based upon extensive author's Interviews 
with members of several d i f f e r e n t groups not including the 
PFLP I t s e l f . Unfortunately the PFLP has i n retrospect claim-
ed "successful p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Battle of al-Karamah" 
(see previous footnote). However there seems to be general 
agreement from the other groups including the PLO that such 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n did not occur, at least not as o f f i c i a l Front 
policy. This i s j u s t one example of many i n which PFLP 
declarations- concerning t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s have proved to be 
unreliable. I n many cases fo r instance, f o r instance the 
blowing up of the Haifa pipeline i n June 1969, the Front 
' have claimed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r operations which have l a t e r 
proved to have been carried out by other groups. Such proof 
i s possible since members of the Palestine Armed Struggle 
Command (see Tables I I and IV) had to place sealed envelopes 
with the Command before conducting any operation stating 
t h e i r intentions. For these reasons PFLP sources have been 
avoided wherever possible. 
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3. For example, hijacking an El A l plane from Rome to Algeria 
on July 23rd 1 9 6 8 . 
kc Based on author's interviews with members of the various 
resistance groups, summer 1 9 6 9 » 'amman. 
5. See above p. 1 1 9 o 
6 o Kadi, OP c i t . p. 30. 
J i b r i l did not explain the s p l i t i n t h i s way. He issued a 
communique claiming that a conference held i n October 1 9 6 8 by 
the PLF ( J i b r i l ) and Abtal al-'audah had decided to expel Shebab 
ath-Thar 1 from the PFLP on the grounds that i t had agreed to a 
policy of interference i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the Arab 
states. 2 The PFLP, excluding J i b r i l and his group, issued a 
communique i n response to t h i s denying the charges and accusing 
J i b r i l of undertaking operations i n the name of the PFLP without 
n o t i f y i n g the Central organisation. 3 I n any case, J i b r i l and 
his group l e f t the PFLP and set up a new organisation called 
Popular Front f o r the Liberation of Palestine - Al-Qivadah a l -
'amah (General Command) PFLP-GC. 
At t h i s stage the PFLP indignantly denied J i b r i l ' s charges of 
accepting a policy of intervention. Yet l a t e r t h i s same policy 
became a fundamental part of t h e i r programme, and a source of 
c r i t i c i s m against al-Fateh. That i s to say, they l a t e r used 
al-Fateh's acceptance of non-intervention as proof of i t s re-
actionary nature, k-
The other element i n the re-orientation of the PFLP, the 
left-wing pressure, also led to a s p l i t . I n August 1 9 6 8 the 
PFLP held a conference i n the course of which the left-wing 
gained acceptance f o r t h e i r programme. 5 I t was couched i n 
strong Marxist terminology and f a r too r a d i c a l f o r the moderates. 
I t eventually provoked armed clashes between the two factions 
i n January 1 9 6 9 i n 'amman. The left-wing subsequently formed 
a new organisation, al-Jabhah ash-Sha'biwah ad-Demoaratiwah 
l i - T a h r i r Falastin (Popular Democratic Front f o r the Liberation 
of Palestine - PDFLP). 
1 . Shebab ath-Thar contained most of the radical ANM elements. 
2 . PFLP, Communique. l 8 t h October I 9 6 8 . 
3. i b i d . 
ko See next chapter f o r further discussion. 
5. Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance), pp. 3 1 - 2 . 
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Because of PFLP l i n k s with Iraq and r i v a l r y with al-Fateh, 
the PDFLP eventually found i t s e l f linked to Syria, and as-Saiqah. 1 
From the beginning the PDFLP co-operated with al-Fateh and as-
Saiqah and l a t e r the PLO. I t s greatest h o s t i l i t y was towards 
the PFLP. 
The August 1968 programme of the front 2 can be considered 
as the platform of the PDFLP. I t began with a su p e r f i c i a l 
class analysis of the h i s t o r y of Palestine and continued with a 
class analysis of the 19>f8 and 1967 defeats. These defeats 
were a t t r i b u t e d to the class nature of the Arab regimes. 3 
The programme then attacked the policy of non-intervention and 
the UN resolution of November 1967. 
Concerning the weaknesses of the resistance movement as a 
whole, the programme pointed to the policy of non-intervention 
and the lack of national unity. The resistance had f a l l e n victim 
to the reactionaries and become dependent.on the Arab states. 
The people were suffering from ideological ignorance. As a 
solution to these problems the PDFLP demanded the development 
of a revolutionary s c i e n t i f i c Ideology, the development of 
national consciousness, r e j e c t i o n of the UN resolution, and 
the Introduction of debate and c r i t i c i s m within the movement. 
When the PDFLP o f f i c i a l l y came i n t o being i n February 1969, 
i t issued a statement of i t s aims. These were basically to 
work f o r national u n i t y , to struggle continuously and to co-
operate with other revolutionary groups. The PDFLP considered 
a l l l i b e r a t i o n movements as well as the s o c i a l i s t countries 
to be a l l i e s . 
By way of answering the PDFLP, and i n order to prevent them 
from taking a l l the i n i t i a t i v e , the remaining part of the 
PFLP issued a P o l i t i c a l , Organisational and M i l i t a r y Report, 
i n February 1969. 5 
1. Based on author's interview with al-Fateh representative, 
London March 1970. Also i n a recent interview a leader of 
as-Saiqah affirmed that: 
"Al-Fateh and the Democratic Front are the 
nearest organisations to as-Salqah, al-Fateh 
because i t believes i n l i b e r a t i o n and works 
sincerely, and the Democratic Front because 
i t believes i n l i b e r a t i o n and works sincerely 
i n addition to being close to. as-Salqah i n i t s 
ideas." Al-Muharrer. 2nd January 1970. 
2. Translation i n Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance). pp. 1^+5-71. 
3. Ideological differences between the groups are discussed i n 
the next chapter. 
k,. Abridged tr a n s l a t i o n i n Committees For So l i d a r i t y with the 
^2h 
Palestinian Revolution, Democratic Popular Front f o r the 
Liberation of Palestine, pp. 1 2 = 1 3 o 
5 . Translation i n Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance). pp. l 8 0 - 2 ^ 7 « 
I t gave the main lines of policy which were remarkably similar 
to the August Platform. However, i t was less academic, more 
p r a c t i c a l and showed greater awareness of the r e a l i t i e s of the 
s i t u a t i o n than the August Platform. 
The report began by emphasising the need for s c i e n t i f i c 
revolutionary thought, but at the same time attacked "verbal 
philosophising". I n t h i s way c r i t i c i s m was directed both at 
al-Fateh f o r i t s lack of open Marxist ideology, and the PDFLP 
fo r i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m . Neither group was actually mentioned 
.by name. 
The next part of the report was e n t i t l e d "Who are our enemies?", 
a d i r e c t quotation from Mao-Tse-Tung. 1 The enemies were 
defined as I s r a e l , World Zionism, World Imperialism and Arab 
reaction, and t h e i r superiority i n both technology and exper-
ience was admitted. The report stressed the importance of 
knowing the nature of the enemy, as t h i s should determine the 
nature of the b a t t l e . Like, the August platform i t was essen-
t i a l l y a class analysis. 
The section of the report dealing with "Who are our Friends" 
was divided i n t o three parts, the Palestinian, the Arab and 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l . I n a l l cases the answer was the "Forces of 
Revolution", and these forces were based on a class analysis. 
The report stressed the need f o r Palestinian unity and also for 
an Arab Hanoi. I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y the friends of the revolution 
were the other l i b e r a t i o n movements and the Socialist Bloc. 
The second half of the report dealt exclusively with the 
strategy of organisation. I t contained very precise, c r i t i c a l , 
and s e l f - c r i t i c a l discussions on party formation. I t had a 
strong Marxist o r i e n t a t i o n , c a l l i n g for a revolutionary party 
based upon revolutionary ideology and constituted on a class 
basis. 
Mao-Tse-Tung, "Analysis of Classes i n Chinese Society", 
(March 1 9 2 6 ) , Selected Works. Vol. 1 , p. 1 3 . 
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Thus, l i k e the Ba'th, the ANM had s p l i t i n t o two antagonistic 
factions, which i n t h e i r ideology and theory were v i r t u a l l y 
indistinguishable from each other. Both factions had suddenly 
become Marxists, and were using t h e i r new-found ideology as a 
weapon against other groups, i n particular al-Fateh, which 
they began to label as reactionaries. 
These, then were the main ideological divisions inside the 
Palestinian movement a f t e r al-Karamah. They w i l l be discussed 
i n d e t a i l i n the next chapter. There were other small organisa-
tions of importance, but these were based mainly upon personal 
differences with the main groups and. had no ideological sign-
if i c a n c e . 3J 
Towards Palestinian Unity 
Although the number of new organisations and through s p l i t s 
i n those already e x i s t i n g , there was a deep desire among the 
Palestinians f o r unity. Many of the new groups set up by the 
regimes and parties f o r t h e i r own purposes were i n a sense 
a r t i f i c i a l and most of these disappeared again quite quickly. 
The s p l i t s , on the other hand were a kind of r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
They had to occur before any r e a l u n i t y could be attempted. 
A group with such great contradictions inside i t as the PFLP, 
fo r example, could not develop or grow, but would iaecome 
paralysed and unable to move i n any direction. 
I n addition to the desire f o r u n i t y , the increasingly f r e -
quent crises between the fedayeen and the Arab governments 2 
made un i t y not only desirable but also necessary. As a r e s u l t , 
there developed two sets of machinery within ^hlch the various 
groups could meet and co-operate. One of these was based upon 
a reformed PLO, and the other developed spontaneously i n 
response to the s i t u a t i o n . 
After al-Karamah, the f i r s t attempt at formal u n i t y was made 
,by the f o u r t h Palestinian National Congress which was held i n 
Cairo i n July. I t was attended by 1 0 0 members, 5 0 of whom 
represented the fedayeen organisations, namely, al-Fateh, 
'27, Major crises occured i n November 1 9 6 8 with Jordan, A p r i l 
and October 1 9 6 9 with Lebanon, and February, June and 
September 1 9 7 0 with Jordsin. 
T T i See Table I I . 
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as-Saiqah, the PFLP, the PLO and the PLA, 1 I n t h i s the fourth 
congress gave much greater voice to the fedayeen than i t s pre-
decessors. The change i n representation was reflected i n i t s 
decisions. I t amended both the National Charter and the con-
s t i t u t i o n of the PLO. 
The charter i n i t s revised form put much less emphasis upon 
Arab u n i t y . 2 I t stressed instead Palestinian nationalism 
and the Palestinian i d e n t i t y . 3 A l l reference to peaceful co-
existence and i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace e f f o r t s was dropped, k and 
any peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem completely 
rejected. 5 The most important innovation, however, was the 
adoption of armed struggle as the only means for l i b e r a t i n g 
Palestine. 6 
Amendments to the PLO constitution were basically intended 
to introduce more democracy i n t o i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . The National 
Congress was made the highest authority and the executive 
held responsible to i t . The functions of each i n s t i t u t i o n 
were c l e a r l y defined, and the power of the executive and the 
president reduced. 7 Perhaps most important of a l l was the 
recognition of the PLA as an o f f i c i a l part of the PLO, that i s 
to say, an independent Palestinian m i l i t a r y force. 8 Decisions 
of the congress and the executive were to be made by simple 
majority vote 9 and the quorum f o r each was two t h i r d s . 1 0 
The 1 9 6 W version of the constitution had made njo such pro-
visions, leaving both i n s t i t u t i o n s open to control by a minority. 
1 , i b i d . Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance), p. 2 5 . 
2 . Compare the two texts. Appendix I i^^6h) and Appendix II 
( 1 9 b 8 ) s A r t i c l e 3 ( 1 9 6 8 ) and a r t i c l e s 3 and k ( 1 9 6 ^ ) ; 
a r t i c l e s 2 6 - 3 0 ( 1 9 6 8 ) and a r t i c l e s 2 6 ( 1 9 6 » + ) . 
3 o A r t i c l e s I f , 7 and 8 ( 1 9 6 8 ) and a r t i c l e s 5 , 8 and 9 ( 1 9 6 » f ) . 
I f . A r t i c l e 2 ^ ( 1 9 6 8 ) and a r t i c l e 2 1 ( 1 9 6 l f ) . A r t i c l e 2 2 of 
1 9 6 ^ was completely dropped. 
5 . . A r t i c l e 2 1 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
6 . A r t i c l e 1 5 ( 1 9 6 8 ) and a r t i c l e 1 ^ ( 1 9 6 ^ ) ; new a r t i c l e s 9 
and 1 0 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
7 . Compare the two texts Appendix I I and Appendix V. 
8 . A r t i c l e 2 2 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
9 o A r t i c l e s 1 2 and 2 1 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
1 0 . i b i d . 
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The statement issued at the end of the congress rejected the 
UN resolution of November 1 9 6 7 and unequivocally endorsed the 
armed struggle, emphasising! 
"... the determination of the Palestinian 
people to continue t h i s struggle u n t i l i t 
becomes a popular war of l i b e r a t i o n , 
undertaken by a l l the Arab nation with a l l . 
i t s forces and resources." 1 
Even so, there were s t i l l many problems which the congress 
could not solve. I t could not agree upon the formation of the 
new executive and Yahya Hammouda was asked to continue with 
the old executive f o r another six months. During t h i s 'time 
another congress would be held. On the p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , the 
congress set up machinery f o r m i l i t a r y co-ordination between 
the groups. This new M i l i t a r y Go-ordination Bureau began 
ef f e c t i v e work i n October. 2 
Al-Fateh, however, was not s a t i s f i e d with the proceedings 
of the congress and refused to allow any of i t s members to 
stand f o r the executive. One of the movement's representatives 
t o l d the f i n a l sessions 
"We came to t h i s assembly i n response to the 
appeal of the Palestinian and Arab masses. 
They expect the armed revolution to be i n -
t e n s i f i e d , the p i l l a r s of the Palestinian 
revolution to be consolidated, and the bases 
of national u n i t y to be emphasised. To our 
regret we have been u t t e r l y disappointed i n 
t h i s assembly. Bargaining and an irresponsible 
s p i r i t of factionalism have predominated at 
the expense of the revolution, i t s ideas and 
i t s p r i n c i p l e s . " 3 
From t h i s c r i t i c i s m i t would seem that thi s fourth congress 
saw only a change of form, not a change of content, i n spite 
of the apparent r a d i c a l i s a t i o n . 
1 . ARR/OP c i t . p. 2 1 5 . 
2 . I t included al-Fateh, as-Saiqah and the PLA. The PDFLP 
Joined i n February 1 9 6 9 . See Table IV. 
3 o ARR, OP c i t . p. 2 1 5 . 
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The next occasion f o r a move towards u n i t y was the c r i s i s 
which developed between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Government 
i n November 1968. 1 As a result of t h i s , a Palestine Emergency 
Council was formed from al-Fateh, as-Saiqah, the PFLF and the 
PLO, together with the "National Bloc" 2 a Jordanian-Palestinian 
p o l i t i c a l organisation headed by Suleiman Nabulsi. 3 The 
Council undertook l i a i s o n between the fedayeen and the Jordanian 
Government, and established links with other Palestinian 
organisations l i k e the unions and parties, k This Council also 
spawned a bureau f o r m i l i t a r y co-ordination of the fedayeen. 
I t included more groups than that established i n October by 
the PLO. The c r i s i s was resolved by negotiation between the 
groups and the Jordanian Government. The agreement included 
concessions on both sides. 5 
The r e a l turning point i n Palestinian u n i t y came with the 
f i f t h Palestinian National Congress which was held i n Cairo 
i n February I969. The PLO Executive allocated 105 seats, 77 
of them to the Palestinian organisations. They were distributed 
1. The incident was provoked by a small organisation called 
Kata'ib an-Nasr (Phalanges of Vi c t o r y ) . Because of t h i s 
organisation's behaviour, the Jordanian Government moved 
against the Resistance movement as a whole. Al-Fateh and 
the other groups claim that t h i s organisation was set up 
by Jordanian Intelligence merely as a pretext to crush the 
fedayeen. The l a t t e r were becoming quite powerful i n Jordan, 
setting up t h e i r own administration. 
2. Arab World. 20th November 1968, p. 2. 
3 . Nabulsi had been Prime Minister of the f i r s t and only demo-
c r a t i c a l l y elected government i n Jordan i n 1956. He held 
position f o r only a few months before a right-wing coup i n 
A p r i l 1957. 
ho Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance)^ p. 27. 
5. The fedayeen agreed not to carry arms or wear uniforms i n 
Jordanian c i t i e s . Their vehicles were to carry Jordanian 
number plates issued by the authorities. They agree not 
to t r y to e n l i s t Jordanians conscripted by the regular army. 
I n return the government dropped demands they had made that 
the refugee camps be disarmed and that the fedayeen organisa-
tions n o t i f y the army before undertaking any operation. 
This agreement was i n fa c t a defeat f o r the goverrjnent 
because i n practice theysialone observed the conditions l a i d 
down. The fedayeen continued to appear i n public armed 
and i n uniform^ They continued to drive unlicenced vehicles. 
Conditions of Agreement i n Arab World. 20th November 1968, 
p. 5. 
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according to the strength of each group, i t s membership and i t s 
popular support. Of these 77 seats, al-Fateh received 33> 1 
and the PFLP 12. The PFLP, hov/ever, refused to attend, on the 
grounds that i t objected to the PLO as the framework for unity. 
The PLA, which had been allocated 6 seats also refused to attend, 
claiming that i t should have been given more representation. 
Although these were undoubtedly part of the reason behind the 
boycott of these two groups the sit u a t i o n was further compli-
cated at t h i s time by contradictions within each of them. 2 
However an 11-member sub-committee 3 was set up to t r y to come 
to some arrangement with the two groups. The committee was 
authorised to offer the PFLP 20 seats and the PLA 12. If I f 
agreement was reached w i t h i n three months a new Congress would 
be held with the new membership. 5 . 
President Nasir opened the congress and pledged the uncon-
d i t i o n a l support of the UAR to the Palestinians, but he called 
upon them to unite t h e i r ranks. The Agenda was i n fact largely 
concerned with u n i t y , u n i t y of action, unity of organisation 
and the establishment of a j o i n t fund f o r a l l the organisations 
drawn from taxes levied on Palestinians everywhere. 6 The most 
s i g n i f i c a n t event of the congress was the election of the new 
executive. Of 11 members, al-Fateh took four including the 
presidency which went to Yasir Arafat. 7 Arafat was also put 
i n charge of the m i l i t a r y section which braght the PLA under 
his control, 
1. i b i d . February 3rd 1969, p. 9 . 
2 . The PLA i n July 1968Jhad mutinied against i t s Commander 
and arrested him, A compromise Commander had been found 
but tension had remained. The PFLP was i n the throes of 
s p l i t t i n g , 
3 . Arab World, 3rd February 1969j p« 9« The committee was 
headed by Hammouda and included representatives of al-Fateh, 
as-Saiqah and the PLO. 
If, i b i d . 
5, Free Palestine. Vol. I , No. 9 , February I969, p, 1. 
6 , Arab World. 3rd February 1969> p<» 9» 
7 , i b i d . 5th February 1969» p. 2 . Of the others two were 
from as-Saiqah, See Table V. Arafat was born i n Jerusalem 
i n 1929. During the 19^8 war together with his father and 
brothers, he fought with al°Jihad al°Muaaddas ( See Ch.1 p.llf) 
After the defeat he l i v e d as a refugee i n Gaza. He studied 
engineering at Cairo University and i n 1952 became chair-
man of the Palestine Students Federation i n Egypt. VJhile 
s t i l l a student he participated i n Egyptian commando 
a c t i v i t y against B r i t i s h troops based near Suez i n 195^ 
and served i n the Egyptian army as a demolitions expert i n 
1956. The following year he went to Kuwait where he remained 
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working u n t i l 1965 when al-Fateh began m i l i t a r y operations. 
Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance). p. 16; author's interviews with 
members of the Resistance Movement, 'amman, summer 1969. 
The statement issued at the end of the congress contained 
a ten-point programme which al-Fateh had submitted to congress 
when i t opened. 1 I t warned that the Palestine problem faced 
l i q u i d a t i o n through the UN Security Council Resolution and 
rejected a l l p o l i t i c a l settlements including the Soviet pro-
posals. I t continued; 
"The Palestinian National Council •,. emphasises 
that the Palestine case i s the property of the 
Palestinian people. The Palestinian people, 
adhering to i t s sacred r i g h t to i t s entire 
homeland, Palestine, emphasises i t s f u l l re-
j e c t i o n of Arab and international p o l i t i c a l 
interference that violates i t s r i g h t to i t s 
homeland and rejects a l l forms of subservience 
or o f f i c i a l Arab or interna t i o n a l interference i n 
the a f f a i r s of Palestine ..." 
The statement declared that through t h e i r struggle the Palestine 
ian peoples. 
"... seek to establish a free and democratic 
society i n Palestine for a l l Palestinians, 
Moslems, Christians and Jews, and to deliver 
Palestine and i t s people from international 
Zionism, which i s a r a c i a l i s t , confessional 
and reactionary movement with f a s c i s t roots 
and organically t i e d to international 
imperialism ..." 
The statement appealed to the Palestinian and Arab masses to 
mobilise a l l t h e i r resources to help the Palestinian resistance 
and to consider the Palestinian l i b e r a t i o n movement as part 
of the general Arab revolution. The fundamental c o n f l i c t 
was with Zionism and a l l other i n t e r n a l contradictions 
should be suppressed and become secondary. Fi n a l l y the 
statement declared that a plan had been prepared for the 
escalation of resistance and that i t s f i r s t steps 
i b i d . 
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"... w i l l be the u n i f i c a t i o n of commando 
a c t i v i t y , c o l l e c t i o n of funds and 
strengthening of the PLA by boosting i t s 
f i g h t i n g a b i l i t y as well as i t s i n t e r -
action with the Palestinian revolution 
i n order to develop t h i s revolution into 
a popular war of l i b e r a t i o n ..." 1 
The new PLO began constructive a c t i v i t y almost immediately 
and generally behaved i n a manner designed to restore confidence 
i n i t s machinery. Executive members had cl e a r l y defined areas 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y compared with the period of Shuqeiry's 
presidency, 2 
The f i r s t meeting was held i n a .refugee camp i n an e f f o r t to 
show the s i n c e r i t y of the new committee. 3 Arafat quickly 
solved the contradictions with the PLA and began to reorganise 
the army along lines more suitable f o r a guerilla-type war. 
Several contingents of the army were moved from Egypt to 
Jordan to be more available f o r action. Arafat went to the 
contingents themselves to announce t h i s decision, not to the 
headquarters i n Damascus, k Soon aft e r t h i s , the Commander-
in-Chief 5 declared that i n future the army would accept 
orders from the new executive. 6 
I n accordance with the council decisions the new executive 
set about strengthening and unifying commando a c t i v i t y . I n 
A p r i l the M i l i t a r y Co-ordination Bureau was replaced by new 
machinery, the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC). 7 I t s 
authority over member organisations was much stronger than that 
of i t s predecessor, and i t comprised over 90^ of actual com-
batants i n the f i e l d , 8 I t was i n f a c t : 
1, i b i d , and Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance). p, 29 , 
2 , See Table V. 
3 , Arab World. 5th February 1969, p. 11 , 
If, Arab World. 6 th February 1969, p, 2 . 
5 , Misbah al-Budeiri. See Table I I . 
6 , Arab World. 17th February 1969j p. 8 . 
7 , I n i t i a l l y i t comprised al-Fateh, as-Saiqah, the PDFLP, the 
PLFs and the PLA. Eventually a l l the groups of any importance 
Joined except the PFLP. See Table IV, 
8 , Al-Fateh. OP c i t (Dialogue), p. 6 . 
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"... a national f r o n t w i t h i n the frame of 
the PLO." 1 
One month a f t e r i t s establishment, the f i r s t Jointly-planned 
g u e r i l l a operation was launched against I s r a e l , 2 and a PASC 
s t r i k e force was established i n October. 3 
Apart from work res u l t i n g from the council decisions the 
new executive undertook other work. One of i t s f i r s t tasks 
had been to mediate between the two wings of the PFLP when 
t h e i r differences resulted i n armed clashes i n 'amman i n 
February, k A few days a f t e r Arafat had intervened i n the 
dispute the l e f t wing set up the PDFLP, 5 which from i t s i n -
ception played an active part i n a l l the machinery of co-
ordination and unity i n the PLO« 
Attempts t o bring the remainder of the PFLP i n t o the PLO 
were less successful. The differences between the f r o n t and 
al-Fateh were based upon two e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t conceptions 
of Palestinian u n i t y and the methods through which i t could 
be achieved. According to the PFLPs 
"The form of national u n i t y i s the creation 
of a f r o n t i n which a l l the classes of the 
revolution - workers peasants and petty bourgeoisie -
should be represented .... We should attend actively 
to the mobilisation of workers and peasants i n one 
revolutionary, p o l i t i c a l organisation armed 
with the ideology of s c i e n t i f i c socialism". 6 
Essentially the PFLP wanted a fro n t based on the equal repre-
sentation of each organisation not on the strength of and 
support f o r each organisation. 7 Al-Fateh's approach to unity 
was of a more p r a c t i c a l nature. Al-Fateh had already attempted 
u n i t y through a fr o n t formula i n January 1968 8 and had f a i l e d 
to bring i n either the PFLP or the PLO. Pressure for unity 
1, i b i d , 
2 , On May 2nd an operation by al-Fateh captured the town of al= 
Hammah and held i t f o r several hours. The operation was 
J o i n t l y planned by PASC. i b i d , p. 21 . 
3 , From al-Fateh, as-Saiqah and the FDFLP. Fateh Vol. 1. No. 2 . 
p. 1. 
ifo Arab World. 6th February 1969j p. 5 . 
5. i b i d , 2kth February 1969, p. 2 . 
60 Kadi, "PFLP P o l i t i c a l Report", OP c i t (Resistance), p. 205. 
7„ Author's interviews, 'amman summer 1969. 
8. See above pp. 113-115. 
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increased on a l l the groups and i n particular on al-Fateh as 
the largest. Al-Fateh. saw two p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
" I t was possible to liave a national f r o n t i n 
which the PLO would be one of the parties .,, 
on the same footing as the other organisa-
tions This trend was not opposed by a l -
Fateh; on the contrary we were prepared to 
follow i t to the end. However there was 
another view regarding the PLO, an objective 
view which considered the welfare of the 
Palestinian people before that of al-Fateh, 
According to t h i s view the PLO represents 
f o r the f i r s t time o f f i c i a l Arab commit-
ment to the Palestinian people. To regard 
the PLO as a private force would re s u l t i n 
weakening the PLO i t s e l f and dissolving t h i s 
commitment ,,,, I t was decided that the PLO 
was a suitable background for the national 
f r o n t which would group together a l l the 
Palestinian forces, and that our insistence 
on entering i t on a l e v e l of equality was 
possibly u n r e a l i s t i c , besides the fa c t that 
i t would paralyse the PLO, This would 
create a si t u a t i o n where these equal forces 
would, under a l l circumstances, have to 
agree unanimously on any action or decision. 
Fa i l i n g such unanimity any small organisa-
t i o n would be i n a position to oppose any 
decision thus creating a vicious c i r c l e by 
veto The voice of any organisation's 
representative should have the weight 
actually carried by that organisation i n 
the f i e l d of action .., i t i s not a matter 
of imposing t h i s or that opinion but of 
determining what t h i s or that organisation 
i s capable of contributing ,.," 1 
This was the rationale behind al-Fateh's acceptance of the 
PLO as the framework f o r Palestinian unity. However i t was not 
acceptable to the PFLP who boycotted both the National Congress 
and PASC, although negotiations between the f r o n t and al-Fateh 
did not cease. 2 The f r o n t J u s t i f i e d i t s position as follows: 
1, Al-Fateh. OP c i t (Dialogue), pp. 10-11 . 
2 , i b i d , pp. 15-17. 
13^ 
"Experience has proved that the variety of 
Palestinian organisations cannot be explained 
on the basis of accident or mere desire for 
leadership. I t i s based upon r e a l differences 
over organisation and strategy .... The 
formula to unite these movements i s a front 
formula .... The representation of 
Palestinian f i g h t i n g forces should be equal 
f r o n t a l representation." 1 
The PFLP maintained t h i s position consistently, r e a l i s i n g that 
proportional representation based on the size of the movements 
would automatically give al-Fateh control of any machinery 
f o r u n i t y . 
Although the f i f t h National Congress made great progress 
towards u n i t y , serious divisions s t i l l existed within the ranks 
of the Palestinians. These divisions were of both an ideological 
nature, and the r e s u l t of the continual creation of small groups 
by Arab governments i n an e f f o r t to crush the movement as a whole. 2 
The problem had become so serious by mid-1969 that i t was the 
main subject of the speech delivered by the al-Fateh representative 
to the annual congress of the General Union of Palestinian 
Students i n 'amman i n July. Al-Fateh pointed out the dangers of 
these divisions which would re s u l t ins 
" 1 . Fragmentation of Palestinian action. 
2c A suitable climate for the development 
of contradictions and p o l i t i c a l polarisation. 
3 . Dissipation of l o y a l t y and support f o r the 
revolution .... 
ko The creation of confusion i n the minds of 
the masses from a m u l t i p l i c i t y of ideo-
logies and slogans, 
5 . A return to the state of purely ambiguous 
and theoretical slogans unrelated to 
r e a l i t y ,,, thus dissipating e f f o r t s i n an 
ideological b a t t l e , 
6 . The p o s s i b i l i t y of i n f i l t r a t i o n of a n t i -
revolutionary forces i n the ranks of the 
revolution, exploiting differences and 
subverting confidence ... 
7 . Diverting the masses from fundamental 
p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y i . . 
8 . Divesting fedayeen a c t i v i t i e s and the armed 
struggle of i t s revolutionary content by 
classifying i n t o r i g h t and l e f t ... 
1. Al-Hadaf. I 5 t h February 1969; PFLP, P o l i t i c a l Communique, 
15th February 1969. 
2 . Al-Fateh. OP c i t (Dialogue), pp, 13-1^, discusses some of these small groups. 
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9 . Subverting the national conduct and behaviour 
of the fedayeen, thereby eroding any sense of 
t r u s t between them and the masses ... 
1 0 . Immobilising a large percentage of bur human 
pot e n t i a l .., 
11. Allowing the authorities to i n t e r f e r e i n the 
a f f a i r s of the revolution on the pretext of 
protecting the citizens from misconduct .,, 
12 . Preparing the ground f o r clashes between the 
' local authorities and some of the Palestinian 
organisations , . , " 1 
Al-Fateh's r e a l i s a t i o n of the inherent danger of the situation 
resulted i n the movement urging, i n addition to unity within 
the PLO, "the establishment of a wide national front from among 
the d i f f e r e n t national forces ..." 2 This was not a national 
f r o n t as envisaged by the PFLP but something much more general. 
"The revolution i n i t s d i f f e r e n t phases 
should establish a national f r o n t which 
w i l l f u l f i l l the aims of each phase. The 
structure of the f r o n t i s not meant to 
be a permanent one which organises relations 
sunong the national forces and groups. On 
the contrary i t i s a temporary framework 
which develops i n accordance with changes 
that occur i n each phase ..." 3 
For the time being the deadlock between the PFLP and the PLO 
remained. The Sixth Palestinian National Congress was held i n 
Cairo at the beginning of September 1969» and once again the 
f r o n t refused to attend on the grounds that: 
" A l l the resistance movements should be 
equally represented i n the Palestinian 
• National Congress. Everyone knows that 
al-Fateh and the PFLP are the two most 
important groups ..." ^ 
Other groups were brought i n , including the PDFLP who were given 
eight seats and provided the PFLP with yet another excuse for i t s 
boycott. 5 J i b r i l ' s group (PFLP-GC) which had by t h i s time also 
1. Statement by al-Fateh to the F i f t h National Congress of the 
General Union of Palestinian students, 'amman 31s t July 1-969, 
Translation by author. 
2 . Al-Fateh, " P o l i t i c a l Struggle", Al-Fateh (Weekly B u l l e t i n , 
'amman), August 1969. 
3 . i b i d . 
ko ARR, 1 s t - l 5 t h September 1969, p. 376. 
5, Arab World, 1st September 1969, p, 2 . 
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s p l i t , 1 was given representation, and the new ALF ( I r a q i Ba'th) 
sent one observer. I n a l l membership was increased to 112 seats. 2 
This congress, although i t was held i n an atmosphere of c r i s i s 
due to the deterioration of relations between the Resistance 
movement and the Lebanese Government, 3 was perhaps most important 
i n i l l u s t r a t i n g the contradictions between the various groups. 
The PFLP, although i t did not attend, made i t s voice heard i n 
other ways. Two days before the congress opened the front 
hijacked a TWA plane from Rome bound for I s r a e l , k They used 
t h i s to declare a popular war of l i b e r a t i o n against US interests 
and severely c r i t i c i s e d the other groups, i n particular al-Fateh 
and as-Saiqah f o r t h e i r policy of non-intervention. 
I n the course of the congress as-Saiqah replied, emphasising 
that i t had no p o l i t i c a l ambitions i n the countries from which 
i t operated, except to lib e r a t e Palestine and establish a 
s o c i a l i s t state there, 5 The movement condemned the PFLP fo r 
i t s adventurist actions. The ALF, feeling the need to establish 
i t s i d e n t i t y , d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i t s e l f from the other groups by 
emphasising Arab u n i t y . I t raised the slogan of Arab unity 
through l i b e r a t i o n of the land, and stressed the need to give 
the revolution a social-democratic face. F i n a l l y the ALF 
declared that i t s organisation was open fo r membership to a l l 
Arabs. 6 
1, Ahmed Za'rur had s p l i t with J i b r i l to form a nev group called 
Munathamah al°'arabiyyah l i - T a h r i r Falastin. (Arab Palestine 
Organisation - APO).The s p l i t was caused over d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of money given to the group f o r services rendered to the 
Jordanian Government. The APO took a Nasirist l i n e . (Author's 
interviews 'amman, summer 1969 ) . See Tables I I and IV. 
2 , See Table V. 
3 , The Congress was extended two days to discuss the c r i s i s . I n 
the course of i t s business, the congress rejected any under-
taking to withdraw the guerillas from Lebanon. Arab World. 
September 3rd 1969» p. 1. The c r i s i s continued and developed 
i n t o open armed confrontation with the Lebanese army. The 
fedayeen refused to give up t h e i r r i g h t to mobility across the 
Lebanese border. Eventually af t e r the intervention and media-
t i o n of President Nasir, Arafat reached an agreement with the 
Government. This "Cairo Agreement" l i k e previous ones with 
Jordan contained concessions from both sides, but again was i n 
the long run to the advantage of the fedayeen. The c r i s i s began 
at the end of 1968 when Israelraided Beirut air p o r t i n r e t a l i a -
t i o n f o r a PFLP attack on an El Al plane i n Zurich. The airport 
r a i d i n turn led to the f a l l of the Lebanese Government and 
tension between the Lebanese authorities and the fedayeen. 
This tension increased throughout 1969 v/hile the Lebanese t r i e d 
to put r e s t r i c t i o n s on fedayeen a c t i v i t y from Lebanese t e r r i t o r y . 
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k. This was the second hijacking undertaken by the Front, 
but the f i r s t had been an El Al plane not an American one. 
5 , " Arab. World. 1s t September 1969, p. 9 . 
6 , i b i d , September 5th 1969, p. 7« 
However, the greatest a c t i v i t y at the congress came from the 
PDFLP, which submitted two dr a f t resolutions one on the 
Democratic State of Palestine 1 and one on the National Front, 
both couched i n i n t e l l e c t u a l and Marxist terminology. The 
resolution on unity 2 began with a long preamble on the 
h i s t o r i c a l significance of u n i t y , and i t s present necessity. 
I t drew a comparison between the "contradictions and centrifugal 
forces" operating w i t h i n the resistance movement and the fact 
that "the reactionary regimes ,,. are prepared to clamp down 
on the movement and are united ,,," 
As a solution the PDFLP suggests that: 
"The alliance of a l l the p a t r i o t i c forces 
i n a United Front with a common platform, 
based on egalitarian relationships among 
i t s d i f f e r e n t organisations, i s the 
effective answer to the dangers that 
threaten the Palestinian national 
l i b e r a t i o n movement, • . The various 
organisations of the resistance move-
ment should understand objectively the 
contradictions existing within the 
resistance movement .,,, Such contra-
dictions w i l l become of secondary im-
portance only by the formation of a 
national l i b e r a t i o n front which would 
contain them within the l i m i t s of a 
minimum national platform, while each 
organisation preserves the r i g h t to i n -
dependent®action beyond the l i m i t s of 
that platform." 3 
This position i s similar to that of the PFLP - a plea f o r equal 
f r o n t a l representation. I t i s a l o g i c a l position but not a 
princ i p l e d one f o r a small orgauiisation to adopt. I t has been 
explained by a representative of al-Fateh as follows: 
1. Arab World. 2nd September 1969, p. 6 , 
2 . Committee For S o l i d a r i t y With The Palestinian Revolution, 
OP c i t . pp. 2 5 - 9 . 
3 . i b i d , pp. 2 8 - 9 , 
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" I f we want to understand national unity, we must 
see i t as similar i n many aspects to the establish-
ment of a c o a l i t i o n government i n any democratic 
state. Each party w i l l t r y to take as many seats 
as possible. But the organisation with the 
strongest base and mass support should take the 
leading r o l e , f o r example i n China and Vietnam 
u n i t y was based on the Communist party because 
i t was the biggest popular movement. However 
i t i s natural that the smaller should t r y to be 
equal to the bigger though one can see that 
they are i l l o g i c a l i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e . I f one 
asks the PFLP whether they are equal to the 
PDF they w i l l denounce th i s proposition asking 
what the PDF represents. P r a c t i c a l l y they 
want equality only with alrFateh and as-Saiqah. 
Si m i l a r l y , i f one asks the PDF i f they are 
equal to J i b r i l or the APO they w i l l deny 
t h i s , wanting equality only with al-Fateh and 
as-Saiqah." 1 
The Front's resolutions were rejected by the congress, and, i n 
spite of the p r i n c i p l e of f r o n t a l equality to which they adhered, 
they accepted a seat on the Executive Committee of the PLO when 
i t was re-elected on 8 th September. 2 
The statement issued at the end of the congress, as on the 
previous occasion, strongly reflected al-Fateh's ideas: 
"The Congress resolutions reaffirmed the insistence 
of the Palestinian people on rejecting a l l sub-
missive solutions .... I t emphasised that the 
aim of the Palestinian revolution i s to achieve 
complete and comprehensive l i b e r a t i o n of the 
Palestinian homeland. The Congress declared 
the Palestinian people's determination to 
pursue the revolution u n t i l v i c t o r y i s 
achieved and a Palestinian.democratic state 
i s established free from a i l forms of r a c i a l 
and ethnic discrimination. 
. The Congress also affirmed that the method 
of revolution i s armed struggle . The t o o l 
of the revolution i s the masses of the 
Palestinian people ,,., 
The Congress emphasised ,,, the independence 
of Palestinian action and rejected a l l attempts 
to impose on i t r e s t r i c t i o n s domination or 
tutelage ..., 
1, Author's interview with Abu Fadi, representative of 
al-Fateh, 'amman, Smmner 1969. 
2 . Ar^b Worlds 8 th September 1969? p. 3 . 
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The Congress paid special attention to the 
subject of national u n i t y and emphasised i t s 
eagerness to continue the e f f o r t s to achieve 
i t i n the most perfect manner .... 
The Congress recommended that measures fo r 
. unifying the f i n a n c i a l levy system be com-
pleted especially i n Jordan. I t also re-
commended the consolidation and development 
of the PLA i n accordance with the require-
ments of the coming phase. 
The Congress entrusted the Palestinian 
Red Creseent with the task of providing 
medical services to a l l (Palestinian) 
f i g h t e r s and charged the Executive Committee 
with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of increasing care 
offered to the families of the martyrs and 
wounded. 1 
The Congress discussed the means of bolster-
ing the technological aspect of the revolution 
and the importance of planning, programming 
and s t a t i s t i c s as a basis for revolutionary 
action i n theory and practice .... 
Among the most important decisions of the 
Congress was the establishment of a Revolu-
tionary Court which w i l l be the only authority 
to pass sentences which would ensure the rule 
of Justice and security of the revolution .... 
The Congress resolved to co-operate f u l l y 
with the l i b e r a t i o n movements i n a l l parts of 
the Arab homeland and i n the world ...." 2 
I n general the results of t h i s congress can be considered 
sati s f a c t o r y . I t had brought i n t o the PLO most of the main 
groups except the PFLP and had undertaken to streamline and 
make the resistance movement more e f f i c i e n t . Moreover the PLO 
had assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r social services which had pre-
viously been maintained only by al-Fateh. 
il - F a t e h had established the Palestinian Red Crescent i n 
January 1968. By mid-1969 i t had established several hospitals 
and 22- c l i n i c s i n the refugee camps. These c l i n i c s unlike 
the UNRWA gave free treatment and free medicines to the 
refugees. The medicines were free samples supplied mainly 
by the Arab states, and the doctors though paid were 
volunteers. Al-Fateh had established also a fund from 
which aid was given to families of fighters k i l l e d or 
wounded i n action. There were also educational services 
f o r the children to supplement not replace UNRWA which was 
proving incapable of dealing with the increased numbers. 
(Based on personal experience of the author, 'amman, summer 
1969) 
2, Text i n Fateh Vol. I No. I . p. k 
Even so, the formal un i t y which had been achieved on both 
the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l levels was s t i l l more nominal than 
r e a l . Each group had i t s own strategy, t a c t i c s , aims and 
slogansj, and, with the exception of al-Fateh and as-Saiqah, 
continued to attack and c r i t i c i s e each other publicly. 
The next step towards u n i t y was impelled by force of circum-
stances. The simmering c r i s i s i n Lebanon and an acute c r i s i s 
with the Jordanian Government i n February 1 9 7 0 made some sort of 
p r a c t i c a l u n i t y essential. The Popular Front would not retreat 
from i t s demand fo r equal representation and thus a new formula 
had to be found which they could accept. This new formula 
was a Unified Command of a l l the main groups, including a new 
group formed from ex-Communists called the Peoples Organisation 
f o r the Liberation of Palestine. 1 The Command comprised eleven 
groups i n a l l , each sending one representative. I n e f f e c t , 
however, al-Fateh remained the leading force by virtue of i t s 
overwhelming superiority of manpower, equipment and support. 2 
The new Command called a meeting of a l l sympathetic organisations 
and individuals on 1 1 t h February and a j o i n t statement c a l l i n g 
f o r popular resistance was issued over t h e i r signatures. 3 The 
statement,ended by saying: 
" A l l the commando organisations which have realised 
t h e i r complete merger, stand united today with the 
popular masses i n Jordan to announce th e i r avowed 
in t e n t i o n to safeguard t h e i r u n i t y and name and 
keep up t h e i r armed struggle against the Zionist 
and i m p e r i a l i s t enemy." k 
1 . The POLP was pro-Chinese i n orientation and had o r i g i n a l l y 
• joined the PDELP i n February 1 9 6 9 - They had ultimately l e f t 
i t on the grounds that i t did not l i v e up to i t s slogans. 
There was another Communist fedayeen group formed from the 
o f f i c i a l Communist Party, called Qoat al°Ansar (Partisan 
Forces). I t did not j o i n the Unified Command because a l -
Fateh vetoed i t s entry. The Communists had from the beginning 
been isolated from the mainstream of the fedayeen movement 
becausfe of t h e i r recognition of I s r a e l and insistence that 
l i b e r a t i o n should be r e s t r i c t e d only to p o s t - 1 9 6 7 occupied 
t e r r i t o r y . The party was composed of three factions. One 
led by Fahimi a s - S e l f i t i was opposed to any form of armed 
action. Another f a c t i o n led by Fa'iq Warrad saw that unless 
some action was taken the party would lose a l l i t s support. 
A middle l i n e was taken by Fuad Nassar who f i n a l l y accepted 
the Warrad argument and allowed al-Ansar to be set up. A l -
Fateh put three conditions on t h e i r entry into the Unified 
Command. They should re j e c t the November 1 9 6 7 UN Resolution, 
they should declare t h e i r aim to liberate a l l of Palestine, 
and they should denounce the ^S^8 p a r t i t i o n . They refused 
these conditions, (Based on author's interview with repre-. 
sentatives of al-Fateh, London March 1 9 7 0 ) . 
l i f l 
2. i b i d . 
3 . F u l l l i s t of signatures i n Table VI. 
ko Complete tex t i n Fateh Vol. I I No. I5th February 1970, p. h. 
When the c r i s i s was over, following a negotiated settlement, 
the Unified Command, along with the PLO and PASC became part of 
the co-ordinating machinery of the Palestinian resistance inside 
Jordan. Moreover i t sought to develop a formula f o r closer 
and more permanent un i t y . On 17th February the Command issued 
a statement severely c r i t i c i s i n g the -past disunity of the 
movements 
"The Resistance Movement, which overcame the 
February 1 0 t h Crisis with firmness and uni t y 
i n i t s ranks believes that i t continues to be 
burdened with errors .... The endeavour f o r 
c r i t i c i s m and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m exercised today 
by the Unified Command with regard to the 1 9 6 9 experience confirms the revolutionary 
i n i t i a t i v e of the resistance to correct i t s 
. mistakes and to develop «... 
. As i t stands before the 1 9 6 9 experience the 
Unified Command observes that: 
1. I t is; called upon by the masses of our 
people and the Arab nation to redress 
i t s i n t e r n a l relations so as to bui l d a 
strong and u n i f i e d national f r o n t on 
the basis.of a defined p o l i t i c a l and 
m i l i t a r y programme .... 
2. I t i s called upon to make available and 
to b u i l d wide sind sound relationships 
with the masses and become aware of i t s 
mistakes i n these relationships .... 
3 . I t must consolidate relations with the 
people - including soldiers, o f f i e s E S 
and security forces .... 
A l l bases of the resistance movement must 
observe mature revolutionary discipline 
and realise the importance of equality 
among a l l citizens .... 5 . A l l factions of the resistance movement 
must abide by the p o l i t i c a l m i l i t a r y 
and d i s c i p l i n a r y instructions of the 
Unified Command .... 
6. Violations should be reported to the 
Unified Command so that an end may be 
put to them immediately..,. 7 . Annoyances to citizens i n t h e i r homes, 
i n work or production locations and i n 
o f f i c i a l o f f i c e s tarnish relations between 
the people and the armed and mass 
1^ 2 
"The Unified Command has taken a series of i n t e r n a l 
measures to implement t h i s statement i n f u l l . I t 
pledges to take a longer c r i t i c a l stand i n the 
near future i n order to build a wide revolutionary 
. relationship with everyone and without regional 
discrimination between the masses of Jordan and 
Palestine." 1 
This statement i l l u s t r a t e s the dominance of al-Fateh i n the 
Unified Command. I t i s devoid of any mention of class struggle 
and i s generally moderate i n tone. Moreover i t deals with 
, p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s and seeks p r a c t i c a l answers to them. 
I n spite of t h i s , the actual form of the command enabled the 
PFLP to accept al-Fateh's leadership without having to go back 
on t h e i r previous position. I n a re a l c r i s i s they had to 
accept the existence of a leading force within the movement. 
They supported the command completely; 
"... the PFLP declares i t s backing to the Unified 
Command. I t i s the correct formula for un i t i n g 
the Palestinian movements. This Palestinian 
Unified Command should work under the slogan 
'freedom of discussion and dialogue for a l l 
forces' and should be based on collective 
leadership guaranting the expulsion of any 
i n d i v i d u a l or organisation f o r individual or 
spontaneous action." 2 
On May 6 t h 1 9 7 0 the command issued a statement agreeing that 
i n the future the PLO should be the framework for unity. I t was 
sighed by a l l the organisations including the PFLP. The state-
ment gave the formula as follows: 
A. " A l l resistance movement groups regard the PLO 
as the broad framework f o r national unity. 
B. Matters agreed upon, commit a l l groups 
c o l l e c t i v e l y , while matters s t i l l pending 
are l e f t f o r each group to deal with as 
i t deems f i t . Matters related to the 
security of the revolution commit a l l 
groups c o l l e c t i v e l y . 
C. A l l groups sh a l l participate i n the f o r t h -
. coming Palestinian.National Congress and 
the i n s t i t u t i o n s emanating from the PLO. 
The question of the percentage represent-
ation of each of the organisations ... 
sh a l l not become a point of issue .... 
D. By a National Congress decree a Central 
Committee s h a l l be formed, with the 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a l l resistance groups, 
to assume i t s leadership role i n the 
resistance movement. The Central Committee 
... s h a l l replace the current Unified 
Command. ( I t ) ' s h a l l comprise the 
1 . Text i n Fateh Vol. I I No. 5 . March l^+th 1 9 7 0 , p. 7 . 
2 . Al-Hadaf^ 7 t h March 1 9 7 0 , p. 9 . 
1 ^ 3 
Executive Committee of the PLO, repre-
sentatives of the commando.organisations, 
the head of the Palestinian National 
Congress the head of the PLA and some 
independents. 
The Palestinian resistance movement ... 
agreed that the points l i s t e d here below 
represent, together with the National 
Charter and the National Congress resolu-
t i o n s , the broad framework f o r j o i n t 
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y action: 
1. . The working, t o i l i n g and a l l other forces 
of the Palestinian and Arab masses that 
have an int e r e s t i n the stage of national 
l i b e r a t i o n and i n the complete l i b e r a t i o n 
of the Palestinian homeland constitute 
the forces of the Palestinian Revolution. 
2. The Palestinian struggle springs from 
f a i t h i n the uni t y of the people on the 
Palestinian-Jordanian l e v e l as well as from 
f a i t h that the people of Palestine are part 
of the Arab nation and that the land of 
.Palestine i s part of the Arab land. 
3 . The Palestinian Revolution i s an i n t e g r a l 
part of the contemporary Arab revolutionary 
movement and of the world national l i b e r a -
t i o n movement. 
The enemies of the national l i b e r a t i o n 
movement are represented by Zionism I s r a e l , 
Imperialism and a l l lackey forces that are 
d i a l e c t i c a l l y or consciously linked to 
Imperialism and colonialism. 5 . The objective of the Palestinian struggle 
i s the l i b e r a t i o n of a l l of Palestine to 
establish a community i n which a l l citizens 
w i l l have equal rig h t s and obligations within 
the Arab nations aspirations f o r unity and 
progress. 
6. Popular l i b e r a t i o n war i s the main path to 
the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine. 
7" The people of Palestine ... reject a l l 
peaceful ... solutions; a l l reactionary 
and'colonialist conspiracies to establish a 
Palestinian state on parts of Palestinian 
t e r r i t o r y ; and the s t i f l i n g UN resolution 
of November 22nd 1?67._ 
8. The Palestinia:n irVvoJLution considers the 
Arab land surrounding I s r a e l as legitimate 
ground f o r struggle, and any attempt to 
close any Arab country to the Palestinian 
resistance would be tantamount to treason .... 
1 M + 
9 » The Palestinian Revolution declares i t s 
complete independence of a l l Arab regimes, 
and rejects a l l attempts to circumscribe, 
t u t o r , contain or subordinate i t . 
1 0 . A l l resistance groups consent to the f o r -
mation of a u n i f i e d m i l i t a r y committee 
to move into a new stage of commando 
action and popular l i b e r a t i o n warfare. . 1 1 . We must arm the masses of our Palestinian 
and Arab people bordering occupied Palestine 
to protect the resistance ... and to par-
t i c i p a t e e f f e c t i v e l y i n confronting any 
Zion i s t - I m p e r i a l i s t invasion of Arab 
t e r r i t o r y bordering Palestine, 
1 2 . I s r a e l by v i r t u e of i t s structure, repre-
sents an ex c l u s i v i s t , r a c i s t society t i e d 
to imperialism. As such the l i m i t e d pro-
gressive forces within i t cannot effect any 
basic change i n i t s ... structure. This i s 
why the aim of the Palestinian Revolution 
i s to dismantle t h i s e n t i t y ..." 1 
The PFLP accepted t h i s declaration though i t was largely a 
r e f l e c t i o n of al-Fateh's policy. The formula for the Central 
Committee was v i r t u a l l y a return to proportional representation. 
Through the inclusion of the PLO executive, al-Fateh once more 
got a majority. Moreover, the f i r s t point i n the programme 
rejected any idea of class struggle, while the f i f t h point 
avoided any mention of a s o c i a l i s t system f o r the future state 
of Palestine. The other points were a l l parts of al-Fateh's 
programme from the beginning. 
The PFLP was thus brought back i n t o the PLO and sent delegates 
to the seventh Palestinian National Congress i n Cairo i n May 
1 9 7 0 . I t i n s i s t e d that i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the congress was 
only 'symbolic', 2 and J u s t i f i e d i t s previous a t t i t u d e blaming 
the ambiguous programme and bureaucracy of the PLO. The fr o n t 
pressed f o r the reform of the PLO during the congress and asked 
that a programme should be drawn up defining relations with 
the Arab states. I t insist e d that both reactionary and n a t i o n a l i s t 
Ara:b states should be fought because they sought either d i r e c t l y 
or i n d i r e c t l y to undermine the revolution. The front also asked 
that the PLO programme should undertake to strike at imperialist 
1 . Text i n Fateh Vol. I I No. 9 . May 2 9 t h 1 9 7 0 , p. 
2 . Al-Hadaf. 3 0 t h May 1 9 7 0 . 
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i n t e r e s t s . I t maintained i t s insistence that representation within 
the PLO should be on a f r o n t a l basis. 1 However, i t s suggestions 
were rejected. 
The msLin'achievement a of the congress was the establishment of 
the Central Committee as defined i n the Unified Command declara-
t i o n quoted above. The congress also decided to set up a unified 
m i l i t a r y , command to incorporate some units from each organisation 
and to standardise g u e r i l l a t r a i n i n g . In addition to t h i s two 
committeeis were set up, one including representatives of the 
Jordanian progressive forces and the' other including representatives 
of the Lebanese pipogressive forces, to plan and direct the 
j o i n t struggle, 2 
The seventh congress, l i k e i t s predecessors, i l l u s t r a t e d the 
dominance of al-Fateh w i t h i n the PLO. The PFLP was not able to 
get i t s programme accepted nor did i t manage to amend the policy 
put forward by al-Fateh. I t continued to lose ground i n the 
following months and progress towards unity continued. Soon 
af t e r the congress al-Fateh began to publish a daily newspaper 
i n 'amman and after eight or nine issues the Central Committee 
decided to adopt the paper as i t s o f f i c i a l organ. 3 The paper, 
i n the hands of a ra d i c a l f a c t i o n of al-Fateh, was praised by 
a l l groups even the PFLP: 
"The d a i l y Fateh newspaper which started recently 
i n 'amman i s achieving continuous success i n a l l 
Arab markets. I t s decisive voice i s playing an 
increasing r o l e i n revealing enemy compromise 
and consolidating the xinity of the Palestinian 
national forces . o , . Al-Hadaf warmly salutes 
al-Fateh and we believe t h i s paper i s q u a l i f i e d 
to play an essential vanguard revolutionary 
role i n the d a i l y information l i f e of the 
revolution ..." 4-
1 . i b i d . 
2 . Fateh Vol, I I No. 1 0 . June 2 5 t h 1 9 7 0 , p. I^f. 
3 o Author' s intervievj with representative of al-Fateh, London 
March 1 9 7 0 , 
>, Al-Hadaf. 2 6 t h June 1 9 7 0 . This c r i s i s l i k e a l l previous ones 
was resolved through agreement, but hot before i t developed into 
. a m i l i t a r y confrontation i n which the fedayeen maintained the 
upper hand. The provisions of the agreement v/ere much as on 
previous occasions. There was a difference i n t h i s c r i s i s i n 
that the PFLP defied the Unified Command and held hostage the 
personnel of the Intercontinental Hotel i n 'amman, causing 
great embarrassment to the Jordanian Government. Agreement 
was reached on 1 0 t h July with the Government giving more con-
• cessions than before, allowing l i g h t arms i n the to\ms. Text 
i n Fateh. Vol. I I No, 1 2 . August 5 t h 1 9 7 0 , p, 7 ; Keesines 
( 1 9 7 0 ) , pp, 2«+059=60, 
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Although i t seemed that u n i t y was about to be realised, thi s 
was more formal than r e a l . Groups were s t i l l undertaking i n -
dependent p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y action and were publishing t h e i r 
own newspapers. Befpre the few hesitating steps towards unity 
could be consolidated. President Nasir accepted the Rogers peace 
plan. The resistance movement, though undoubtedly more united 
than before, was not strong enough to bear t h i s blow. I t 
rapidly disintegrated into i t s various disparate groups. A l -
Fateh, while attacking the peace plan i t s e l f did not attack 
Nasir personally, r e a l i s i n g that such a move would only result 
i n a loss of support, since Nasir was s t i l l popular. The 
fronts however organised a demonstration i n 'amman at which 
Nasir was strongly attacked 1 and as a resu l t clashed v^ith two 
other groups which supported Nasir's move as 'clever t a c t i c s . ' 2 
. I t was during t h i s period of tension and uncertainty that 
the PFLP staged t h e i r spectacular hijacking of four planes to 
Jordan. 3 Their membership i n the Central Committee was frozen 
fo r t h i s action and they were severely c r i t i c i s e d . However, i t 
was too l a t e and King Husain took advantage of the incident 
using i t as a pretext to attack the resistance movement as a 
whole. He sent his entire army against the guerillas and a 
viol e n t c i v i l war resulted. Moreover, he had western support 
f o r his actions, k 
As a r e s u l t of the c i v i l war and the unpreparedness of the 
resistance movement, the guerillas l o s t t h e i r hold i n 'amman 
and were forced to return to underground a c t i v i t y . Their morale 
was severely damaged and i n the succeeding year they lo s t control 
of a l l of Jordan. By the end of 1971 they could act openly 
only i n south Lebanon and i n the Golan Heights and even then 
1. July 2 5 t h 1970. 
2 . The Arab Palestine Organisation. (APO) v;hich was led by 
Ahmed Za'rur and had s p l i t from J i b r i l , and the Action 
Organisation f o r the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) led 
by Dr. Issam Sartaiwi, which had s p l i t from al-Fateh. See 
Table I I and IV, 
3 . Peter Snow and David P h i l i p s , Leila's Hi.jack War, passim, 
i b i d . 
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they were r e s t r i c t e d by the goverrments of those countries. 
I n a few weeks they l o s t what had taken more than ten years 
to build.. The appearance of u n i t y was seen f o r what i t was, 
a mere facade, and even al-Fateh began to suffer from i n t e r n a l 
discord* A l l the groups devoted t h e i r time and energy to 
analysing the September c i v i l war i n Jordan. They c r i t i c i s e d 
themselves and each other, sought j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i r 
actions and generally became involved i n a profound reassess-
ment of the s i t u a t i o n . I t remains to be seen whether they 
w i l l ilearn anything from t h e i r past mistakes and w i l l build up 
t h e i r movement again to a point where i t caii be a power i n 
the Middle East. 
^k8 
CHAPTER SIX: ASSESSMENT OF AL-FATEH 
AND THE FRONTS 
The four most important fedayeen groups are al-Fateh, as-
Saiqah, the Democratic Front and the Popular Front. A l l these 
groups can be said to have ideologies as defined i n the i n t r o -
duction. They each/coffer an explanation for the situ a t i o n i n 
which the Palestinians f i n d themselves and each t r i e s to provide 
a solution f o r the Palestinians' problems. Each group i n t e r -
prets the. s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n t l y and therefore the solutions 
offered are also d i f f e r e n t . 
The two largest groups i n terms of-organised membership and 
popular support are al-Fateh and as-Saiqah. 1 The ideological 
differences between these two have been pointed out i n previous 
chapters. They concern the r e l a t i v e importance of the Palestinian 
and Arab revolutions and the structure of the future state of 
Palestine, For as-Saiqah the Arab revolution i s the p r i o r i t y 
and the Palestinian revolution merely a means to that end. 
Moreover, as-Saiqah i n s i s t s on the s o c i a l i s t nature of the 
future state of Palestine, 2 Al-Fateh, on the other hand, 
believes the Palestinian revolution to be of prime importance 
and refuses to consider the nature of the Palestinian state as 
of any consequence at t h i s stage. 
The differences between as-Saiqah and the fronts seem to be 
more concerned with strategy and tac t i c s than with basic ideology, 
As-Saiqah from the beginning t r i e d to avoid involvement i n 
purely ideological disputes. I t co-operated with al-Fateh and 
the PLO i n a l l t h e i r attempts to set up machinery fo r m i l i t a r y 
co-ordination and to establish a framev/ork f o r national u n i t y , 
As-Saiqah only states i t s views when absolutely necessary 
and consequently documentation i s r e l a t i v e l y sparse. For t h i s 
reason, and since as-Saiqah's ideology was never an obstacle to 
the development of the Palestinian revolution or the achievement 
of national u n i t y , t h i s chapter w i l l be concerned only with 
the f r o n t s and al-Fateh. 
1,, This i s based upon the author's observations i n 'amman i n 
the summer of 1 9 6 9 and also upon the allocations of seats i n 
the Palestine National Congress which i s decided according 
to. the"strength of the groups (Table V), 
2 . See.above Ch, 5 pp. 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 
3 . See above Ch. 5 pp. 1 2 0 - 1 2 6 . 
Both the Popular Front (PFLP) and the Democratic Front (PDFLP) 
have conducted an unceasing propaganda war against al-Fateh, 
c r i t i c i s i n g and challenging, both d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , the 
policy and personnel of the organisation. The standpoint from 
which both fronts launch t h e i r attacks i s t h e i r Marxist-
Leninist theory, although, before the June war, the parent 
organisation, the ANM, was to the r i g h t of most of the other 
parties i n the Arab world. 1 Before we consider the differences 
between the fronts and al-Fateh, i t might be useful to l i s t 
the points on which they are i n agreement. 
F i r s t , a l l groups consider I s r a e l as an imperialist base i n 
the Middle East and see i t s creation and maintenance as the 
work of f i r s t B r i t i s h and then American imperialism. There i s 
consequently an a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t orientation about the entire 
resistance movement and a certain sympathy towards the 
communist bloc. The Palestinian revolution i s seen as part of 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h i r d world revolution against imperialism. 
I t i s a national l i b e r a t i o n revolution. 
Second, armed struggle and the organisation of the masses i s 
generally accepted as the means f o r l i b e r a t i n g Palestine. Any 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure for compromise or f o r a peaceful solution 
i s rejected. 
Third, the aim of the armed struggle i s the creation of a 
democratic state where Jews, Muslims and Christians w i l l enjoy 
equal r i g h t s and duties. A l l groups are careful to distinguish 
between the Jews as a r e l i g i o u s - c u l t u r a l group and Zionism as a 
p o l i t i c a l movement. 
These three points are the essence of the Palestinian revolu-
t i o n . A l l were contained i n al-Fateh's o r i g i n a l programme 
drawn up i n 1 9 5 8 . 2 They only became .acceptable to the Ba'th 
and the ANM after the defeat of June 1 9 6 7 . They were then 
adopted by the groups based on these parties and the groups 
themselves became even more radical i n t h e i r outlook. 
The differences between al-Fateh and the fronts arose mainly 
over how best to achieve the agreed aim - the l i b e r a t i o n of 
Palestine through armed struggle. There were three main areas 
1 , See above Ch, 2 pp. 2 8 - 3 2 . 
2 . See above Ch. 3 P« ^ 9 . 
1 5 0 
of disagreement. What p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y strategy and 
t a c t i c s t o employ f i r s t with respect to the Arab states, and 
second with respect to the d i f f e r e n t classes and groups i n 
Arab society. The other point of debate concerned the best 
type of organisation f o r the Palestinians to adopt. We w i l l 
consider these three areas of difference i n turn. 
The Palestinian Revolution and the Arab regimes 
• As we have seen, al-Fateh's position on th i s question i s that 
the Palestinian revolution, though part of the Arab revolution, 
i s a prerequisite f o r Arab l i b e r a t i o n and must have p r i o r i t y . 
This a t t i t u d e made al-Fateh unique i n i t s ideas when, through-
out the Arab world, i t was generally accepted that the 
l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine could only come through Arab unity. 
In order to protect i t s e l f i n the early stages when Arab 
h o s t i l i t y was very strong and the movement very weak, al-Fateh 
raised the slogan, 'non-intervention i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s 
of the Arab stat.es.' I t continued to press t h i s policy i n spite 
of growing c r i t i c i s m from the f r o n t s . 
O r i g i n a l l y the slogan was accepted by a l l the groups, includ-
ing the PFLP before i t s s p l i t . 1 However, as tension mounted 
between the two factions of the front the l e f t wing was obliged 
to adopt attitudes which would distinguish i t both p o l i t i c a l l y 
and i d e o l o g i c a l l y from the r i g h t wing. As a specific point 
of difference i t categorically rejected the policy of non-
intervention. C r i t i c i s m of the slogan was included i n the 
left-wing's programme of August 1 9 6 8 : 2 
"How did the movement translate t h i s slogan? 
I t i s clear that the Palestinian resistance 
movement i s not required.to take the place 
of the national l i b e r a t i o n movement of each 
Arab state .... But i t i s also clear that 
the slogan ,,, should also mean that the 
Palestinian resistance should interfere 
with whatever affects the Palestine 
problem i n the policies adopted by the 
Arab regimes ,... 
The Popular Front openly condemns t h i s 
slogan i n the context i n which i t has been 
practised f o r the l a s t f i f t e e n months. 
The resistance movement i s not expected to" 
substitute f o r the national l i b e r a t i o n 
movements i n the Arab countries but i t i s 
expected to c r i t i c i s e the stands adopted 
by Arab governments towards the Palestine 
1 , See Ch. 5 . p , l 2 2 . The PFLP statement issued on 
the occasion of the J i b r i l s p l i t s p e c i f i c a l l y denied J i b r i l ' s 
.charges that.the Front had adopted a policy of intervention i n 
the a f f a i r s , .of the Arab states, 
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2 , Text translated i n Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance), pp. 1 ^ - 5 - 1 7 1 . 
problem and put blame on those responsible 
f o r the ( 1 9 6 7 ) defeat." 
The August platform not only implied that the Palestinian 
movement should on occasions i n t e r f e r e i n the internal a f f a i r s 
of Arab states, i t also rejected any support which the Arab 
regimies might offer the movement. 
"Through i t s dependence on the Arab regimes 
fo r arms, the resistance movement has 
allowed i t s e l f to be transformed into a 
t a c t i c a l weapon of pressure i n the hands 
of the regimes - a t a c t i c a l means of 
putting pressure on imperialism and I s r a e l 
i n order to a t t a i n a p o l i t i c a l settlement 
of the Palestinian problem. I t i s hoped 
that the concessions demanded by Is r a e l 
and imperialism as a price f o r application 
of the Security Council resolution ... w i l l 
be minimised as a r e s u l t . " 1 
Later, when the l e f t wing formed i t s e l f i n t o the Democratic 
Front, i t adopted the provisions of the August platform 2 and 
increased i t s c r i t i c i s m of the Arab regimes. I t accused them 
of attempting to s p l i t the Resistance movement: 
"The Arab regimes, at t h i s time, are 
setting up nominal organisations within 
the resistance movement and are backing 
the weakest groups ,,,, These regimes, 
when they cannot control the Palestinian 
movement i n conformity with t h e i r policies 
and programmes t r y to plant dynamite inside 
the movement to explode when the decisive 
hour comes, the hour of peaceful li q u i d a -
t i o n The Arab regimes t r y to exploit 
the contradictions between the Palestinian 
groups by backing some and denouncing 
others, forcing many to conform to th e i r 
programmes and policies ,,., 
The Palestinian movement denounces the 
att i t u d e of many Arab regimes which donate 
money to some movements and not to others 
because t h i s serves to increase the s p l i t s 
- i n the movement," 3 
1 , i b i d , pp. 1 5 9 - 6 5 . 
2 , Henceforth the platform, when quoted, w i l l be attributed to 
the Democratic Front, although i t was issued before the 
s p l i t , 
3 , Democratic Front. Harakah al-Maaawamah al-Falastinivvah f i 
Waai'ha ar-Rahin. pp. 1 2 5 and 14-9. Translation by the author. 
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The Democratic Front went as f a r as to attack Nasir, though 
without mentioning him by neune: 
"The Palestinian resistance movement must put 
. as a p r i o r i t y the struggle against l i q u i d a -
. t i o n i s t schemes and should prepare to over-
throw them. One of the best ways of doing 
t h i s i s to expose these schemes and those 
who support them ..." 1 
This, then was the position of the Democratic Front with 
respect.to the Arab regimes. After the s p l i t what was l e f t of 
the Popular Front did not t o t a l l y reject the August platform 
but t r i e d to adopt an even more ra d i c a l position. I t accepted 
the c r i t i c i s m s against the Arab regimes and while i t d i f f e r e n t -
iated between t r a d i t i o n a l and progressive regimes, i t con-
demned them both. I n r e l a t i o n to the 'reactionary' regimes, 
'Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab states J the Popular Front 
considered: 
the r e l a t i o n of the armed struggle -
•Palestinian at the moment and Arab i n the 
future - i s one of c o n f l i c t with these 
regimes i n spite of any t a c t i c a l temporary 
positions that may be forced on both sides," 2 
With respect to the progressive regimes, especially the UAR, 
the Popular Front, while acknowledging the advances they had 
made, stated: 
"... the June defeat i s not only a m i l i t a r y 
defeat but also a defeat for these regimes 
and t h e i r programmes and demonstrates t h e i r 
• i n a b i l i t y to undertake the p o l i t i c a l , 
m i l i t a r y , economic and ideological mob 
l i s a t i o n which can r e s i s t and defeat neo-
colonialism and i t s plans i n our home-
land." 3 
The distinguishing feature of Popular Front ideology was the 
insistence that the b a t t l e was not only with I s r a e l and Zionism 
but also d i r e c t l y with Imperialism and Arab reaction: 
"The road which w i l l lead to v i c t o r y i s , 
armed struggle against I s r a e l and the im-
p e r i a l i s t interests i n our homeland, ex-
tending the f r o n t of armed struggle which 
res i s t s Arab reaction and the interests and 
bases of Imperialism i n the Arab homeland ..." k 
1 . i b i d , p. 9 6 , 
2 . Kadi ( t r a n s ) , 'Popular Front Report of February 1 9 6 9 ' > 
OP c i t (Resistance), pp. 2 0 8 - 9 . 
3 . i b i d , p. 2 1 3 . 
If. i b i d , p. 2 0 7 . 
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The distinguishing feature of Popular Front ideology was 
the insistence that the b a t t l e was not only with I s r a e l and 
Zionism but also d i r e c t l y with Imperialism and Arab reaction: 
"The road which w i l l lead to vi c t o r y i s , 
armed struggle against I s r a e l and the 
im p e r i a l i s t interests i n our homeland, 
extending the f r o n t of armed struggle 
which resists Arab reaction and the 
interests and bases of Imperialism i n 
the Arab homeland .,,." 1 
The f r o n t s ' a t t i t u d e to the Arab regimes were thus t o t a l l y 
h o s t i l e , blaming them.for past f a i l u r e s and accusing them of 
working f o r the destruction of the Palestinian resistance or at 
the very least t r y i n g to gain control of i t . By contrast, 
al-Fateh's a t t i t u d e was one of moderation, Al-Fateh defended 
i t s adoption and retention of the non-intervention policy as 
follows: 
"This policy i s objectively sound since i t 
requires al-Fateh not to concern i t s e l f 
w i t h who shall become Prime Minister i n 
• t h i s country or that. However, there i s 
i n r e a l i t y an interconnection between 
Palestinian action and Arab action, and 
consequently we have always proclaimed 
that we are part of the Arab revolution 
We believe that none of the progressive 
policies announced by the Arab nation i s 
capable of implementation except through 
our b a t t l e and the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine 
..... How can we bu i l d a progressive society 
i n our country while we are having to 
allocate a l l our income and productive 
. e f f o r t to the procurement of m i l i t a r y hard-
ware f o r use.against the colonising 
aggressor? Therefore t h i s policy of non-
intervention i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of 
the Arab countries does not preclude 
interconnection between the Arab countries 
and Palestine." 2 
Al-Fateh not only refrained from d i r e c t attack on the Arab 
regimes but even considered co-operation as a p o s s i b i l i t y , at 
least i n theory. 
1. ibid,, p. 207. 
2 o Al-Fateh, OP c i t (Dialogue), pp. 5 2 - 3 . 
"We have our own clear-cut concept of co-
ordination from which we do not deviate. 
I n our view, co-ordination i s f i r s t of 
a l l anything contributed to the resistance 
movement by way of support, assistance 
and t r a i n i n g . We do not refuse any of 
these things but welcome them h e a r t i l y . 
However, we are not prepared to be part 
of a regional co-ordination plan.... I f 
we f i n d Arab regimes which have a serious 
plan for the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine, 
and want us to be part of th i s plan, 
then we have no objection at a l l . But 
i f certain Arab regimes want to con-
t a i n us under the name of co-ordination 
and the preservation of t h e i r regional 
f r o n t i e r s then, f r a n k l y , we w i l l refuse," 1 
Here then, we have two very d i f f e r e n t points of view with 
al-Fateh consistently rejecting any direct or ind i r e c t action 
which might incur the h o s t i l i t y of the Arab states and the 
fronts increasing t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of and accusations against 
the regimes. Let us now attempt to assess the v a l i d i t y of 
these two approaches, remembering that the aim of a l l the 
groups was the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine and the establishment 
of a Palestinian state. 
At the beginningj when the conditions f o r the development 
of any s p e c i f i c a l l y Palestine-oriented movement were extremely 
unfavourable, the policy of non-intervention was a wise and 
necessary one. Without the utmost care to reassure the Arab 
regimes of i t s peaceful intentions towards them, the movement 
would have had to face even harsher repression than i t did. 2 
I n t h i s early stage, the fronts did not exist and t h e i r parent 
organisation, the ANM s t i l l believed i m p l i c i t l y i n Arab un i t y 
and Nasirism. Since the fro n t was formed only a f t e r the June 
1 9 6 7 war and took no part i n the d i f f i c u l t i n i t i a l stages of 
forming a Palestinian movement, there was no real reason why 
i t should understand the importance of the non-intervention 
p o l i c y . 
Once the Palestinian movement had gained some kind of 
acceptance, the continued application of the slogan enabled i t s 
members to work with Palestinians i n d i f f e r e n t Arab stages and 
to mobilise them. The Arab states also provided a r i c h source 
of finance and arms for the movement and gave i t the chance to 
1 , i b i d , p. 8 5 . 
2 . See above Ch. k p. 9 2 f n . 2 . 
1 5 5 
b u i l d i t s e l f i n t o a r e l a t i v e l y powerful organisation. At t h i s 
stage, al-Fateh s k i l l f u l l y exploited inter-Arab r i v a l r i e s to 
gain as much as possible from every regime. I t equally s k i l l -
f u l l y avoided becoming linked to any particular state or become 
a t o o l of Arab policy. I n spite of t h e i r allegations against 
al-Fateh, i t was the fronts which eventually became bound up 
with specific regimes. The PFLP became a l l i e d with Iraq 
because of previous r i v a l r y with the Syrian Ba'th 1 and i n 
answer to t h i s , the PDFLP established good relations with 
Syria. 2 The fronts were used by both regimes i n t h e i r r i v a l r y 
with Egypt. 
Whenever disputes with the Arab regimes did arise, i t was 
al-Fateh, as the most powerful organisation, that had to resolve 
them. I n the early stages, i t never allowed any dispute to 
reach the point of open confrontation (as i n November I 9 6 8 i n 
Jordan and A p r i l 1 9 6 9 i n Lebanon). 3 However, the movement 
was equally not prepared to give any ground and the agreements 
concluded with Arab governments were always to the advantage 
of the Palestinians, k Their main effect was to give legal 
and o f f i c i a l Arab recognition to the movement and i t s r i g h t to 
independent action. I n October 1 9 6 9 i n Lebanon and i n February 
and June 1 9 7 0 i n Jordan, the movement showed the Arab regimes 
that i f forced to open confrontation i t would not compromise 
on anything of,fundamental importance to i t s future development. 
On the other hand, the fr o n t s ' extremist actions were 
responsible, on at least two occasions for actually precipitating 
crises with the Arab regimes. I t was the PFLP attack on an El Al 
plane i n Zurich which caused Israel's r a i d on Beirut a i r p o r t i n 
December 1 9 6 8 , This i n turn led to the f a l l of the Lebanese 
Government and to a p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s which eventually developed 
into, open confrontation between the Lebanese Army and the 
1 . See above Ch, 5 p. 1 2 1 f n . 1 , 
2 . See above Ch. 5 p« 1 2 ^ f n , 1 , 
3 . See abov6 Ch. 5 p. 1 2 9 f n . 1 and.p. 1 3 7 f n . 3 . 
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P a l e s t i n i a n s . 1 Likewise, the f r o n t s ' actions i n June 1 9 7 0 , 
h o l d i n g as hostages the personnel of the 'amman I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l 
h o t e l , together w i t h t h e i r subsequent h i j a c k i n g s , gave King 
Husain the p r e t e x t f o r the showdown i n September. 2 
F i n a l l y we come t o consider the a d v i s a b i l i t y of openly 
a t t a c k i n g s p e c i f i c regimes and Arab leaders, even though the 
attacks might be j u s t i f i e d . I t i s obvious t h a t such attacks 
w i l l not predispose the regimes to be more t o l e r a n t to the 
P a l e s t i n i a n movement, but i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t the f r o n t s ' 
a t t a c k s , p a r t i c u l a r l y on Nasir, had an adverse e f f e c t on the 
P a l e s t i n i a n movement i t s e l f . Public demonstrations and 
de c l a r a t i o n s against Nasir a f t e r h i s acceptance of the Rogers 
plan 3 not only r e s u l t e d i n the c l o s i n g down of f a c i l i t i e s 
f o r the Pa l e s t i n i a n s i n the UAR but also s p l i t mass support 
f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n movement down the middle. Nasir s t i l l 
had a larg e personal f o l l o w i n g i n the Arab world and among 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s i n p a r t i c u l a r . Al-Fateh had r e a l i s e d t h i s 
from the" s t a r t and although i t attacked, f o r instance the UN 
r e s o l u t i o n and the Rogers plan, i t never personally attacked 
any Arab leader. 
Al-Fateh's p o l i c y of caution and diplomacy was, i t would 
seem, c o r r e c t f o r the formative period of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
movement. I t enabled the movement t o develop r e l a t i v e l y un-
hindered to a p o i n t where i t became a r e a l p o l i t i c a l and 
m i l i t a r y f o r c e i n . the Middle East. However, al-Fateh should 
have been aware t h a t the Arab regimes would not allow the 
process o f development t o continue to a point where i t became 
a t h r e a t t o t h e i r existence. I t should have r e a l i s e d t h a t a 
time would come when the non-intervention p o l i c y would become 
a brake on i t s grov^th. The power of the movement i n Jordan 
was such t h a t King Husain was merely looking f o r the r i g h t 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o s t r i k e . The f r o n t s gave him t h a t opportunity i n 
1 9 7 0 . The f a c t t h a t the Palestinians l o s t the b a t t l e must be 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of al-Fateh as the best organised, best 
equipped and r i c h e s t of the groups. I n the September 1 9 7 0 
1 . See above Ch. 5 p. 1 3 7 f n . 3 « 
2 . See above Ch. 5 p. 1^+6 f n . 
3 . See above Ch. 5 p« l ' + 7 . 
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b a t t l e they were pushed out of 'amman and i n the subsequent 
year they l o s t t h e i r other bases i n the country. I f al-Fateh 
had e i t h e r taken the i n i t i a t i v e i n b r i n g i n g down the regime i n 
Jordan or had a t l e a s t had proper contingency plans f o r the • 
showdown which they must have seen coming, they could have 
taken over the country. 1 Thus the f r o n t s ' charges against 
al-Fateh are i n one.sense c o r r e c t . I t became r i g i d i n i t s 
outlook and d i d not change i t s p o l i c y when the proper time f o r 
such a change came. 
The P a l e s t i n i a n Revolution and Arab Society 
Both the Democratic and Popular Front adopt t r a d i t i o n a l 
Marxist c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n deciding which sections of Arab 
so c i e t y are t o be considered f r i e n d s and which enemies. The 
Democratic Front adopts a r i g i d formula which f o l l o w s the 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y accepted ideas of Marxist class a n a l y s i s . I t 
believes t h a t the p e t t y bourgeoisie has c o n t r o l of both the 
Arab and P a l e s t i n i a n l i b e r a t i o n movements and t h a t because 
of t h i s they are weak and i n e f f e c t i v e : 
"The June defeat put the programme of the p e t t y 
bourgeoisie and i t s leadership to the t e s t .... 
The defeat proved t h e i r f a i l u r e ... to solve 
the dilemmas o f n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n i n an 
under-developed country i n t h i s age ... 
Thus the p e t t y bourgeoisie was confronted 
w i t h two a l t e r n a t i v e s , e i t h e r to adopt the 
Vietnamese-Cuban course o f a c t i o n to face 
the consequences o f the June war or t o r e t r e a t 
continuously before the forces of counter-
r e v o l u t i o n and accept the l i q u i d a t i o n i s t 
UN S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n of 2 2 November. 
The p e t t y bourgeoisie has chosen what best 
serves i t s i n t e r e s t s ... t h a t i s , the 
Sec u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n ... 
The P a l e s t i n i a n l i b e r a t i o n movement i s of 
the same i d e o l o g i c a l class and p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e as t h a t of the Arab n a t i o n a l 
l i b e r a t i o n movement l e d by the p e t t y bour-
g e o i s i e . At the same time i t represents 
one of the weakest groups ... because of 
several s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , 
i n p a r t i c u l a r the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n problem and the large number of 
T o The author was i n Jordan i n the summer of 1 9 6 9 - At t h i s time 
. the Jordanian a u t h o r i t i e s appeared to have t o t a l l y l o s t c o n t r o l 
of the country. The fedayeen were p o l i c i n g not only the 
refugee camps but also 'amman. They were d i r e c t i n g t r a f f i c , 
s e t t i n g up road blocks wherever they wished, carrying arms 
openly i n the main streets, and generally doing whatever they 
wanted w i t h o u t any check on t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s a t a l l . 
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unproductive h\iman beings among the 
dispersed P a l e s t i n i a n people ... 
The p e t t y bourgeoisie, leading the 
Arab l i b e r a t i o n movement, was able t o 
elimi n a t e the forces of feudalism and 
the bourgeoisie from a leading p o s i t i o n 
w i t h i n the n a t i o n a l movement and was 
able t o expose the a l l i a n c e of these 
forces w i t h colonialism and imperialism. 
Yet the P a l e s t i n i a n p e t t y bourgeoisie 
f a i l e d t o remove t h i s incapacitated 
bourgeois class from p l a y i n g a n a t i o n a l 
r o l e . The P a l e s t i n i a n r i g h t , supported 
by the Arab r i g h t , was able to dominate 
the r e s i s t a n c e movement . . . . " 1 
Thus, f o r the Democratic Front, the enemies of the r e v o l u t i o n 
are not only the f e u d a l i s t s and bourgeoisie c l a s s , but also 
the 'petty bourgeoisie', both on the Arab and P a l e s t i n i a n l e v e l . 
The Popular Front also adopts a c l a s s i c a l Marxist class 
a n a l y s i s i n deciding i t s a l l i e s and enemies w i t h i n Arab society. 
However i t i s much more d e f i n i t e : 
"Defining Arab r e a c t i o n as pa r t of the 
enemy's forces i s a matter of paramount 
importance. The absence of t h i s f a c t 
i m p l i e s an unclear v i s i o n of the enemy 
and o f the forces which support i t 
among us," 2 
The Popular Front describes each o f the P a l e s t i n i a n classes 
and assesses i t s value as an a l l y . The core of the r e v o l u t i o n 
i s the workers and peasants: 
"These classes d a i l y s u f f e r from the 
oppressive e x p l o i t a t i o n p r actised by 
world imperialism and i t s a l l i e s i n 
the Arab homeland. Workers and peasants 
are the ones who f i l l the camps of misery 
i n which the great m a j o r i t y of; the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s l i v e . When one t a l k s about 
the camps, t h i s means i n f a c t t a l k i n g 
about a class s t r u c t u r e which represents 
the workers, peasants and d e s t i t u t e 
bourgeois P a l e s t i n i a n s . The P a l e s t i n i a n 
bourgeois class does not l i v e i n the camps." 3 
The f r o n t describes the P a l e s t i n i a n p e t t y bourgeoisie as: 
1 o Kadi ( t r a n s ) , "August Platform", op c i t (Resistance), pp. 
1 6 6 - 7 . 
2 , Popular Front, " P o l i t i c a l Report", Kadi, op c i t (Resistance), 
p. l 8 8 , 
3 , i b i d , pp. 1 9 ^ - 5 . 
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"... craftsmen and manual workers, small 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s such as students, elementary 
and high school teachers, small o f f i c i a l s 
lawyers, small shopkeepers, engineers and 
physicians ... 
Generally, i t could be said t h a t the p e t t y 
bourgeoisie could be an a l l a y of the r e v o l u -
t i o n ... during the stage of democratic 
n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n . But such an a l l i a n c e 
should be on an enlightened basis t o avoid 
i t i n f i l t r a t i n g i n t o p o s i t i o n s of leader-
ship and subjec t i n g the r e v o l u t i o n to 
v a c i l l a t i o n , d e v i a t i o n and stagnation." 1 
F i n a l l y , the P a l e s t i n i a n bourgeoisie: 
"The P a l e s t i n i a n bourgeoisie i s i n r e a l i t y a 
commercial and banking bourgeoisie whose 
i n t e r e s t s are l i n k e d w i t h the ... i n t e r e s t s 
of imperialism .... The P a l e s t i n i a n bour-
geoisie which i s ' l i v i n g ... under Z i o n i s t 
occupation - even i f i t has not o v e r t l y 
. j o i n e d I s r a e l - i s not a fo r c e of the 
r e v o l u t i o n . I t w i l l o b j e c t i v e l y remain 
the class through which the enemy w i l l 
t r y t o abort the r e v o l u t i o n .... 
As f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n bourgeoisie now 
l i v i n g outside P a l e s t i n e , i t s i n t e r e s t s , 
a t the moment, are not c o n t r a d i c t o r y to 
g u e r i l l a a c t i o n as long as i t remains 
w i t h i n a l i m i t e d ... f i e l d of v i s i o n . 
Thus occas i o n a l l y ( t h i s class) supports 
g u e r i l l a a c t i o n w i t h p a r t of i t s surplus 
wealth. But the r e v o l u t i o n a r y development 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement ... 
w i l l make the bourgeoisie adopt an 
a t t i t u d e which w i l l ... conform to i t s 
class i n t e r e s t s . " 2 
For the Popular Front then, the forces of r e v o l u t i o n are the 
workers and peasants and sections of the p e t t y bourgeoisie. 
The m a j o r i t y of the p e t t y bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie i t s e l f , 
however, are not considered r e l i a b l e a l l i e s . 
I n c o ntrast t o both f r o n t s ' approaches, al-Fateh does not 
use a Marxist class framework i n deciding i t s a l l i e s . I t adopts 
a pragmatic a t t i t u d e : 
1 . i b i d , pp. 1 9 5 - 9 . 
2 . i b i d , pp. 1 9 9 - 2 0 2 . 
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"The enemies of the r e v o l u t i o n are numerous 
but we have t o know the main enemy, i s o l a t e 
and destroy i t . Then the r e v o l u t i o n w i l l 
, choose a second enemy to concentrate on 
and confront .... The f r i e n d s of the r e v o l -
u t i o n vary. There are temporary f r i e n d s 
who may become enemies i n the f u t u r e . 
There are other long-term f r i e n d s who may 
lag behind the r e v o l u t i o n i n i t s development. 
There are also permanent f r i e n d s who w i l l be 
. able to support the r e v o l u t i o n under a l l 
circumstances." 1 
I t recognises the weakness i n the f r o n t s ' approach: 
"There are classesj or sections of classes 
now which were unrecognised i n the days of 
K a r l Marx. Did Marx study a class c a l l e d 
the displaced persons class which has 
appeared among the Palestinians? The d i s -
placed person i s a labourer who used to 
work as such i n h i s country, but now he no 
longer works as a labourer. The displaced 
person i s a farmer no longer engaged i n 
farming. IIow do we evaluate t h i s ? There 
i s thus a displaced persons class which 
imposes i t s presence and cannot be defined 
according to t r a d i t i o n a l standards, 
although i t s circumstances and o r i g i n may 
be of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y character." 2 
Because of i t s r e f u s a l t o approach the problem on the bases 
of classes, al-Fateh i s severely c r i t i c i s e d by the f r o n t s . How-
ever, we must f i r s t see whether a class analysis i n the 
t r a d i t i o n a l Marxist manner i s v a l i d f o r the s i t u a t i o n of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s before we can decide whether the c r i t i c i s m i s 
v a l i d or no t . 
Nineteenth century Marxist analyses were based upon European 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d s o c i e t y . The categories used, although valuable 
and basic, were not meant t o be applied automatically t o other 
s o c i e t i e s i n d i f f e r e n t circumstances. Lenin himself r e a l i s e d 
t h i s : 
1 . Al-Fateh, " P o l i t i c a l Struggle", Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance), 
pp. 1 1 1 - 2 . 
2 . Al^Fateh, OP c i t (Dialogue). pp. 5 3 ^ ^ « 
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"Relying on the general theory and p r a c t i c e 
of communism, you must adapt yourselves t o 
s p e c i f i c c o nditions such as do not e x i s t 
i n the European coun t r i e s . You must be 
able to apply theory and p r a c t i c e to con-
d i t i o n s i n which the bulk of the population 
are peasants and i n which the task i s to 
wage a s t r u g g l e against medieval s u r v i v a l s 
and not against c a p i t a l i s m .... You w i l l 
have t o base yourselves on the bourgeois 
n a t i o n a l i s m which i s awakening and must 
awaken among these people and which has 
• i t s h i s t o r i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . " 1 
Both the f r o n t s took over the categories used i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
Marxist class analysis without considering t h e i r aptness t o the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s i t u a t i o n . The categories working class, peassintry, 
bourgeoisie etc. when used i n t r u e Marxist analysis are economic 
terms based on the m a t e r i a l conditions and occupations of the 
members of the class concerned. I t i s therefore not possible t o 
describe the refugee camps as being f i l l e d w i t h workers and 
peasants, e s p e c i a l l y since many of the refugees were born i n the 
camps and have never known any other way of l i f e . Even the 
older i n h a b i t a n t s o f the refugee camps have, f o r the most p a r t , 
not worked f o r more than 2 0 years. They represent a new 
phenomenoa which cannot be f i t t e d i n t o the old class categories. 
The P a l e s t i n i a n p e t t y bourgeoisie r e f e r r e d t o by the f r o n t s 
does not e x i s t i n the t r u e Marxist sense e i t h e r . The Palestinians 
can only form p a r t of the p e t t y bourgeoisie i n the countries 
where they are r e s i d e n t . They are not a separate class. The 
same would apply t o P a l e s t i n i a n c a p i t a l i s t s since there i s no 
s t a t e of P a l e s t i n e j no separate recognisable p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y , 
i n which they can own the c a p i t a l , . 
None of the groups has undertaken a thorough analysis of 
P a l e s t i n i a n s o c i e t y . The best attempt at a class analysis i s 
contained i n a book by an Arab Marxist, Munir Shafiq. i He gives 
some general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which he believes could be used as 
a basis f o r a proper study i n the f u t u r e . 2 
1 . V . I o Lenin, "Address t o the Second All-Russia Congress of 
Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East", ( 2 
November 1 9 1 9 ) Selected Works, pp. 5 1 ^ - 5 . 
2 . Munir Shafiq, Hax^rl at-Taaaad wal Mumarasah f i ath-Tha\jrah 
a l - F a l a s t i n i y y a h . 
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The f i r s t 'class described by Shafiq are the Palestinians 
expelled i n 1 9 ^ + 8 , whatever t h e i r class before t h a t time, who 
became the i n h a b i t a n t s o f the refugee camps. These P a l e s t i n i a n s , 
"... a f t e r the loss of an economic base ... 
formed a new cla s s , i f one can use t h a t term 
i n speaking of a group outside the forces 
and r e l a t i o n s o f production and outside the 
existence o f e i t h e r s t a t e or society. I t i s 
perhaps more accurate t o describe them as 
crushed refugee masses, since they own 
nothi n g , do not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the pro-
d u c t i v e process and l i v e under regimes as 
fo r e i g n e r s . " 1 
Shafiq then discusses the second category, the group of 
P a l e s t i n i a n c a p i t a l i s t s who have grown up since the 1 9 ^ 8 defeat: 
"They do not. comprise a P a l e s t i n i a n class i n 
the s c i e n t i f i c sense since they lack u n i t y . 
They do not work i n one land under one s o c i a l , 
p o l i t i c a l and economic regime .... 
These c a p i t a l i s t s of P a l e s t i n i a n o r i g i n are 
e x p l o i t i n g Arab workers not P a l e s t i n i a n s . 
This makes the form of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w i t h i n 
the P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n of a very sp e c i a l 
type needing deep study .... I t i s a new 
phenomenon." 2 
Turning t o the P a l e s t i n i a n workers, Shafiq points out t h a t , 
"The P a l e s t i n i a n workers, although they are 
a small p a r t of the population as a whole, 
are dispersed i n many countries from Jordan 
t o the o i l states to West Germany .... They 
do not l i v e i n one land and face one c a p i t a l i s t 
c l a ss. They do not enjoy the simplest c i v i l 
r i g h t s . They work by v i r t u e of permits and 
the host country can expel them without 
reason .... The P a l e s t i n i a n workers cannot 
organise trade unions t o defend t h e i r r i g h t s 
or s t r u g g l e f o r t h e i r d a i l y economic 
i n t e r e s t s o . . because they do not work as 
one u n i t y .... The General Union of P a l e s t i n i a n 
Workers, organised a f t e r the establishment of 
the PLO does not struggle as a trade union. 
I t i s more l i k e the mass women's or youth 
organisations." 3 
The same analysis i s applied t o the P a l e s t i n i a n p e t t y bour-
g e o i s i e . They are also l i n k e d t o the economic system of the 
host country. F i n a l l y , Shafiq considers the peasantry. 
1 o i b i d ^ pp. 6 7 - 9 , ( t r a n s l a t i o n by a u t h o r ) . 
2, i b i d , pp. 6 9 - 7 1 . 
S o i b i d , pp. 7 2 - ^ , 
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"The P a l e s t i n i a n peasantry i s much smaller 
than i n any other Asian or Arab country. 
The v i l l a g e s remaining t o the Palestinians 
are e i t h e r i n the West Bank, Gaza or the 
occupied t e r r i t o r y o f Palestine ( I s r a e l ) . 
The v i l l a g e s were deserted by the young 
elements a f t e r 1 9 ^ 8 because of the poverty, 
the occupying power's p o l i c y of t e r r o r i s m 
and work o p p o r t u n i t i e s elsewhere." 1 
None of the groups attempts a proper analysis of P a l e s t i n i a n 
s o c i e t y l i k e Shafiq's. While the f r o n t s t r y to impose i n v a l i d 
a n a l y t i c a l frameworks on the s i t u a t i o n , al-Fateh remains s i l e n t . 
As an o r g a n i s a t i o n i t never attempts class analysis. Shafiq i s 
a supporter of al-Fateh. and a strong c r i t i c of the f r o n t s , 
although he i s a Marxist. 2 His ideas may^therefore be taken 
as r e f l e c t i n g the thought of a t l e a s t some sections of the 
movement." However, i t should be. emphasised t h a t al-Fateh's 
f a i l u r e to undertake class sinalysis i s not mere oversight but 
a c a l c u l a t e d p o l i c y . 3 I n t h i s way, the movement avoids 
a l i e n a t i n g important and r i c h sections of the community from 
which i t seeks support, t h a t i s to say, the e n t i r e P a l e s t i n i a n 
p o p u l a t i o n . 
Since we have defined an ideology as something which seeks 
t o e x p l a i n the s i t u a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r group we can say t h a t 
a l l the groups' ideologies f a i l t o some extent i n t h i s respect. 
None of them have attempted r e a l l y t o understand or analyse 
the fragmented P a l e s t i n i a n society of which they are p a r t . 
The f r o n t s merely o f f e r s t i l t e d explanations bearing no r e l a t i o n 
t o r e a l i t y and based on a s u p e r f i c i a l and to some extent f a u l t y 
understanding of Marxism. Al-Fateh on the other hand although 
i t recognises t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l Marxist class analyses are not 
v a l i d f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n s i t u a t i o n , does not attempt an analysis 
of i t s own. f o r f e a r of a l i e n a t i n g c e r t a i n sections of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n population. 
1 . i b i d , p. 7 6 , 
2 . Based on author's i n t e r v i e w s . 
3 o i b i d . 
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P a l e s t i n i a n Organisation 
A l l the P a l e s t i n i a n groups agree t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n 
r e v o l u t i o n i s passing through a democratic n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n 
stage. I t i s not a s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . Perhaps the best 
examples of such r e v o l u t i o n s are the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n during 
i t s phase o f s t r u g g l e against the Japanese and the Vietnamese 
s t r u g g l e against f i r s t the French and then the Americans. 
A l l the groups and i n p a r t i c u l a r the f r o n t s , c i t e these examples 
f r e q u e n t l y i n t h e i r w r i t i n g s . 
A l l the groups agree t h a t the ^creation of a n a t i o n a l f r o n t 
embracing most sections of P a l e s t i n i a n society i s necessary. 
The Democratic Front sees i t as an umbrella grouping d i f f e r e n t 
class organisations: 
" I t i s n a t u r a l t h a t each of the people's 
classes should b u i l d . f o r i t s e l f a p o l i t i c a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n which defines i t s programme 
and i n t e r e s t s . . . o Although we are conscious 
of t h i s f a c t , we f i n d i t of fundamental 
importance t o c a l l f o r the u n i t y of a l l 
n a t i o n a l groups ... because n a t i o n a l 
l i b e r a t i o n achieves t h e i r aims and does 
not c o n t r a d i c t them a t t h i s stage." 1 
However, i t i s also necessary: 
"... t o openly c r i t i c i s e the Arab n a t i o n a l 
l i b e r a t i o n movement i n a l l i t s regimes 
and organisations besides c u t t i n g a l l 
a l l i a n c e s t h a t have a f e u d a l i s t , b i g -
bourgeoisie, r i g h t i s t class nature and 
d e c l a r i n g an end to these a l l i a n c e s 
openly and c l e a r l y , " 2 
The Popular Front adopts a s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e : 
"We should work f o r the m o b i l i s a t i o n of 
workers and peasants i n one r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n w i t h the ideology 
of s c i e n t i f i c socialism .... The p e t t y 
bourgeoisie w i l l not j o i n such an organ-
i s a t i o n .... Thus i t w i l l j o i n those 
P a l e s t i n i a n organisations which r a i s e 
general l i b e r a l slogans, avoid c l a r i t y 
of thought and analysis of class s t r u c t u r e 
.... I n other words the p e t t y bourgeoisie 
w i l l f i l l ... the ranks of al-Fateh and 
the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation. 
1. Democratic Front, op c i t (Harakah al-Maaawamah). p. 12^. 
2 . Democratic Front, Hawla Azmah Harakah al-Maoawamah a l -
F a l a s t i h i v v a h . p. 1 ^ 9 . ( T r a n s l a t i o n by author). 
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We should work f o r the establishment of 
a n a t i o n a l f r o n t w i t h al-Fateh and the PLO 
which can o f f e r the war of l i b e r a t i o n the 
necessary class a l l i a n c e and p r o t e c t the 
r i g h t of each class t o view the war and 
plan f o r i t i n accordance w i t h i t s class 
v i s i o n on the other." 1 
I n c o n t r a s t the approach of al-Fateh i s again pragmatic and 
f l e x i b l e : 
"Every n a t i o n which i s passing through the 
phase of n a t i o n a l struggle needs to f i n d a 
common formula t o u n i f y i t s e f f o r t s . Thus 
the c r e a t i o n of a n a t i o n a l f r o n t i s a funda-
mental determining f a c t o r i n preparing the 
basic conditions f o r the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the 
r e v o l u t i o n and i t s v i c t o r y . The fragmenta-
t i o n of our s o c i e t y and the dispersion of 
our people has c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e i r weakness 
v i s - a - v i s t h e i r enemies. There are many 
forces and groups who are l o y a l to our 
n a t i o n , but because of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s 
and s o c i a l s t a t u s , cannot j o i n the r e v o l u -
t i o n a r y organisations. There are other forces 
and groups who can, a t one stage, p a r t i c i p a t e , 
* i n one form or another alongside the r e v o l u t i o n . 
Thus the r e v o l u t i o n i n i t s d i f f e r e n t phases 
should e s t a b l i s h a n a t i o n a l f r o n t which w i l l 
f u l f i l l the aims of each stage .... I n the 
f i r s t stage the n a t i o n a l f r o n t can include 
a l l popular groupings, but i n i t s more 
developed stages the f r o n t becomes clearer 
and more r e v o l u t i o n a r y so t h a t i t expresses 
the aims of the r e v o l u t i o n . A large number 
of the a l l i e s o f yesterday become the 
enemies of today, many of the a l l i e s today 
w i l l become the enemies of tomorrow." 2 
Al-Fateh's conception of a f r o n t i s a dynamic one, taking i n t o 
account the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n of the Palestinians and the 
changes which w i l l occur as the r e v o l u t i o n develops. The move-
ment I s never s p e c i f i c i n r e f e r r i n g t o i t s enemies or a l l i e s . 
I t does not define them once and f o r a l l l i k e the f r o n t s . 
The f r o n t s do admit the need f o r an a l l i a n c e w i t h the 'bour-
g e o i s i e ' and 'petty bourgeoisie', but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see 
how such an a l l i a n c e can succeed f o r even a short time when 
they have made i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t these groups w i l l u l t i m a t e l y 
1 o Popular Front, " P o l i t i c a l Report", Kadi, op c i t (Resistance)^ 
p. 2 0 5 . 
2 , Al"?Fateh, " P o l i t i c a l Struggle", i n Kadi, OP c i t (Resistance), 
pp. 1 1 1 - 2 . 
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be t h e i r b i t t e r enemies. To be more precise, the f r o n t s have 
not learned the a r t of diplomacy. Even i f , they intend to f i g h t 
these sections o f P a l e s t i n i a n s o c i e t y i n the f u t u r e i t i s not 
t o t h e i r advantage to say so while they s t i l l need to form an 
a l l i a n c e w i t h them. The f r o n t s ' Marxist ideology may i n d i c a t e 
t h a t these sections are p o t e n t i a l t r a i t o r s t o the r e v o l u t i o n 
but there i s no need to broadcast t h i s and thus make these 
sections withdraw t h e i r support i n the e a r l y stages. An 
Ideology i s e s s e n t i a l l y a guide t o a c t i o n . I t should not be 
employed t o make the r e a l i s a t i o n o f c e r t a i n aims more d i f f i c u l t , 
i n t h i s case the formation of a wide n a t i o n a l f r o n t . 
The leaders of the Chinese and Vietnamese r e v o l u t i o n s , so 
revered by the P a l e s t i n i a n groups, d i d not make such mistakes. 
To quote Mao-Tse Tung: 
" I t i s an accepted p r i n c i p l e t h a t i n the 
anti-Japanese war everything must be sub-
ordinated t o the armed resistance. There-
f o r e the i n t e r e s t s o f the class struggle 
must not c o n f l i c t w i t h , but must be sub-
ordinated t o , the war of resistance." 1 
More e x p l i c i t l y : 
•. "To r e j e c t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the bour-
geoisie i n the r e v o l u t i o n on the, grounds 
t h a t i t can only be temporary and to 
describe the a l l i a n c e w i t h anti-Japanese 
sections of the bourgeoisie ( i n a semi-
c o l o n i a l country) as c a p i t u l a t i o n i s ... 
an approach w i t h which we cannot agree." 2 
I f we look a t the Vietnamese r e v o l u t i o n , we f i n d t h a t the 
VietMinh when f i g h t i n g the French d i d not c a l l only on the 
workers and peasants t o j o i n the struggle or even imply t h a t 
there were sections of the community which would not be welcome 
i n the n a t i o n a l f r o n t . The Vietnamese communist party pro-
posed t h a t : 
"Within the country.the e n t i r e people must 
be u n i t e d . The n a t i o n a l f r o n t against French 
aggression must be consolidated arid developed 
day by day. To wage a long resistance war 
the e n t i r e people must be u n i t e d and s i n g l e -
minded." 3 
1 . Mao-Tse-Tung, 'The r o l e of the Chinese Communist Party i n 
the N a t i o n a l War' (October 1 9 3 8 ) Selected Works Vol. I l l , p. 3 2 . 
2 . Mao-Tse-Tung, 'Win the Masses i n t h e i r M i l l i o n s f o r the A n t i -
Japanese N a t i o n a l United F r o n t ' j Selected Works Vol. I . 
pp. 2 9 0 - 1 . 
3 . Truong Chinh, The Resistance W i l l Win, p. k2. 
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The communist-led N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Front i n south Vietnam 
has adopted a s i m i l a r p r i n c i p l e i n f i g h t i n g the Americans. I t s 
f i v e - p o i n t programme adopted i n March 1 9 6 5 contains the aim: 
"To u n i t e the e n t i r e people, arm the e n t i r e 
people, continue to march forward h e r o i c a l l y 
and be resolved to f i g h t and defeat the US 
aggressors and Vietnamese t r a i t o r s . " 1 
The NLF i t s e l f i s comprised of many d i f f e r e n t organisations 
from a l l s o c i a l and economic l e v e l s . Among some 1 5 mass 
or g a n i s a t i o n s , l i k e students' and womens' unions there i s one 
c a l l e d , 'The Group of Traders and I n d u s t r i a l i s t s Opposing the 
US-rDiem D i c t a t o r s h i p . ' I n a d d i t i o n there are three p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s i n c l u d i n g the 'Democratic Party', f o u r r e l i g i o u s 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , two movements representing n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s 
and the l i b e r a t i o n armed f o r c e s . 2 
A l l these examples would seem t o i l l u s t r a t e t h a t any pa r t y 
which s e r i o u s l y sets about pursuing a n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n war, 
cannot a f f o r d t o discount the middle classes of the society 
merely because they are considered on the basis of theory t o 
be u n r e l i a b l e or v a c i l l a t i n g . Of the P a l e s t i n i a n groups only 
al-Fateh seems aware of t h i s and as a r e s u l t i t i s c r i t i c i s e d 
by the f r o n t s and described as a petty-bourgeois organisation. 
I t i s l a b e l l e d a l i b e r a l o r g a n i s a t i o n because of the moderation 
of i t s slogans. 
I f we look a t i t s achievements i n p r a c t i c e , i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o see al-Fateh as a petty-bourgeois or middle class organjsatipn; 
I n the f i r s t place, these terms cannot be applied to the refugees 
i n the camps, and t h a t i s where al-Fateh i s most popular, rather 
than i n the c i t i e s and tov/ns or among i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 3 Al-Fateh 
alone provided f o r the refugees a r e l a t i v e l y extensive network 
of s o c i a l services i n the educational, medical and f i n a n c i a l 
f i e l d s . I t began the armed struggle and b u i l t up the movement 
from nothing. 
1 . 'Fundamental Problems', Vietnamese Studies No. 1 2 ^ p. 1 6 8 . 
2 . i b i d , pp. 1 6 8 - 9 . 
3 . Based on observations of author i n Jordan i n 1 9 6 9 . 
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The slogans which the f r o n t s object to so s t r o n g l y and l a b e l 
' l i b e r a l ' are perhaps one of the secrets of al-Fateh's i n i t i a l 
success. The simple moderate slogans had meaning f o r the 
ord i n a r y P a l e s t i n i a n s i n the camps. Far more than any other 
group, al-Fateh could communicate w i t h the refugees because 
i t d i d not adopt terminology which was meaningless and confusing 
t o the poor and uneducated refugees. 
On the question o f organisation then al-Fateh was a t l e a s t 
i n the beginning more successful than the f r o n t s . I t managed 
to m obilise the m a j o r i t y of Palestinians i n support of the 
armed str u g g l e and adopted an approach which could be understood 
by the i n h a b i t a n t s of the camps. I t gave them what they wanted -
a f u t u r e t o believe i n , and i n more concrete terms, skeleton 
s o c i a l services. 
We have now considered the f r o n t s and al-Fateh from three 
angles, t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards the Arab regimes, towards Arab 
s o c i e t y and towards o r g a n i s a t i o n . On the f i r s t p o i n t we have 
seen t h a t w h i l e al-Fateh's a t t i t u d e made possible the emergence 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n movement i n the face of Arab h o s t i l i t y , i t s 
f a i l u r e t o change a t the proper time caused the defeat of the 
resistance i n Jordan i n 1 9 7 0 . On the second p o i n t , we have 
shown t h a t while the f r o n t s attempted t o impose an a n a l y t i c a l 
framework on Arab s o c i e t y which was not appropriate, al-Fateh 
d i d nothing a t a l l and f a i l e d t o undertake any analysis what-
soever. F i n a l l y on the question of organisation we have seen 
t h a t the f r o n t s were so determined t o spread t h e i r Marxist 
ideology t h a t they d i d not approach'the formation of a n a t i o n a l 
f r o n t w i t h proper caution. Al-Fateh, on the other hand t r i e d 
t o keep support on as wide a basis as possible, and because of 
t h i s found i t much.easier t o grow. I t made a po i n t of not 
a l i e n a t i n g any s p e c i f i c groups. I t i s , of course, possible t o 
argue t h a t al-Fateh c a r r i e d t h i s p o l i c y too f a r and allowed 
c e r t a i n u n r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements to gain p o s i t i o n s of power 
w i t h i n the movement, and t h a t t h i s was one of the reasons why 
al-iFateh was slow t o move i n the c r i s i s of September 1 9 7 0 i n 
Jordan. Whether or not t h i s i s t r u e , bad organisation was 
c e r t a i n l y one of the f a c t o r s which l e d to the defeat of the 
r e s i s t a n c e , bad orga n i s a t i o n i n the sense of lack of communication 
and preparations..' Although al-Fateh gave the Palestinians an 
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i d e n t i t y and" set up p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n 
f o r them, i t f a i l e d t o develop proper p r o t e c t i o n f o r these 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which crumbled before the onslaught of the 
Jordanian Army. As the l a r g e s t and most powerful of the groups, 
al-Fateh must take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the f a i l u r e . 
N a j i ' a l l u s h points out i n h i s analysis of the September 
events t h a t two such c o n t r a d i c t o r y forces as the P a l e s t i n i a n 
r e s i s t a n c e and the Jordanian Government could not co-exist i n 
the same country i n d e f i n i t e l y . 1 Al-Fateh as the most powerful 
o f the groups should have made preparations f o r the confronta-
t i o n which was bound t o come. 
' a l l u s h says t h a t the f a c t t h a t 'amman defied the Jordanian 
Army at. a l l was not because i t was expecting an attack but simply 
because the masses decided t o f i g h t . 2 Munir Shafiq, i n another 
a r t i c l e on the September events i n s i s t s t h a t i f the necessary 
preparations had been made, the resistance could have won. 3 
However, in s t e a d of dealing w i t h d u l l p r a c t i c a l i t i e s , the groups 
had been absorbed i n t h e o r e t i c a l disputes:. 
"The P a l e s t i n i a n resistance became the arena 
f o r ... t h e o r e t i c a l p o l i t i c a l disputes and 
f o r a war of slogans .... Those who spoke 
about " r e v o l u t i o n a r y theory" never bothered 
to discuss the problem of shelters f o r the 
masses or o f ensuring t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the event of an armed clash .... Such 
issues were considered t r i f l e s compared w i t h 
discussions on ... the laws of class struggle 
i n h i s t o r y , the problem of non-intervention 
i n Arab a f f a i r s etc ..." k 
I t would seem then t h a t the ideologies of the various P a l e s t i n -
i a n groups were u l t i m a t e l y t h e i r d ownfall. Because of f a i l u r e 
t o agree on a s i n g l e approach to the problem of l i b e r a t i n g 
P a l e s t i n e , the energy of the resistance was div e r t e d from the 
r e a l l y important matters i n hand. The f r o n t s , which were i n s t r u -
mental i n b r i n g i n g about the September c i v i l war, had not made 
any preparations to face the c r i s i s they sought to provoke. 
1 . N a j i ' a l l u s h , "Ma'araka A y l u l wal Haqa'iq a l a t i ak-Kadaha", 
Dirasat 'arabivvah No. 1 1 . September 1 9 7 1 , pp. 2 - 6 and 1 1 + 8 - 1 5 2 . 
2 . i b i d . 
3 . Munir Shafiq, "Ma'araqah A y l u l 'askariyyan", Al-Maaawamah 
a l - F a l a s t i n i v v a h al°Waai'a wa Tawaao'at (Dirasat Arabiyyah -
s p e c i a l issue J u l y 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 1 5 9 - 6 7 . 
h. i b i d , pp. 1 6 3 - ^ . 
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Al-Fateh, on the other hand, although i t d i d not seek a c r i s i s 
should have made contingency plans, since i t was obvious i t 
would happen sooner or l a t e r . 
P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m gave the Palestinians an i d e n t i t y 
and an aim - the l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r country. As developed by 
al-Fateh, however, the ideology d i d not properly analyse the 
s i t u a t i o n or see the dangers f a c i n g the r e v o l u t i o n . The other 
groups pointed t o al-Fateh's f a i l i n g s but could o f f e r no r e a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e . They simply applied o l d and i n v a l i d t heories t o 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s i t u a t i o n which were equally unable to provide 
a guide t o a c t i o n . 
. From t h i s , we can say t h a t an ideology, as w e l l as d e f i n i n g the 
group at which i t i s d i r e c t e d , should accurately analyse the 
s i t u a t i o n of t h a t group. I t should give t h a t group something t o 
work f o r and should work out the most e f f i c i e n t means of achiev-
ing, i t s aims. Since w i t h i n the P a l e s t i n i a n resistance movement, 
ther e were several d i f f e r e n t methods put forward f o r achieving 
l i b e r a t i o n , i t i s no wonder t h a t the movement f a i l e d . Al-Fateh 
d i d much t o achieve formal and p r a c t i c a l u n i t y , but d i d very 
l i t t l e on the i d e o l o g i c a l l e v e l . A l l the groups were too 
i n t e r e s t e d i n maintaining t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l p u r i t y to admit 
a t any p o i n t t h a t they might be wrong. Action e s s e n t i a l l y 
f o l l o w s thought, t h e r e f o r e attempts a t u n i t y were bound to f a i l 
w h i le several d i f f e r e n t and o f t e n a n t a g o n i s t i c ideologies 
f l o u r i s h e d . 
None of the groups accurat e l y analysed the s i t u a t i o n of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s , and although al-Fateh d i d not make a wrong analysis 
l i k e the f r o n t s , i t o f f e r e d no a l t e r n a t i v e . I t s pragmatic 
approach was immensely successful a t the beginning but f a i l e d 
when the movement became a r e a l p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y f o r c e 
i n the area. At t h i s p o i n t a true'and accurate understanding 
o f the conditions was e s s e n t i a l . None o f the groups had t h i s 
understanding. 
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P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism t h e r e f o r e q u a l i f i e d as an ideology up 
to a p o i n t . I t provided the basis f o r the establishment of a 
powerful p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y force which threatened the 
e x i s t i n g regimes i n the area. I t . u n i f i e d a n a t i o n a l group, t o 
a c e r t a i n extent, but not enough. To be f a i r , i t faced over-
whelming d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h a t the group i t sought t o u n i f y was 
scat t e r e d i n ' many d i f f e r e n t countries and was l i v i n g under 
d i f f e r e n t sets of co n d i t i o n s . Because of t h i s the ideology was 
requ i r e d t o be e s p e c i a l l y d e t a i l e d i n i t s explanation of the 
group's s i t u a t i o n . 
The aim and n a t i o n a l awareness 'that P a l e s t i n i a n nationalism 
gave to.the. P a l e s t i n i a n s w i l l not be so easy to destroy as the 
movement b u i l t around them. For t h i s reason, what i s l e f t of 
the resistance may l e a r n from i t s past e r r o r s and r e b u i l d i t s e l f 
along d i f f e r e n t l i n e s . - I t remains to be seen, however, whether 
the deep d i v i s i o n s i n P a l e s t i n i a n society can be properly 
understood and overcome. I f they ckn a strong resistance move-
ment w i l l r e s u l t , otherwise d i s u n i t y and f a c t i o n a l i s m w i l l 
again b r i n g defeat. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have now described the development of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
r e s i s t a n c e and discussed various aspects of i t s ideology. We 
have seen t h a t i t was al-Fateh which developed the concept of 
P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m and b u i l t up a movement on t h i s concept 
dedicated t o the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine by armed st r u g g l e . 
Other movements l i k e as-Saiqah and the f r o n t s took t h i s new 
n a t i o n a l i s m and t r i e d t o impose pre-conceived a n a l y t i c a l frame-
Works oh i t , B a ' t h i s t i n the case of as-Saiqah and Marxist i n 
the case of the f r o n t s . 
While al-Fateh's theory was drawn from the a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n 
i n which the P a l e s t i n i a n s found themselves and i n t h i s sense 
was a t r u e ideology, t h a t of the f r o n t s was i n many cases a 
s t r a i t - j a c k e t which prevented a r e a l understanding of the 
s i t u a t i o n . Because of t h i s the f r o n t s cannot claim t o have an 
ideology i n the sense of o f f e r i n g an explanation to the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s f o r the conditions i n which they were l i v i n g . The 
terms peasant, worker and bourgeoisie have l i t t l e meaning to 
the i n h a b i t a n t s of refugee camps. The f r o n t s ' s u p e r f i c i a l 
reading of Marxism and adoption of i t s terminology prevented 
them from j o i n i n g or co-operating w i t h al-Fateh's e f f o r t s t o 
achieve n a t i o n a l u n i t y . They were t h e r e f o r e a source of con-
t i n u a l weakness.to the resistance movement. 
On the other hand, we have also defined an ideology as o f f e r -
i n g both short and long term aims. Al-Fateh's ideology stops 
short at the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine and the c r e a t i o n of a 
democratic s t a t e there. Both the f r o n t s and as-Saiqah i n s i s t 
t h a t the s t a t e created must b e . s o c i a l i s t , and i t could therefore 
be argued t h a t they are more f a r - s i g h t e d . I f al-Fateh's 
reluctance t o discuss i n any d e t a i l the form of the f u t u r e 
P a l e s t i n i a n state i s c a l c u l a t e d p o l i c y designed not t o a l i e n a t e 
c e r t a i n sections of P a l e s t i n i a n society i t i s not short-sighted 
but merely wise and f o l l o w i n g w e l l known precedents. The South 
Vietnamese NLF o f f i c i a l l y aims f o r , 
• b . . an independent, democratic, peaceful and 
n e u t r a l South Vietnam w i t h a view to r e i i n i f i -
c a t i o n ...' 1 
1. 'Fundamental Problems', Vietnamese Studies No. 12. p. 168. 
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b u t j since i t i s l e d by a w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d communist p a r t y i t i s 
c e r t a i n t h a t i n r e a l i t y i t s u l t i m a t e aim i s socialism. S i m i l a r l y , 
Mao-Tse Tung agreed t o work f o r the l i b e r a l aims of Sun Yat Sen 
i n the e a r l y stages of h i s s t r u g g l e ; These were Nationalism, 
Democracy and People's L i v e l i h o o d . There was no mention of 
s o c i a l i s m , although again since he was leader of a communist party 
h i s u l t i m a t e aims were obviously not those of Sun Yat Sen. 
The question i s whether al-Fateh i s remaining s i l e n t on the 
subject of the f u t u r e of Palestine f o r reasons of p o l i c y or 
because i t has no programme f o r the f u t u r e . I t seems l i k e l y 
t h a t the l a t t e r i s the case. I t s leadership i s made up of 
very diverse elements, Abu lyad (Salah Khalaf) i s l e f t - w i n g , 
Abu Sayid ( K h a l i d Hasan) i s r i g h t wing and Yasir Arafat (Abu 
Ammar) performs a d e l i c a t e balancing act between the two. 1 
There are many other f a c t i o n s i n s i d e the movement which are not 
represented i n the leadership. Thus although al-Fateh's ideology 
and actions can be i n t e r p r e t e d as the r e s u l t of caution and 
diplomacy, they might also be the r e s u l t of a desire not t o 
b r i n g f a c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the movement out i n t o the 
open. This would account f o r al-Fateh's i n a b i l i t y t o change 
i t s p o l i c y and overthrow the Jordanian regime when i t had the 
power. I t would also account f o r i t s apparent i n a b i l i t y to 
move q u i c k l y during the September 1970 c r i s i s . I t may have 
been paralysed by disparate elements i n the leadership p u l l i n g 
i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . Al-Fateh's r e f u s a l to carry out any 
s o r t of analysis of P a l e s t i n i a n s o c i e t y could be the r e s u l t of 
the same k i n d of p a r a l y s i s . 
Whatever the t r u e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the defeat of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n s i n Jordan, i t i s c e r t a i n t h a t al-Fateh d i d proceed 
w i t h great wisdom i n i t s e a r l y days. However, the problems 
i t had t o face were tremendous. The population i t sought to 
lead : waC; scattered i n several d i f f e r e n t countries and had 
been subjected to d i f f e r e n t influences f o r more than twenty 
years. The Palestinians before l^kQ were not p a r t i c u l a r l y 
n otable f o r t h e i r u n i t y and o l d r i v a l r i e s were passed down i n 
a d i l u t e d form to the next generation. 
1. Based on author's i n t e r v i e w s . 
17^ 
When al-Fateh was a small persecuted group i t acted w i t h the 
c a u t i o n necessary t o i t s s u r v i v a l , however, as i t became bigger 
and more powerful the weakness of P a l e s t i n i a n society i n general 
came t o be r e f l e c t e d I n s i d e the movement. The f r o n t s suffered 
the same problems of d i s u n i t y and d i d not cover them so w e l l , 
openly s p l i t t i n g several times. None of the groups managed to 
develop the type of o r g a n i s a t i o n r e a l l y needed f o r underground 
l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e . Although i n the examples of r e v o l u t i o n s 
we have c i t e d , China and Vietnam, the o v e r a l l organisation has 
been a f r o n t i n c l u d i n g a l l sections of the community, i n both 
cases the f r o n t was l e d by a w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d and h i g h l y 
organised communist p a r t y guided by c e r t a i n basic and unanimously 
accepted p r i n c i p l e s . This cannot be said of any of the groups. 
Al-Fateh's leaders proceed according to what seems wise at any 
p a r t i c u l a r time and the f r o n t s disagree b i t t e r l y over t h e i r 
r e spective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Marxism. 
P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m s u f f e r s from the same disorder i t 
d i d i n the 1930s - d i s u n i t y and lack of d i s c i p l i n e . I t remains 
t o be seen whether the shock of September 1970 w i l l r e s u l t i n 
a new form of organisation which can properly e x p l o i t the new 
f e e l i n g of P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y f o s t e r e d by al-Fateh. 
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Appendix I 
The D r a f t P a l e s t i n i a n National Charter 196^ 
1. P a l e s t i n e i s an Arab homeland t i e d by Arab nationalism t o 
the Arab countries which together form the great Arab 
homeland. 
2. P a l e s t i n e , w i t h i n the boundaries i t had during the B r i t i s h 
Mandate i s an i n d i v i s i b l e t e r r i t o r i a l u n i t . 
3 . The P a l e s t i n i a n Arab people have a l e g a l r i g h t to t h e i r 
homeland. They are an i n t e g r a l part of the Arab n a t i o n 
and share i n i t s hopes, s u f f e r i n g s and struggles f o r 
freedom, sovereignty, progress and u n i t y . 
k. A f t e r the l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r homeland, the P a l e s t i n i a n people 
w i l l o f t h e i r own f r e e w i l l , decide i t s destiny w i t h respect 
to i t s sovereignty, n a t i o n a l (Oawmiyyah) l i f e and p o l i t i c a l 
f u t u r e . 
5. The P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y i s an e s s e n t i a l , i n n a t e , p e r s i s t e n t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , , t r a n s m i t t e d from generation to generation. 
6. The P a l e s t i n i a n s are those Arab c i t i z e n s who were i n Palestine 
u n t i l 19^7, whether they l e f t or remained there. Anyone 
born a f t e r t h a t date,.of an Arab P a l e s t i n i a n f a t h e r , whether 
i n s i d e or outside P a l e s t i n e , i s also a P a l e s t i n i a n . 
7. Jewish c i t i z e n s of P a l e s t i n i a n o r i g i n are considered 
Pa l e s t i n i a n s provided t h a t they pledge themselves t o l i v e 
p e a c e f u l l y a n d . l o y a l l y i n Palestine. 
8. The education of P a l e s t i n i a n s not born i n Palestine i s a 
primary n a t i o n a l (Qawmi) duty. Every means must be employed 
t o e n l i g h t e n and educate t h i s generation so t h a t i t may 
acquire strong s p i r i t u a l t i e s w i t h i t s homeland. 
9. D i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic ideologies must not 
d i s t r a c t the P a l e s t i n i a n people from t h e i r f i r s t duty, the 
l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r homeland. A l l Palestinians form one 
n a t i o n a l (Oawmiyvah) f r o n t working w i t h a l l t h e i r moral and 
m a t e r i a l resources t o l i b e r a t e t h e i r homeland. 
10. The P a l e s t i n i a n s s h a l l have three slogans: n a t i o n a l (Watan-
ivvah) u n i t y , n a t i o n a l (Qawmiyyah) m o b i l i s a t i o n and l i b e r a t i o n . 
A f t e r the l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r homeland the P a l e s t i n i a n people 
s h a l l choose any p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l system they 
d e s i r e . 
11. The P a l e s t i n i a n people believe i n Arab u n i t y . I n order t o 
p l a y t h e i r p a r t i n achieving t h i s u n i t y , t h ^ must, during 
t h i s stage of t h e i r s t r u g g l e , safeguard t h e i r P a l e s t i n i a n 
i d e n t i t y and develop t h e i r consciousness of i t . They must 
oppose any plan which may d i s s i p a t e or weaken ( t h i s i d e n t i t y ) . 
12.. Arab u n i t y and the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine are two comple-
mentary o b j e c t i v e s . The attainment of e i t h e r one of them 
f a c i l i t a t e s the attainment of the other. Thus Arab u n i t y 
leads t o the L i b e r a t i o n of Palestine and the l i b e r a t i o n of 
Palestine leads t o Arab u n i t y . Both objectives should be 
pursued simultaneously. 
176 
13. The f a t e of the Arab n a t i o n , and indeed the Arab existence 
i t s e l f , depends upon the f a t e of the Palestine cause. This 
common destiny must be the basis f o r the Arabs' struggle to 
l i b e r a t e Palestine and i n a d d i t i o n must guide the people of 
Palest i n e to achieve t h e i r n a t i o n a l (Qawmi) aim. 
I'f. The l i b e r a t i o n of Pa l e s t i n e , from an Arab point of view, 
i s the n a t i o n a l (Qawmi) duty and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 
e n t i r e Arab n a t i o n , both governments and people, l e d by 
the P a l e s t i n i a n Arab people. Accordingly the Arab n a t i o n 
should mobilise a l l i t s s p i r i t u a l andi m a t e r i a l forces t o 
l i b e r a t e Palestine and should give every support t o the 
Palestinian.Arab people f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r home-
land . 
15. The l i b e r a t i o n of Pa l e s t i n e , from the s p i r i t u a l p o i n t of 
view, w i l l give the Holy Land an atmosphere of s e c u r i t y 
and t r a n q u i l l i t y . This i n t u r n w i l l safeguard the 
country's r e l i g i o u s santuaries and w i l l guarantee freedom 
of worship and pilgrimage t o a l l , whatever t h e i r race, 
c o l o u r , language or r e l i g i o n . Accordingly, the P a l e s t i n i a n 
people expect the support o f a l l the s p i r i t u a l forces i n 
the world. 
16. The l i b e r a t i o n of Pa l e s t i n e , from an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o i n t of 
view, i s an act of self-defence i n the terms of the UN 
Charter. Accordingly, the P a l e s t i n i a n people, seeking 
the f r i e n d s h i p of a l l people, expect the support of those 
s t a t e s which cherish freedom, j u s t i c e and peace, i n 
r e s t o r i n g t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s i n Palestine and r e -
e s t a b l i s h i n g peace and s e c u r i t y i n the country, thus 
enabling them t o exercise n a t i o n a l (Qawmi) sovereignty 
and freedom. 
17. The p a r t i t i o n of Palestine i n 19^7 and the establisiment 
of I s r a e l are i n v a l i d (and w i l l remain so) regardless of 
the passage of time. These acts were contrary to the w i l l 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n people and t h e i r n a t u r a l r i g h t to t h e i r 
homeland. They were i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the general p r i n c i p l e s 
embodied i n the Charter of the United Nations, i n p a r t i c u l a r 
the r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 
18. Claims of h i s t o r i c a l and r e l i g i o u s t i e s between the Jews 
and Palestine are incompatible w i t h the f a c t s of h i s t o r y 
and the tr u e conception of what c o n s t i t u t e s statehood. 
Judaism, being a heavenly r e l i g i o n worthy of respect, i s 
not an independent n a t i o n a l i t y . The Jews do not comprise 
a s i n g l e n a t i o n w i t h an i d e n t i t y of i t s own. They are 
c i t i z e n s of the states t o which they belong. 
19. The. Z i o n i s t movement i s I m p e r i a l i s t i n o r i g i n , aggressive 
and expansionist i n i t s aims, f a n a t i c a l l y r a c i s t i n i t s 
formation and f a s c i s t i n i t s p r a c t i c e and methods. I s r a e l , 
being the leader of t h i s d e s t r u c t i v e movement i s a constant 
source of i n s t a b i l i t y i n the Middle East i n p a r t i c u l a r 
and i n the world i n general. Accordingly, the Palestinians 
deserve world-wide.sympathy and support. 
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20. The demands of peace and s e c u r i t y , as w e l l as the demands 
of r i g h t and j u s t i c e r e q u i r e t h a t a l l states view Zionism 
as an i l l e g a l movement. I t s existence should be outlawed 
and i t s operations p r o h i b i t e d so t h a t f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
between peoples may be preserved and the l o y a l t y of c i t i z e n s 
to t h e i r respective homelands safeguarded. 
21. The P a l e s t i n i a n people believe i n the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , 
freedom sovereignty, s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and human d i g n i t y 
as w e l l as the r i g h t of a l l peoples to exercise them. The 
P a l e s t i n i a n people support a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s t o 
e s t a b l i s h peace on the basis of j u s t i c e and f r e e i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l co-operation. 
22. The P a l e s t i n i a n people believe i n peaceful co-existence 
based upon l e g i t i m a c y . There can be no co-existence w i t h 
aggression and no peace w i t h Imperialism and usurpation. 
23. To implement t h i s Charter a P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l (Qawmiyyah) 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s h a l l be established and s h a l l be c a l l e d the 
Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation. I t s h a l l play a f u l l 
r o l e i n the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine i n accordance w i t h i t s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
2k, This Organisation s h a l l not exercise any r e g i o n a l sovereignty 
over the west Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan nor 
over the Gaza sector. I t s a c t i v i t i e s w i l l be on the n a t i o n a l 
(Qawmi) popular l e v e l i n the p o l i t i c a l , o r g a n i s a t i o n a l , 
f i n a n c i a l , and l i b e r a t i o n spheres. 
25. The Organisation w i l l be responsible f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n 
people's movement i n the struggle to l i b e r a t e t h e i r home-
land i n the p o l i t i c a l and l i b e r a t i o n spheres and w i l l do 
whatever may be required f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n cause on the 
Arab and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . 
26. The Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation w i l l co-operate w i t h 
each Arab s t a t e according t o i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and w i l 
not i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of any Arab s t a t e . 
27^ The Organisation s h a l l have a f l a g , an oath of allegiance 
and an anthem. These things w i l l be decided by s p e c i a l 
r e g u l a t i o n , 
28. Regulations t o be known as the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Palestine 
L i b e r a t i o n Organisation s h a l l be annexed to t h i s Charter. 
• I t s h a l l define the manner i n which the Organisation w i t h 
i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s and a u t h o r i t i e s s h a l l be c o n s t i t u t e d euid 
a l l t h e i r powers and duties under the terms of t h i s Charter. 
29. This d r a f t Charter must be submitted f o r consideration t o 
the N a t i o n a l Congress described i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n . A f t e r 
r a t i f i c a t i o n , i t s h a l l be amended only by a two-thirds 
m a j o r i t y vote of the National Congress at a s p e c i a l session 
convened f o r t h a t purpose. 
Source; Watha'iq a l - ' a r a b i . 196^. American U n i v e r s i t y B e i r u t -
pp. 80-82. 
T r a n s l a t i o n by the author. 
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Appendix I I 
The D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n 
Organisation 196^ 
1. I n accordance w i t h t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n , an organisation known 
as "The Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation" s h a l l be formed 
and s h a l l launch i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n accordance w i t h 
the p r i n c i p l e s of the National Charter and clauses of t h i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
2. A l l the Palestinians are n a t u r a l members of the L i b e r a t i o n 
Organisation e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r duty i n the l i b e r a t i o n of . 
t h e i r homeland i n accordance w i t h t h e i r a b i l i t i e s and 
e f f i c i e n c y . 
3. The P a l e s t i n i a n people s h a l l form the l a r g e r base f o r t h i s 
Organisation; and the Organisation, a f t e r i t s c r e a t i o n , 
s h a l l work c l o s e l y and constantly w i t h the Palestine people 
f o r the sake of t h e i r o r ganisation and m o b i l i s a t i o n so 
they may be able t o assume t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the 
l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r country. 
h. U n t i l s u i t a b l e conditions are a v a i l a b l e f o r holding f r e e 
general e l e c t i o n s among a l l the Palestinians and i n a l l 
the countries where they r e s i d e , the L i b e r a t i o n Organisation 
s h a l l be set up i n accordance w i t h the r u l e s set i n t h i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
5. Measures l i s t e d i n t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l be taken f o r the 
convocation of a P a l e s t i n i a n General Assembly i n vhich s h a l l 
be represented a l l P a l e s t i n i a n f a c t i o n s , emigrants and 
r e s i d e n t s , i n c l u d i n g . o r g a n i s a t i o n s , s o c i e t i e s , unions, trade 
unions and representatives of P a l e s t i n i a n p u b l i c opinion of 
various i d e o l o g i c a l trends; t h i s assembly s h a l l be c a l l e d 
"The N a t i o n a l Congress of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organ-
i s a t i o n . " 
6. I n preparation and f a c i l i t a t i o n of the work of the assembly, 
the P a l e s t i n i a n representative a t the Arab League (Ahmed 
Shuqeiry) s h a l l , a f t e r holding consultations w i t h various 
P a l e s t i n i a n f a c t i o n s form: 
a) A Preparatory Committee i n every Arab country hosting 
a minimum of 10,000 P a l e s t i n i a n s ; the mission of each 
of these committees i s t o prepare l i s t s according to 
which Palestinian-candidates i n the respective Arab 
country w i l l be chosen as members of the assembly; 
these committees s h a l l also prepare studies and pro-
posals which may help the assembly carry out i t s work; 
these studies and proposals s h a l l be presented t o the 
Co-ordination Committee l i s t e d below. 
b) A Co-ordination Committee w i t h headquarters i n Jerusalem; 
the mission of t h i s coinmittee s h a l l be t o issue i n v i t a -
t i o n s t o the assembly, adopt a l l necessary measures f o r 
the holding of the assembly, and co-ordinate a l l studies 
and proposals as w e l l as l i s t s of candidates t o the 
assembly, as s p e c i f i e d i n the clause above; also the 
committee s h a l l prepare a p r o v i s i o n a l agenda - or as a 
whole undertake a l l t h a t i s required f o r the holding 
and success of the assembly i n the execution of i t s 
mission. 
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7. The Nat i o n a l Congress s h a l l be held once every two years; 
i t s venue r o t a t e s between Jerusalem and Gaza; the National 
Congress s h a l l meet f o r the f i r s t time on May l ^ t h 196^ 
i n the c i t y of Jerusalem. 
8. To f a c i l i t a t e i t s work the assembly s h a l l form the f o l l o w i n g 
committees; 
a) The P o l i t i c a l Committee: t h i s s h a l l be i n charge of 
studying the p o l i t i c a l aspects of the Palestine question 
i n the Arab and i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i e l d s . 
b) The Charter, Bye-Laws and L i s t s Committee: t h i s s h a l l 
consider.the National Charter as w e l l as the various 
bye-laws and l i s t s required by the Organisation i n the 
execution of i t s d u t i e s . 
c) The F i n a n c i a l Committee: t h i s s h a l l formulate a com-
p l e t e scheme f o r the Palestine National Fund required 
f o r f i n a n c i n g the Organisation. 
d) The Information Committee: t h i s s h a l l work out a com-
p l e t e plan f o r i n f o r m a t i o n and o f f i c e s t o be established 
i n various parts of the world. 
e) The J u r i d i c a l Committee: t h i s s h a l l study the various 
l e g a l aspects of the Palestine question, be i t i n 
r e l a t i o n t o p r i n c i p l e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l law, UK Charter, 
or i n t e r n a t i o n a l documents p e r t a i n i n g t o Palestine. 
f ) Proposals and Nominations Committee: t h i s s h a l l co-
ordi n a t e proposals and nominations submitted t o the 
assembly. 
g) Consciousness Committee: t h i s s h a l l study ways and 
means f o r the up-bringing of the new generations 
both i d e o l o g i c a l l y and s p i r i t u a l l y so they may serve 
t h e i r country and work f o r . t h e l i b e r a t i o n of t h e i r 
homeland. 
h) The National Organisation Committee: t h i s s h a l l l a y 
dovm general plans r e l a t i n g t o the trade unions, 
. f e d e r a t i o n s , sports organisations and scouts groups; 
t h i s w i l l be i n accordance w i t h r u l e s and laws i n 
e f f e c t i n the Arab countr i e s , 
9. The National Congress s h a l l have a President's O f f i c e com-
posed o f the President, two vice-presidents, a secretary 
and a secretary general: these o f f i c e r s s h a l l be elected 
by .the N a t i o n a l Congress when i t meets. 
10. These ( e i g h t committees) s h a l l submit t h e i r reports and 
recommendations t o the National Congress which, i n t u r n , 
s h a l l discuss them and draw up the necessary r e s o l u t i o n s . 
11. The Nat i o n a l Congress s h a l l have an executive apparatus 
c a l l e d "The Executive Committee of the L i b e r a t i o n Organisa-
t i o n " which s h a l l p r a c t i s e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f the 
L i b e r a t i o n Organisation i n accordance w i t h general plans 
and r e s o l u t i o n s drawn up by the National Congress. 
12. The Executive Committee s h a l l be formed of f i f t e e n members 
elected by the Na t i o n a l Congress; the Committee s h a l l i n 
t u r n e l e c t a President and two Vice Presidents and a 
Secretary General. 
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13. The Executive Committee can be c a l l e d t o a meeting i n the 
time and place decided by the President or on a request 
of f i v e members of the Committee. 
1^. The President of the Executive Committee s h a l l represent the 
Pa l e s t i n i a n s t o the Arab League: thus h i s o f f i c e s h a l l be 
i n Cairo since t h a t i s the seat of the League headquarters. 
15. The Executive Committee s h a l l e s t a b l i s h the f o l l o w i n g 
departments: 
a) P o l i t i c a l and Information A f f a i r s . 
b) N a t i o n a l Fund. 
c) General A f f a i r s . 
Each department s h a l l have a D i r e c t o r General and the 
requ i r e d number of employees. Duties of each department 
s h a l l be defined by sp e c i a l bye-laws drawn up by the 
Executive Committee. 
16. The Executive Committee has the r i g h t t o c a l l the National 
Congress at a place and time i t s p e c i f i e s ; i t also has 
the r i g h t t o c a l l a meeting of any committee.of the National 
Congress t o study a c e r t a i n subject. 
17. The Executive Committee s h a l l have a Consultative Council 
t o be known as "The Consultative Council"; The Executive 
Committee s h a l l choose the President and members of t h i s 
Council from renowned and respected people among the 
Pa l e s t i n i a n s ; the prerogatives of the Consultative Council 
are i n matters proposed to i t by the Executive Committee. 
18. The Arab states s h a l l give the sons of Palestine the 
op p o r t u n i t y of e n l i s t i n g i n t h e i r regular armies on the 
widest possible scale, 
19.. Special P a l e s t i n i a n contingents, s h a l l be formed according 
t o the m i l i t a r y needs and plans drawn up by the U n i f i e d 
Arab Command i n agreement and co-operation w i t h the Arab 
states concerned. 
20. A fund known as "The P a l e s t i n i a n National Fund" s h a l l be set 
up t o finance the operations of the Executive; the Fund 
s h a l l have a Board of D i r e c t o r s elected by the National 
Congress. 
21. Sources of the Fund w i l l be: 
a) Fixed Taxes l e v i e d on Palestinians and c o l l e c t e d i n 
accordance w i t h s p e c i a l laws. 
b) F i n a n c i a l assistance from the Arab Governments and 
people. 
c) A " L i b e r a t i o n Stamp" issued by the Arab states and used 
i n p o s t a l and other t r a n s a c t i o n s . 
d) Donations on n a t i o n a l occasions. 
e) Loans or a i d from Arab or f r i e n d l y nations. 
22. Committees known as "Palestine Support Committees" s h a l l be 
set up i n Arab and f r i e n d l y countries t o c o l l e c t donations 
and support the L i b e r a t i o n Organisation. 
181 
23. The Executive Committee s h a l l have the r i g h t t o issue bye-
laws t o f u l f i l the provisions o f t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
2h. The d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l be submitted t o the National 
Congress f o r consideration what i s r a t i f i e d cannot be 
changed except by a two- t h i r d s m a j o r i t y of the National 
Congress. 
Source: Walter Laqueur - The A r a b - I s r a e l i Reader, pp. 131-135. 
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Appendix I I I 
The United Nations S e c u r i t y Council Resolution of 
22nd November 1967 
The S e c u r i t y Council, 
Expressing i t s continuing concern w i t h the grave s i t u a t i o n i n 
the Middle East, 
Emphasising the i n a d m i s s a b i l i t y of the a c q u i s i t i o n of t e r r i t o r y 
by war and the need t o work f o r a j u s t and l a s t i n g 
peace i n which every s t a t e i n the area can l i v e , i n 
s e c u r i t y , 
1. A f f i r m s t h a t the f u l f i l l m e n t of a j u s t and l a s t i n g peace i n 
the Middle East which should include the a p p l i c a t i o n of both 
the f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e s : 
i ) withdrawal of I s r a e l i armed forces from t e r r i t o r i e s 
occupied i n the recent c o n f l i c t ; 
i i ) t e r m i n a t i o n of a l l claims or states of b e l l i g e r e n c y 
and respect f o r and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l independence of 
every State i n the area and t h e i r r i g h t t o l i v e i n peace 
w i t h i n secure and recognised boundaries f r e e from threats 
or acts of f o r c e ; 
2. A f f i r m s f u r t h e r the necessity 
a) f o r guaranteeing freedom of navigation through i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l waterways i n the area; 
b) f o r achieving a j u s t settlement of the refugee problem; 
c) f o r guaranteeing the t e r r i t o r i a l i n v i o l a b i l i t y and 
p o l i t i c a l independence of every s t a t e i n the area 
through measures i n c l u d i n g the establishment of 
d e m i l i t a r i s e d zones; 
3. Requests the Secretary General t o designate a Special 
Representative t o proceed t o the Middle East t o e s t a b l i s h 
and maintain contacts w i t h the States concerned i n order to 
promote agreement and a s s i s t e f f o r t s t o achieve a peaceful 
and accepted settlement i n accordance w i t h the provisions 
and p r i n c i p l e s o f t h i s r e s o l u t i o n ; 
k. Requests the Secretary General t o r e p o r t t o the Security 
Council on the progress of the e f f o r t s of the Special 
Representative as soon as possible. 
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Appendix IV 
The P a l e s t i n i a n National Charter 1968 
1. Palestine i s the homeland of the Arab P a l e s t i n i a n people. 
I t i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Arab homeland and the 
P a l e s t i n i a n people are an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Arab nation. 
2. P a l e s t i n e , w i t h i n the boundaries i t had during the B r i t i s h 
Mandate, i s an i n d i v i s i b l e t e r r i t o r i a l u n i t . 
3. The P a l e s t i n i a n Arab people have a l e g a l r i g h t t o t h e i r 
homeland. They have the r i g h t to determine t h e i r destiny, 
a f t e r l i b e r a t i n g t h e i r country, according t o t h e i r wishes 
and i n complete accord w i t h t h e i r own f r e e w i l l and choice. 
k. The P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y i s an e s s e n t i a l , innate, p e r s i s t e n t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , t r a n s m i t t e d from generation t o generation. 
The Z i o n i s t - occupation, and the dispersion of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
Arab people r e s u l t i n g from the disasters which b e f e l l them, 
do not cause them t o f o r f e i t t h e i r P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y nor 
t h e i r membership of the P a l e s t i n i a n community. (The Z i o n i s t 
occupation and the dispersion o f the Palestinians) do not 
negate (the P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y nor membership o f the 
P a l e s t i n i a n community), 
5. The Pa l e s t i n i a n s are those Arab c i t i z e n s who, u n t i l 19'f7, 
normally resided i n Pal e s t i n e , whether they were evicted 
or remained th e r e . Anyone born a f t e r t h a t date, of an 
Arab.Palestinian f a t h e r , whether i n s i d e or outside Palestine, 
• i s also a P a l e s t i n i a n . 
6. The Jews who normally resided i n Palestine u n t i l the beginning 
of the Z i o n i s t i n v a s i o n w i l l be considered P a l e s t i n i a n s . 
7. The existence of a P a l e s t i n i a n community and i t s m a t e r i a l , 
s p i r i t u a l and h i s t o r i c a l connection w i t h Palestine, are i n -
disputable f a c t s . I t i s a n a t i o n a l duty to bring up i n -
d i v i d u a l P a l e stinians i n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y Arab way. A l l 
means of informing and educating the P a l e s t i n i a n must be 
adopted so t h a t he may become as f i r m l y acquainted w i t h h i s 
country as po s s i b l e , both m a t e r i a l l y and s p i r i t u a l l y . He 
must be made ready f o r the armed struggle and be prepared 
. t o s a c r i f i c e h i s wealth and h i s l i f e t o regain h i s homeland 
and achieve i t s l i b e r a t i o n . 
8. The h i s t o r i c a l stage through which the Palestinisin people 
are now passing i s t h a t of n a t i o n a l (Watani) struggle t o 
l i b e r a t e Palestine. Any c o n f l i c t s among P a l e s t i n i a n 
n a t i o n a l (Wataniyyah) forces i s thus secondary and should be 
suspended i n favour of the basic c o n f l i c t between the forces 
of Zionism and Imperialism on the one hand and the P a l e s t i n -
i a n and Arab people on the other. Accordingly, the P a l e s t i n -
ian masses, whether they reside i n the n a t i o n a l homeland or 
i n the diaspora, both i n t h e i r organisations and as i n -
d i v i d u a l s , c o n s t i t u t e a s i n g l e n a t i o n a l (Wataniyyah) s t r i v i n g 
f o r the recovery of Palestine and i t s l i b e r a t i o n through 
armed s t r u g g l e . 
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9. Armed struggle i s the only way t o l i b e r a t e Palestine. I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e an o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y and not j u s t t a c t i c s . The 
P a l e s t i n i a n Arab people proclaim t h e i r absolute determina-
t i o n and f i r m r e s o l u t i o n to pursue t h e i r armed struggle and 
to march forward t o the armed popular r e v o l u t i o n to l i b e r a t e 
t h e i r country and make possible t h e i r r e t u r n t o i t . They 
also proclaim t h e i r r i g h t t o a normal l i f e i n Palestine and 
t h e i r r i g h t t o exercise s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and sovereignty 
t h e r e , 
10. Fedayeen a c t i o n forms the basis of the P a l e s t i n i a n popular 
l i b e r a t i o n war. This war requires the promotion, extension 
. and p r o t e c t i o n of such a c t i o n , ( I t also requires) modilisa-
t i o n of a l l the mass and s c i e n t i f i c c a p a b i l i t i e s of the 
Pa l e s t i n i a n s and t h e i r organisation and involvement i n the 
P a l e s t i n i a n armed r e v o l u t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n i t i s necessary 
t o achieve the u n i t y of the P a l e s t i n i a n people and u n i t y 
between the P a l e s t i n i a n people and the Arab masses, i n 
order t o insure the r e v o l u t i o n ' s c o n t i n u a t i o n , escalation 
and v i c t o r y , 
11. The Pa l e s t i n i a n s s h a l l have three slogans: n a t i o n a l 
(Wataniyyah) u n i t y , national. (Qawmiyyah) m o b i l i s a t i o n and 
l i b e r a t i o n . 
12. The P a l e s t i n i a n Arab people believe i n Arab u n i t y . I n 
order t o play t h e i r p a r t i n achieving t h i s u n i t y , they 
must, during t h i s stage of t h e i r n a t i o n a l (Watani) st r u g g l e , 
safeguard t h e i r P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y and develop t h e i r 
consciousness of i t . They must oppose any plan which may 
d i s s i p a t e or weaken ( t h i s i d e n t i t y ) . 
13. Arab u n i t y and the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine are two com-
plementary o b j e c t i v e s . The attainment of e i t h e r one of 
them f a c i l i t a t e s the attainment of the other. Thus Arab 
u n i t y leads t o the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine and the 
l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine leads t o Arab u n i t y . Both 
o b j e c t i v e s should be pursued simultaneously, 
1^, The f a t e of the Arab n a t i o n , and indeed the Arab existence 
i t s e l f , depends upon the f a t e of the Palestine cause. From 
t h i s dependence spring the Arab nation's endeavours and 
s t r i v i n g f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine. The people of 
Palestine have the vanguard r o l e i n the achievement of 
t h i s sacred, n a t i o n a l (Qawmi) aim. 
15. The l i b e r a t i o n of Palest i n e , from an Arab point of view, 
i s a n a t i o n a l (Qawmi) duty. I t seeks t o oppose Z i o n i s t 
and I m p e r i a l i s t aggression against the great Arab homeland. 
I t aims at the e l i m i n a t i o n of Zionism i n Palestine. The 
e n t i r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s rests w i t h the Arab n a t i o n , 
both peoples and governments, w i t h the Arab people of 
Palest i n e i n the vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab na t i o n 
must mobilise a l l i t s m i l i t a r y , human, moral and s p i r i t u a l 
c a p a b i l i t i e s t o p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y w i t h the P a l e s t i n i a n 
people, i n the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine. Especially during 
the stage of the armed P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n , (the Arab 
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n a t i o n ) must o f f e r to the P a l e s t i n i a n people, and supply 
them w i t h a l l possible help i n terms of ma t e r i a l and hum.an 
support. I t must make a v a i l a b l e t o (the P a l e s t i n i a n people) 
the means arid] o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o enable them to continue 
p l a y i n g t h e i r leading r o l e i n the armed r e v o l u t i o n u n t i l 
t h e i r homeland i s l i b e r a t e d . 
16. The l i b e r a t i o n of Pal e s t i n e , from the. s p i r i t u a l p o i n t of 
view, w i l l give the Holy Land an atmosphere of s e c u r i t y 
and t r a n q u i l l i t y . This, i n t u r n w i l l safeguard the 
country's r e l i g i o u s sanctuaries and w i l l guarantee freedom 
of worship and pilgrimage to a l l whatever t h e i r race, 
c o l o u r , language or r e l i g i o n . Accordingly the P a l e s t i n i a n 
people expect the support of a l l the s p i r i t u a l forces i n 
the world. 
17. The l i b e r a t i o n o f Pa l e s t i n e , from the human p o i n t of view, 
w i l l r e s t o r e to the P a l e s t i n i a n i n d i v i d u a l h i s d i g n i t y , 
p r i d e and freedom. Accordingly the P a l e s t i n i a n Arab 
people expect the support of a l l i n the world who believe 
i n human d i g n i t y and freedom. 
18. The l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine, from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l point 
of view, i s an act of self-defence. Accordingly, the 
P a l e s t i n i a n people, seeking the f r i e n d s h i p of a l l people, 
expect the support of those states which cherish freedom, 
j u s t i c e and peace i n r e s t o r i n g t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s i n 
Palestine and r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g peace and s e c u r i t y i n the 
country, thus enabling them t o exercise n a t i o n a l (Wataniyyah) 
sovereignty and n a t i o n a l (Gawmiyyah) freedom. 
19. The p a r t i t i o n of Palestine i n 19^7 and the establishment 
of I s r a e l are i n v a l i d , (and w i l l remain so) regardless of 
the passage of time. These acts were contrary to the w i l l 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n people and t h e i r n a t u r a l r i g h t t o t h e i r 
homeland. They were i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s 
embodied i n the Charter of the United Nations, the f i r s t 
of T«*iich i s the r i g h t t o se l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
20. The Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , the Mandate f o r Palestine and 
everything based upon them are t o be considered n u l l and 
vo i d . Claims of h i s t o r i c a l and r e l i g i o u s t i e s between 
the Jews and Palestine are incompatible w i t h the f a c t s of 
h i s t o r y and the t r u e conception of what c o n s t i t u t e s 
statehood. Judaism being a heavenly r e l i g i o n i s not an 
independent n a t i o n a l i t y . The Jews do not comprise a single 
n a t i o n w i t h an i d e n t i t y of i t s own. They are c i t i z e n s of 
the states to which they belong. 
21. The Arab people of Palestine, expressing themselves through 
the armed P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n , r e j e c t any s o l u t i o n pre-
f e r r e d as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r the t o t a l l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine, 
and r e j e c t any proposal f o r l i q u i d a t i n g the Palestine 
problem or seeking i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
22. Zionism i s a p o l i t i c a l movement o r g a n i c a l l y l i n k e d t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Imperialism. I t i s antagonistic t o any 
a c t i o n f o r l i b e r a t i o n and to any progressive movement 
i n the world. I t has a r a c i s t , f a n a t i c nature, aggressive, 
expansionist and c o l o n i a l i s t aims and employs f a s c i s t 
methods. I s r a e l i s the instrument of the Z i o n i s t move-
ment. I t i s a human and geographical base of World 
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Imperialism, s t r a t e g i c a l l y placed i n the Arab homeland to 
s t r i k e a t the a s p i r a t i o n s of the Arab n a t i o n f o r l i b e r a t i o n , 
u n i t y and progress. I s r a e l i s a constant t h r e a t t o peace 
i n the Middle East and the whole world. Since the 
L i b e r a t i o n of Palestine w i l l destroy the Z i o n i s t , 
I m p e r i a l i s t presence, thus c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of peace i n the Middle East, the P a l e s t i n i a n people 
expect the support of a l l the forces of peace and progress, 
and urge them, whatever t h e i r a f f i l i a t i o n s and b e l i e f s , 
to o f f e r the P a l e s t i n i a n people every help and support 
i n the j u s t s t r u g g l e to l i b e r a t e t h e i r homeland. 
23. The demands of peace and s e c u r i t y , as w e l l as the demands 
of r i g h t and j u s t i c e require t h a t a l l . s t a t e s view Zionism 
as an i l l e g a l movement. I t s existence should be outlawed 
and i t s operations p r o h i b i t e d so t h a t f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
between peoples may be preserved and the l o y a l t y of c i t i z e n s 
t o t h e i r respective homelands safeguarded. 
2h, The Arab P a l e s t i n i a n people believe i n the p r i n c i p l e s of 
j u s t i c e , freedom, sovereignty, self-determination and human 
d i g n i t y , as w e l l as the r i g h t of a l l peoples t o exercise 
them. 
25. To r e a l i s e the aims and p r i n c i p l e s of t h i s Charter, the 
Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation w i l l be set up t o play 
a f u l l r o l e i n the l i b e r a t i o n of Palestine. 
26. The Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation, as representative 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s , i s responsible 
f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n Arab people's movement i n the struggle 
t o r e g a i n , l i b e r a t e and r e t u r n t o t h e i r homeland where 
they can exercise the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . (The 
Organisation i s responsible) i n the m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , 
and f i n a n c i a l spheres and whenever necessary w i l l be 
responsible f o r the Palestine cause a t the inter-Arab 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . 
27. The Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation w i l l co-operate 
w i t h each Arab s t a t e according to i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and 
w i l l adopt a n e u t r a l p o l i c y among them as may be d i c t a t e d 
by the needs of the l i b e r a t i o n war.' Accordingly (the 
Organisation) s h a l l not i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s 
of any Arab s t a t e . 
28. The P a l e s t i n i a n people proclaim the r e a l i t y and independence 
of t h e i r n a t i o n a l (Wataniyyah) r e v o l u t i o n . They r e j e c t any 
form of i n t e r f e r e n c e patronage or domination. 
29. The P a l e s t i n i a n people have a basic and r e a l l e g a l r i g h t 
t o l i b e r a t e and regain t h e i r homeland. The P a l e s t i n i a n 
people w i l l determine t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards any s t a t e or 
f o r c e on the basis of i t s stand v i s - a - v i s the Palestine 
case, and the extent of i t s support f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n 
r e v o l u t i o n t o achieve the aims of the P a l e s t i n i a n people. 
30. Those who f i g h t and bear arms i n the l i b e r a t i o n war are 
the nucleus of the popular army which w i l l p rotect the gains 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n people. 
31. The Organisation s h a l l have-a f l a g , an oath of allegiance 
and ah anthem. These things w i l l be decided by s p e c i a l 
r e g u l a t i o n . 
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32. Regulations t o be known as the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Palestine 
L i b e r a t i o n Organisation s h a l l be annexed t o t h i s Charter. 
I t s h a l l define the manner i n which the Organisation w i t h 
i t s sub-organisations and i n s t i t u t i o n s , s h a l l be formed. 
I t w i l l o u t l i n e the respective competence of each w i t h i t s 
o b l i g a t i o n s under the Charter. 
33. This Charter s h a l l only be amended by a vote of a two-
t h i r d s m a j o r i t y of the t o t a l membership of the National 
Congress of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation taken 
a t a s p e c i a l session convened f o r t h a t purpose. 
Source: Al-Mithaa al-Watani a l - F a l a s t i n i - Palestine L i b e r a t i o n 
Organisation. 
T r a n s l a t i o n by the author. 
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Appendix V 
The C o n s t i t u t i o n of the PLO, 1968 
General P r i n c i p l e s 
1.. I n accordance w i t h t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n , the Palestinians 
form a body which s h a l l be c a l l e d the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n 
Organisation. 
2. The P a l e s t i n i a n L i b e r a t i o n Organisation w i l l undertake i t s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of the 
Na t i o n a l Charter, the a r t i c l e s of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n and any 
other r e g u l a t i o n s , decisions or orders which may be based 
upon them. 
3. Relations w i t h i n the organisation s h a l l be based upon 
commitment, str u g g l e and n a t i o n a l a c t i o n . The rank and f i l e 
o f Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation s h a l l be s t r o n g l y 
l i n k e d t o the c o l l e c t i v e leadership and the m i n o r i t y w i l l 
respect the w i l l of the m a j o r i t y . The confidence of the 
people w i l l be gained by convincing them through continuing 
the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e and supporting the armed 
P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n , s t r i v i n g f o r i t s escalation which 
w i l l b r i n g the masses t o v i c t o r y . 
I n order t h a t these p r i n c i p l e s may be applied and 
executed the Executive Committee w i l l , i s s u e a special order 
which w i l l define the formation of the Organisation, taking 
i n t o account the d i f f e r e n t conditions of the Palestinians 
i n t h e i r places of residence, the conditions of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n r e v o l u t i o n , and the need to achieve the aims 
of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n and the Charter, 
A l l P a l e s t i n i a n s who recognise t h e i r duty to l i b e r a t e t h e i r 
homeland, according to t h e i r a b i l i t i e s and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , 
are members of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation. The 
P a l e s t i n i a n people c o n s t i t u t e the wide base of the 
Organisation. 
The N a t i o n a l Council 
5. The members of the National Council w i l l be chosen through 
d i r e c t e l e c t i o n by the P a l e s t i n i a n people i n accordance 
••• w i t h an order issued by the Executive Committee. 
6. a) I f i t should be impossible t o hold e l e c t i o n s f o r the 
Nat i o n a l Council the e x i s t i n g Council w i l l continue 
u n t i l e l e c t i o n s are possible, 
b) I f one or more seat i s vacated i n the Council f o r any 
reason the Council w i l l appoint a member, or members, 
to f i l l the vacancy or vacancies. 
7. a) The National Council i s the highest a u t h o r i t y i n the 
Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation and w i l l draw up the 
p o l i c y and plans of the Organisation, 
b) Jerusalem w i l l be the permanent residence of the 
National Council. 
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8. The mandate of the National Council s h a l l l a s t f o r three 
years and i t w i l l h o l d regular sessions on a c a l l from the 
President every s i x months. Extraordinary sessions can be 
c a l l e d by the President on the demand of the Executive 
Committee or on the demand of one quarter of the members. 
The Council may meet i n Jerusalem, Gaza or any other 
place depending on the circumstances. I f the President 
does not c a l l the meeting, i t w i l l be held at a time and 
i n a place assigned by the Executive Committee or the 
members. 
9. The N a t i o n a l Council w i l l have a praesidium consisting of 
the President, two Vice-Presidents and a Secretary who w i l l 
be elected by the Council at i t s f i r s t meeting. 
10. The N a t i o n a l Council i n i t s regular meetings w i l l : 
a) Study the annual report submitted by the Executive 
Committee concerning the achievements of the Organisation. 
b) Study the r e p o r t of the National Fund concerning the 
budget. 
c) Study suggestions from the Executive Committee and 
recommendations of the committees of the Council. 
d) Study any other problems which may a r i s e . 
11. The N a t i o n a l Council w i l l e l e c t the necessary committees to 
f a c i l i t a t e proceedings. These w i l l r eport t o the Council 
w i t h t h e i r suggestions and advice. The Council w i l l discuss 
these suggestions and w i l l then take decisions. 
12. The quorum of the N a t i o n a l Council i s two t h i r d s of the 
membership, and decisions w i l l be taken on a simple m a j o r i t y . 
The Executive Committee 
13. a) A l l the members of the Executive Committee s h a l l be 
elected from the N a t i o n a l Council. 
b) The President of the Executive Committee w i l l be elected 
by the Executive Committee. 
c) The Executive Committee s h a l l be elected by the 
N a t i o n a l Council. 
1^. The Executive Committee w i l l consist of 11 members i n c l u d i n g 
the president of the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Council of the 
P a l e s t i n i a n N a t ional Fiind. I f any seat on the Executive 
Committee i s vacated between meetings of the National 
Councils. 
a) I f they c o n s t i t u t e less than one t h i r d they w i l l remain 
vacant u n t i l the N a t i o n a l Council meets. 
b) I f they are one t h i r d or more the National Council w i l l 
be c a l l e d t o a s p e c i a l meeting w i t h i n t h i r t y days. 
c) I f the National Council cannot meet f o r any reason the 
vacancies w i l l be f i l l e d by the Executive Committee, 
w i t h the Praesidium of the Council and any Council 
members who can attend a j o i n t meeting of these bodies. 
The replacement members w i l l be elected by a simple 
m a j o r i t y at t h i s j o i n t meeting. 
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15., The Executive Committee i s the highest executive a u t h o r i t y 
of the National Council and must be i n continuous session. 
I t s members w i l l be f u l l - t i m e workers i n the Committee. 
I t w i l l be responsible f o r executing the p o l i c y programme 
and plans decided by the National Council and w i l l be held 
responsible t o the Council c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y . 
16. The Executive Committee w i l l : 
a) Represent the P a l e s t i n i a n people. 
b) Supervise the formation of various organisations. 
c) Issues r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s concerning the work of 
the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation providing they 
do not c o n t r a d i c t the C o n s t i t u t i o n or the Charter. 
d) Control the f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n 
Organisation and prepare i t s budget. I n general the 
Executive Committee w i l l p r a c t i s e a l l the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation i n accordance 
w i t h the general plans and decisions of the National 
Council. 
17. The permanent seat of the Executive Committee w i l l be 
Jerusalem but i t may meet i n any other place i f necessary. 
18. The Executive Committee w i l l form the f o l l o w i n g departments: 
a) M i l i t a r y . 
b) I n f o r m a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l . A f f a i r s . 
c) The P a l e s t i n i a n National Fund. 
d) Research and S p e c i a l i s t i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
e) A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
f ) Any other department the Executive Committee deems 
necessary. 
Each department w i l l have a General D i r e c t o r and the 
r e q u i s i t e number of employees. The a u t h o r i t y and duties of 
each department w i l l be defined by s p e c i a l orders issued by 
the Executive Committee. 
19. The Executive Committee w i l l strengthen i t s r e l a t i o n s and 
co-ordinate i t s work w i t h a l l Arab and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n -
s t i t u t i o n s , organisations and unions which agree w i t h or 
help i n the achievement of the aims of the Palestine 
L i b e r a t i o n Organisation. 
20.. As long as the Executive Committee has the confidence of 
the N a t i o n a l Council, i t w i l l continue t o exercise i t s 
a u t h o r i t y and d u t i e s . The Executive Committee should resign 
t o the new National Council at i t s f i r s t meeting, but i t 
may be r e - e l e c t e d . 
21. The Quorum of the Executive Committee i s t w o , t h i r d s . I t s 
decisions w i l l be taken on a simple m a j o r i t y of the 
attending members. 
General Points 
22. The Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation w i l l e s t a b l i s h an 
army f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n people t o be known as the Palestine 
L i b e r a t i o n Army. I t w i l l have an independent leadership 
which w i l l work under the supervision of the Executive 
Committee and c a r r y out the special and general decisions 
and orders of the l a t t e r . I t s n a t i o n a l duty i s t o act as 
the vanguard f o r the L i b e r a t i o n B a t t l e . 
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23. The Executive Committee w i l l endeavour t o l e t the P a l e s t i n -
ians j o i n the Arab m i l i t a r y academies and schools f o r 
m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g i n order t o mobilise a l l P a l e s t i n i a n 
e f f o r t s and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r the b a t t l e of l i b e r a t i o n . 
2^. A Fund w i l l be established c a l l e d the P a l e s t i n i a n National 
Fund to finance the a c t i v i t i i e s of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n 
Organisation. I t w i l l be d i r e c t e d by a special Admini-
s t r a t i v e Council which w i l l be formed according to a special 
order issued by the Executive Committee. 
25. The resources of the Fund w i l l be: 
a) A regular t a x on the Palestinians imposed and executed 
by s p e c i a l order. 
b) F i n a n c i a l a i d from the Arab na t i o n and governments. 
c) A L i b e r a t i o n Stamp which the Arab states w i l l issue 
through t h e i r p o s t a l systems. 
d) Donations and c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 
e) Loans and a i d from Arab and f r i e n d l y peoples. 
f ) Any other resources which the Council may decide. 
26. Committees w i l l be established i n a l l Arab and f r i e n d l y 
c o u n t r i e s known as Committees f o r the Support of Palestine, 
which w i l l c o l l e c t donations and support the Palestine 
L i b e r a t i o n Organisation i n i t s n a t i o n a l endeavours. 
2.7. The P a l e s t i n i a n people w i l l be represented i n Arab confer-
ences and i n s t i t u t i o n s at the l e v e l decided upon by the 
Executive Committee which w i l l also nominate the repre-
s e n t a t i v e f o r Palestine t o the Arab League. 
28. The Executive Committee has the a u t h o r i t y t o issue a l l 
necessary orders or r e g u l a t i o n s to execute the a r t i c l e s of 
t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
29. The amendment of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n or any additions t o i t 
can be undertaken by the National Council of the P a l e s t i n i a n 
L i b e r a t i o n Organisation w i t h a m a j o r i t y of two t h i r d s . 
T r a n s i t i o n a l Provisions 
30. The N a t i o n a l Council which w i l l be held i n Cairo on 10th 
J u l y 1968 w i l l replace the previous t r a n s i t i o n a l Council of 
the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation and w i l l henceforth 
p r a c t i s e a l l the a u t h o r i t y given i t by t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
31. The mandate of the new National Council w i l l extend f o r two 
years from 10th J u l y I968. I f i t i s not possible t o hold 
e l e c t i o n s f o r the mem.bers of the subsequent Council, t h i s 
Council w i l l h old a meeting t o decide whether to extend 
i t s mandate.or t o form a new Council i n some other way. 
32. The Council, and only the Council, has the r i g h t t o add 
new members from time to tim.e i f necessary and according 
t o the needs, of the L i b e r a t i o n B a t t l e and the need t o deepen 
n a t i o n a l u n i t y . This w i l l be done i n the l i g h t of the 
a r t i c l e s of the N a t i o n a l Charter and i n accordance w i t h 
r e g u l a t i o n s which w i l l be issued by the Executive Committee 
i n the coming session. 
Source: An-Nitham al-Asasi li-Munthamah a t - T a h r i r a l - F a l a s t i n i v v a h 
Palestine L i b e r a t i o n Organisation. 
T r a n s l a t i o n by the author. 
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Table V 
Membership of the Palestine National Congresses and the PLO Executives 
Date Congress Membership 
Fourth Al-Fateh 
Congress As-Saiqah 50 
July 1968 PLO 
PFLP 
Individuals 50 
T O T A L 100 
Fifth Al-Fateh 33 
Congress As-Saiqah 12 
Feb. 1969 PFLP 12* 
PLO (Exec) 11 
PLA 5* 
Fund 1 
Unions 3 
Individuals 28 
T O T A L 105 
P L O Executive 
Shuqeiry's Old Executive now led by Yahya Hammouda was asked to 
continue for another six months. 
Name 
Faruq Qaddumi 
(Abu Lutf) 
Khalid Hassan 
(Abu Sayyid) 
Yasir Arafat 
(Abu Amar) 
Muhammad Najjar 
(Abu Yusuf) 
Yusuf Burji 
(Abu Issa) 
Ahmed Shehabi 
Kamal Nasir** 
Ibrahim Bakr** 
Hamid Abu Sittah 
'abdulMajidShuman 
Yasir Amr*" 
Organisation 
Fateh 
Fateh 
Fateh 
Fateh 
Salqah 
Salqah 
PLO 
PLO 
PLO 
PLO 
PLO 
Duties 
Popular Organisation 
Political Bureau 
President and Military 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
Occupied Palestine 
Finance 
unknown 
Sixth Al-Fateh 33 Faruq Qaddumi Fateh Popular Organisation 
Congress As-Saiqah 12 Khalid Hassan Fateh Political Bureau 
Sept. 1969 PFLP 12* Yasir Arafat Fateh President and Military 
PDF LP 8 Muhammad Najjar Fateh unknown 
PFLP-GC 3 Yusuf Burji Saiqah unknown 
PSF 2 Ahmed Shehabi Saiqah unknown 
APO 1 Kamal Nasir** PLO unknown 
Unions 5 Khalid Yashruti** PLO Finance 
Students 3 Dr. Hassan Khatib PLO unknown 
Women 2 Hamid Abu Sittah PLO Occupied Palestine 
Individuals 21 Balal Hassan PDF LP unknown 
T O T A L 112 
June 1970 New Central Committee 
Al-Fateh 
As-Saiqah 
PLO** * * 
PDF LP 
PFLP 
AO LP 
APO 
PSF 
ALF 
POLP 
PFLP-GC 
PNC (Pres) 
Jordanians 
T O T A L 
4 
2 7 
This Committee included the PLO Executive plus one representative of 
each organisations. These representatives were not permanent and 
indivkluals varied from meeting to meeting. 
* These groups boycotted the Congress. 
** Pro-Fateh. 
* • * Pro-Saiqah. 
• * • * Including two pro-Fateh. 
Sources: Arab Report and Record 
Arab World 
Keesings 
Fateh 
Interviews 
Newspapers in bibliography. 
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Table VI 
Signatories of Joint statement issued Febniaiy 1970 
Al-Fateh 
As-Saiqah 
PFLP 
PDFLP 
APO 
AGLP 
PFLP-GC 
ALF 
PSF 
PLFs : . 
General Union of Jordanian-Palestinian Women 
General Federation of Labour Trade Unions in Jordan 
Jordanian Communist Party 
General Uilion of Palestinian Women 
Arab Women's League 
General Union of Palestinian Workers 
Union of Medical Doctors 
. Union of Pharmacists 
Dentist's Union 
General Union of Palestinian Students 
Jordanian Student's Union 
Bar Association 
Engineers Union 
Agriculturists Union 
Save Jerusalem Committee (Suleiman Nabulsi) 
Sheikh Abdul Hamid Sayeh 
Ibrahim Bakr 
Ruhi al-Khatib 
Akif Fayez 
Dr. Daoud Husseini 
Kassem Rimawi 
Kamal Daiani 
Isaac Khatemdar 
Father lliya Khouiy 
Dr. Nabih Moammar 
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A Note on the Sources 
Many of the sources used f o r t h i s t hesis are unavoidably the 
subject of considerable bias. 
I n the case of the English-language sources the bias i s 
e i t h e r the r e s u l t of open h o s t i l i t y towards the Arab case i n 
general, or based upon considerations of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t . 
Open h o s t i l i t y f o r example, characterises the books by Pearlman, 
Schechtman, Laqueur and the ESCO Foundation. Whereas e s s e n t i a l l y 
B r i t i s h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the s i t u a t i o n are contained i n the 
books by Glubb, K i r k b r i d e and Marlovje, Dearden's book i s 
s t r o n g l y pro-Hashemite and Mogannam's book i s w r i t t e n from the 
po i n t of view of the Palestine Defence Party. 
I n the case of the Arabic sources, the bias i s of a d i f f e r e n t 
k i n d . N a t u r a l l y they a l l put forward the Arab case very s t r o n g l y , 
but i n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s some were w r i t t e n t o support a p a r t i c u l a r 
regime or p a r t y i n the inter-Arab disputes. The most notable 
i n t h i s respect i s the book by a t - T a l l which i s very a n t i -
Hashemite and was w r i t t e n while a t - T a l l was i n e x i l e i n the 
UAR. F o r t u n a t e l y , however, much of h i s case i s borne out by 
s t r i c t l y p r o - Z i o n i s t sources l i k e Syrkin's book on Golda Meir . 
and Eytan's book on I s r a e l ' s f i r s t ten years. 
These comments apply only to the secondary sources. Primary 
sources are, i n general, most valuable because of t h e i r bias, 
not i n s p i t e of i t . That i s t o say, p o l i t i c a l documents and 
pamphlets are u s e f u l because they show the opinion of one 
p a r t i c u l a r p a r t y or group. 
F i n a l l y , some explanation i s needed concerning the lack of 
any r e a l d e t a i l i n many of the inte r v i e w s c i t e d . These i n t e r -
views were conducted i n the midst o f an armed struggle. The 
Resistance movement f e l t i t s e l f i n constant danger not only 
from I s r a e l , but also from the so c a l l e d f r i e n d l y Arab govern-
ments. The d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the Resistance movement i t s e l f 
was another reason f o r caution. Thus interviews were only 
granted i n many cases under assurances of anonymity and i n 
conditions of great secrecy. Wherever possible, code names 
and o r g a n i s a t i o n are given. 
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